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Uncanny Belonging 
 Schelling, Freud and the Vertigo of Freedom 
Teresa Fenichel 
Dissertation Director: Professor Vanessa Rumble 
 
Abstract:  The aims of my dissertation are 1) to explicate what I take to be the 
philosophical foundations of Freudian psychoanalysis with the aid of Schelling’s 
contributions to the development of the unconscious and the nature of human freedom 
and 2) to make use of certain fundamental discoveries of psychoanalysis in order to 
reinterpret Schelling’s dynamic and developmental vision of reality.  My claim is that 
Schelling’s philosophy not only offers an important historical moment in the 
development of the psychoanalytic account of the unconscious, but also gives us a vision 
of human development—and indeed the development of Being as such—that is grounded 
in the unconscious and the activity of the drives. Where Freud is often viewed as a 
determinist, through a closer examination of the connections Schelling makes between 
the unconscious ground of existence and human freedom we can begin to open up the 
space for a more complex Freudian subjectivity. Furthermore, the advances Freud makes 
in terms of the structure of the unconscious, his work on the altered temporality (most 
notably Nachträglichkeit, or “afterwards-ness”) of trauma and repression, also serve to 
bring some of Schelling’s most abstract and speculative work to both a more practical 
and philosophically relevant level. In the work of both Schelling and Freud, the 
relationship between the human subject and the reality such a subject “confronts” is 
radically transformed. In Schelling, we find that the developmental phases of Being, of 
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the Absolute and of Nature are also manifested in the structure of human becoming; that 
is, the catastrophic divide between subjective experience and objective reality is bridged 
by reinterpreting both as dynamic processes.  Although Freud himself often has recourse 
to a more static view of “objective” reality, his work also speaks to a deep and disturbing 
revision of such a view. Indeed, Freud’s continued questioning of the boundaries between 
fantasy and reality, between the internal and the external, suggest that the irreducible 
otherness of the unconscious extends beyond the individual.   
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Introduction 
 
The Unconscious is in fact the real psychical, as unknown to us in terms of its inner nature as the 
reality of the outside world and as incompletely rendered to us by the data of consciousness as 
the outside world is rendered by the information supplied the sense organs—Freud, 
Interpretation of Dreams 
 
Man must be granted an essence outside and above the world; for how could he alone, of all 
creatures, retrace the long path of developments from the present back into the deepest night of 
the past, how could he alone rise up to the beginning of things unless there were in him an 
essence from the beginning of times? Drawn from the source of things and akin to it, what is 
eternal of the soul has a co-science/con-sciousness [Mitt-Wissenschaft] of creation—Schelling, 
Die Weltalter, 1813 
 
 
I received my first real introduction to psychoanalysis and philosophy at the New School 
for Social Research. I became interested in these subjects both independently and at their 
intersection, because I see them as offering possibilities for self-questioning—languages 
that could do justice to a textured reality, to an objectivity that can encompass desire, 
fantasy, freedom and the unconscious. Freud’s therapeutic methods and their ethical 
implications, namely that psychic health requires an empathetic engagement with the 
most radical alterity, suggested to me a way to think the kind of grounding instability that 
would anchor such a metaphysics of freedom.1 With the guidance and generosity of Alan 
Bass, author of book-length studies of Freud, Heidegger and Deconstruction, I completed 
                                                       
1 From very early on in his development of psychoanalysis, Freud insists that the “normal” is in no way 
qualitatively different from the “neurotic,” the “psychotic” or the “perverse.” Part of his project entails 
using his treatment of the pathological both to illustrate its encroachment into the normal and to show that 
psychic “health” can only be an interpretive recognition of unconscious desires and fears. Paraphrasing one 
of the theses of a late work, Civilization and its Discontents, insofar as we are civilized so too are we 
neurotic. And, as he writes in “The Uncanny” (1914), the work of psychoanalysis is akin to telepathic 
communication: “Indeed, I should not be surprised to hear that psychoanalysis, which is concerned with 
laying bare these hidden forces, has itself become uncanny to many people for that reason.  In one case, 
after I succeeded—though none too rapidly—in effecting a cure in a girl who had been an invalid for many 
years, I myself heard this view expressed by the patient’s mother after her long recovery” (SE Vol. XVII, p. 
243). 
 7 
an MA thesis focusing on the psychoanalytic contributions of Hans Loewald—an analyst 
and former student of Heidegger’s.2 I found in Loewald a critique of key Freudian 
assertions, clinical and metapsychological, that came from a genuine, philosophical 
appreciation.3 Concerned that psychoanalysis can be naïvely understood as relying upon a 
form of “objectivity” which would be exposed as a fantasy in the therapeutic situation, 
Loewald argued that Freud, at times, suffered from a “neurotic” sense of reality. In other 
words, Freud often retreated into a fundamentally antagonistic ontology—a distorted 
perspective he diagnosed in his neurotic patients—rather than following through with the 
much more radical and nuanced alternatives that psychoanalytic treatment depends upon: 
On three levels, then, the biological, the psychological and the cultural, 
psychoanalysis has taken for granted the neurotically distorted experience 
of reality. It has taken for granted the concept of a reality as it is 
experienced in a predominantly defensive integration of it. Stimulus, 
external world, and culture, all three on different levels of scientific 
approach, representative of what is called reality, have been understood 
unquestioningly as they are thought, felt, experienced within the 
framework of a hostile-defensive ego-reality integration. It is a concept of 
reality as it is most typically encountered in the obsessive character 
neurosis, a neurosis so common in our culture it has been called the 
normal neurosis (“Defense and Reality”, p. 30).4 
 
Freud could not see that the (sometimes implicit, sometimes explicit) assumption of a 
hostile relationship between the psyche on one side, and the pre-given world on the other, 
was a neurotic construction of his own making.5  
Like Loewald, I was dissatisfied with Freud’s strained insistence on the “scientific” 
status of psychoanalysis; I wanted to articulate a more radical worldview that 
                                                       
2 Alan Bass, Difference and Disavowal: The Trauma of Eros. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000). 
3 Teresa Fenichel, “Neurotic Being and Erotic Time: Philosophic Reflections on Hans Loewald’s 
Contributions to Psychoanalysis”. American Imago. Vol. 70 No. 4, Winter 2013, pp. 663-698. 
4 Hans Loewald, The Essential Loewald: Collected Papers and Monographs. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2000. Hereafter, TEL. 
5 “Hate, as a relation to objects, is older than love” (“Drives and their Fates,” SE Vol. XIV, p. 137). 
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psychoanalysis seems to demand, but that also seems to threaten the very foundations of 
the system. For my part, I considered Freud’s reading of the uncanny and telepathy as 
focal points for such a questioning, and thus situated myself in the same territory that so 
attracted Jacques Derrida.6 If Loewald offered insight into the therapeutic consequences 
of a more philosophically robust theory, Derrida helped me work toward a philosophical 
formulation of the therapeutic situation.  
It was not until I began studying Schelling and German Idealism at Boston College, 
however, that I became interested in the metaphysical thinking that laid the groundwork 
for Freud’s therapeutic project. As Professors Bloechl, Kearney, Lawrence, Rumble and 
Sallis helped bring to my attention, these post-Kantian philosophers, situated at the 
interstices of science and subjectivity, were in fact the very well-spring of the intellectual 
tradition from which, and within which, Freud was able to formulate his own project.7 In 
a sort of shock of recognition, I recalled that in the short paper at the center of my thesis 
work—“The Uncanny”—Freud had already pointed the way: it is Schelling’s definition 
of the uncanny that he uses.8 And there were broader similarities: Schelling, like Freud, 
has been dismissed from mainstream, academic philosophy for his false claims to 
rigorous, scientific thinking; and this, in no small part, is due to the role of the 
unconscious in his system. Indeed, it was partly in response to the shadow of Schelling’s 
                                                       
6 See in particular: “Telepathy” in Psyche: Inventions of the Other Vol. 1, pp. 226-261. Eds. Peggy Kamuf 
and Elizabeth Rottenberg. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007.  
7 See in particular: John Sallis’s essay, “The Logic and Illogic of the Dream-Work,” pp. 1-16 in John Mills, 
Rereading Freud: Psychoanalysis Through Philosophy, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
2004) and The Gathering of Reason: 2nd Edition, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005).  
See also: Richard Kearney, On Stories, (London: Routledge, 2002) and Joe Lawrence, Schellings 
Philosophie des ewigen Anfangs, (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1989). I have Vanessa Rumble, 
Joe Lawrence, Jeff Bloechl and Richard Kearney to thank for countless wonderful conversations as well as 
access to published and unpublished writings alike, including Lawrence’s essay “Philosophical Religion 
and the Quest for Authenticity” in Jason M. Worth, Schelling Now: Contemporary Readings, 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005).  
8 Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XVII, pp. 217-256. 
Hereafter, cited as SE. 
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once-pervasive Naturphilosophie—and to its consequently being shunned as mysticism—
that Freud so rabidly defended psychoanalysis as a system of psychic determinism.9 And 
yet at the same time, in seeking to reinterpret the human through the reality and potency 
of the mythological, Freud does carry on Schelling’s understanding of myth as the 
privileged site of and access to a truth that exceeds the logic and order of consciousness.10 
It should not be a surprise that it is within a text he calls aesthetic —“The Uncanny”—
that Freud invokes Schelling; that the uncanny convergence of fate and omnipotence, 
which I argue is the domain of freedom, can be most adequately addressed as feeling.11 
It is in the philosophical weight they give to human desire and emotion that Schelling 
and Freud most decidedly converge: drive [Trieb]—the border between the physiological 
                                                       
9 It is also worth noting that some of Freud’s most fundamental concepts—the constancy principle, for 
example—derive from inheritors of and contributors to the Naturphilosophie movement, like Gustav 
Fechner. This only adds to the sense that Freud is at pains to make a place for psychoanalysis as science, at 
times at the expense of fully admitting both the precedents and consequences of his work.  
10 See Denis Schmidt’s brief discussion of Schelling’s account of the tragic coming to fruition in Freud in 
On Germans and Other Greeks: Tragedy and Ethical Life: “The ultimate outcome of this modern emphasis 
on the issue of subjectivity in connection with the dynamics of tragedy is most clearly expressed in Freud’s 
theory of psychological complexes. It is not by accident that when Freud chooses to name the complexes 
which forge and shape the development of the self, he names these forces after figures in ancient Greek 
tragic drama. Freud could not use figures from Shakespearean tragedy as models to exemplify such 
dynamics because those characters are already too clearly defined as psychological types and by forces too 
obviously directed at the specific subjectivity of the characters. Since the hiddenness of the complex 
belongs to its basic nature, those characters so profoundly alert to their own subjective life, cannot serve as 
models for such unconscious complexes. In the final analysis, Freud’s theory of complexes needs to be 
seen as the final consolidation of this modern shift in the presentation of tragedy. It is the ultimate 
destination of the specifically modern experience of tragedy. It is also the point at which the specifically 
ancient Greek character of the experience of tragedy is most obscured” (p. 79). 
11 I only recently discovered, and have not seen it mentioned elsewhere in the literature, that the only other 
text in which Freud mentions Schelling (and his “followers”) is in the first chapter of Interpretation of 
Dreams: “Quite apart from all the pietistic and mystical writers—who do right to occupy the remains of the 
once extensive realm of the supernatural, as long as it has not been conquered by scientific explanation—
we also encounter clear-sighted men averse to the fantastic who use this very inexplicability of the 
phenomena of dreams in their endeavors to support their religious belief in the existence and intervention 
of superhuman powers. The high value accorded to the dream-life by many schools of philosophy, for 
example, by Schelling’s* followers [Naturphilosophie], is a distinct echo of the undisputed divinity 
accorded to dreams in antiquity; and the divinatory, future-predicting power of dreams remains under 
discussion because the attempts at a psychological explanation are not adequate to cope with all the 
material gathered, however firmly the feelings of anyone devoted to the scientific mode of thought might 
be inclined to reject such a notion” (SE IV, p. 5). It is worth noting that, in this brief reference, Freud 
connects Schelling with both occultism and “clear-sighted” scientific explanation—thus occupying the 
same territory that Freud himself seeks to lay claim to in his “scientific” explanation of the dream work that 
follows.  
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and psychological—is the most basic unit of reality, structuring our psychic experience as 
well as the world we encounter. Although a theory of drives is implicit even in 
Schelling’s earliest works, it is his development of the concept in his middle and late 
texts that I focus on here. As with Freud, it is when the dualistic system approaches 
cosmological aspirations that Schelling’s drives collapse under the artifice of their 
rationality:  
It is God’s will to universalize everything, to lift it to unity with light or to 
preserve it therein; but the will of the deep is to particularize everything or 
to make it creature-like. It wishes differentiation only so that identity may 
become evident to itself and to the will of the deep. Therefore it 
necessarily reacts against freedom as against what is above the creature, 
and awakens in it the desire for what is creature—just as he who is seized 
by dizziness on a high and precipitous summit seems to hear a mysterious 
voice calling to him to plunge down, or as in the ancient tale, the 
irresistible song of the sirens sounded out of the deep to draw the passing 
mariner down into the whirlpool (Philosophical Inquiries into the Essence 
of Human Freedom, pp. 58-59/Sämmtliche Werke Vol. VII, 381).12 
 
It is the essential liminality of the drive—where manifest opposition conceals an 
originary, dizzying ambivalence—that is the culmination/disintegration of both 
Schelling’s and Freud’s drive theories. The drive is at its core unconscious desire, 
whether understood most fundamentally as wish (Freud) or as will (Schelling), and as 
such represents the simultaneous unity and differentiation—the motivating conflict—of a 
(desiring) subject and the (desired) object. As Schelling notes in the Weltalter, primal 
desire—the will in its struggle to return to and reclaim itself—is the root of being. As a 
working out or progression of desire, the psychical is always already infused by the 
bodily, and creation as such is reconfigured as generation: “The whole is thus a spiritual-
                                                       
12 F.W.J. Schelling, Philosophical Inquiries into the Essence of Human Freedom. Trans. James Gutmann. 
LaSalle: Open Court, 1992. Hereafter this will be cited as FS (Freiheitsschrift) and I will use the pagination 
from Schelling’s Sämmtliche Werke Vol. VII, hereafter denoted by SW which is also given in the former. 
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corporeal essence, and even at this early stage, the spiritual and the corporeal find 
themselves to be the two sides of one and the same existence” (p. 148). Truth is not 
obscured by desire, but rather emerges from it: Schelling’s aesthetic claims are no mere 
corollary to his metaphysics of freedom, but its very foundation.13 
The connection between desire and truth in Schelling, the way they disrupt and define 
each other, is perhaps most evident in the call springing forth from his Weltalter:  
Perhaps he will yet come, who will sing the great heroic poem, 
encompassing in spirit (as is reputed of the seers from times gone by) what 
was, what is, and what will be. But this time is not yet at hand. As its 
harbingers, we do not wish to pluck its fruit before it is ripe, nor do we 
wish to misjudge our own. This is still a time of struggle (Ages of the 
World 1813, pp. 119-120).14 
 
The aim of philosophy, Schelling suggests, is not to overcome the illusions of art—it is 
not an antidote to the fantasies and deceptions endemic to the human. Rather, philosophy 
must be devoted to maintaining a connection—one we are always, it seems, in danger of 
losing—to the desiring, ecstatic pulse of existence. Schelling’s interest in the 
philosophical “seer,” the “great heroic poem” he will produce, does not imply that the 
“time of struggle” should one day cease; the unity of time is not some universal, 
redemptive event, as we will see, but an ever-present possibility—lost and gained—that 
is the life of a free subject. Schelling’s task in the Weltalter, as in the Freiheitsschrift, is 
to develop a form of philosophy that can serve as an expression of and impetus to this 
horrific (abyssal), beautiful (infinite) possibility. The mutual dependence of love and evil, 
which he derives from the ultimate inseparability of ontological drives towards otherness 
                                                       
13 F.W.J Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, trans. Douglas Stott (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1989). 
14 F.W.J. Schelling and Slavoj Zizek, The Abyss of Freedom: Ages of the World (2nd draft, 1813). Trans. 
Judith Norman. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2000). Hereafter, unless otherwise cited, 
this will be the draft cited as AW. 
 12 
and egoity, suggests the extent to which the creations and permutations of human desire 
inform even Schelling’s most abstract thinking.  
Within psychoanalysis, it might seem that the drives serve to rectify the superficial 
irrationality of symptoms and dreams; that their underlying logic is the key to “decoding” 
the truth. I would argue, however, that this is a dangerously facile reading; the drives, as 
Freud repeatedly points out, are unknowable in themselves, a useful linguistic fiction that 
can help us interpret and recalibrate the meaning of our experience. As I intend to show, 
Freud’s dependence on a paradigm of conflict—torn between the wish and our fear of its 
accomplishment—is undercut by his insistence on an essentially ambivalent and eternal 
unconscious. For Freud, and this supports my point, there are almost as many iterations 
of drive theory as there are texts—from the dualism of sexual and self-preservation drives 
in Studies on Hysteria, to the antagonism of Eros and Thanatos in Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle.15 As with Schelling, it is this latter drive theory that I focus on, where the 
duality of the drives (and the stable identities such duality depends upon) becomes 
questionable. If Freud is commonly understood as a determinist, such a reading is surely 
belied by a system predicated on the strange interdependence and in-between status of 
unconscious drives. That is, in the confused convergence/antagonism of Eros and 
Thanatos that disrupts the very narrative of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud recalls 
the essential distinction between drives and mechanical forces. In contrast to instinct 
[Instinkt], drives are the fundamental components of psychical reality, of the inchoate 
beginnings from which the oppositions between the body and the mind can emerge. In 
one among many revealing admissions concerning the provisional status of drives in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle, an intrusion of self-doubt that speaks not only to the 
                                                       
15 Sigmund Freud, Studies on Hysteria. SE Vol. II, pp. 1-323. 
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subject at hand but to the philosophical underpinnings of psychoanalysis more generally, 
Freud writes:  
In judging our speculation about the life and death drives, we would not be 
much disturbed by the fact that so many strange and unclear processes 
occur in them, e.g., one drive may be driven out by others, or may turn 
from the ego to the object, and so on. This is merely a result of the fact 
that we are obliged to work with scientific terminology, i.e., with our own 
figurative language, that of psychology (or more correctly: depth 
psychology). Otherwise, we would be completely unable to describe the 
processes in question; indeed, we would not even have noticed them. The 
deficiencies of our description would probably disappear, were we already 
able to invoke physiological or chemical terms in lieu of psychological 
ones. Admittedly, those terms too belong merely to figurative language—
but one long familiar to us and perhaps simpler as well (p. 96/SE Vol. 
XVIII, p. 60, my italics).16 
 
Even, or perhaps especially, in dealing with what we might call the atomic theory of 
psychoanalysis, Freud is torn between aesthetic and scientific truth. Language—whether 
chemical or psychoanalytic—is not a tool separable from the object it discloses, adequate 
or not to the truth it claims to reproduce; rather, as Freud is uniquely aware, language is 
most fundamentally the capacity to shape the truth, or to make certain kinds of truth 
available to us. Freud’s drive language, with its emphasis on antagonism, is world-
disclosing in this way. But it is no accident that Freud draws our attention to the 
limitations of language in the same text where the drives begin to take on the aspect of 
cosmic principles. In the end, Freud’s dualism succeeds (which is to say, is over-turned) 
in revealing, anew, an originary plasticity and ambivalence that distinguishes the realm of 
the psychical and motivates each new theory of the drives. It is the irrepressible creativity 
and resistance of the drives, along with his determination to compulsively order their 
                                                       
16 Sigmund Freud and Todd Defresne, Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Toronto: broadview editions, 2011. 
Hereafter, reference will be to this edition, cited as BPP with reference also to page numbers from SE Vol. 
XVIII. 
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conflicts and expressions, that leads Freud to speculate on language and structures of 
representation—not the other way round. As the primary components of the unconscious, 
the drives must be essential to developing an account of freedom in psychoanalysis—a 
freedom indelibly marked by its connection to this nexus of feeling and symbolization.  
It is this concern with freedom, particularly in its relation to this fundamental 
aesthetics I will consider, that was lacking in Loewald’s and Derrida’s readings of Freud. 
Their elaborations of Freud’s psychic reality are untethered from the existential concerns 
they set out to transform. Though very much in line with their calls for psychoanalysis to 
acknowledge the reality of the unconscious, the temporal or causal repercussions are 
never fully dealt with:17 Is there a space for freedom in psychoanalysis? And if so, how 
might this transform philosophical approaches to freedom? Through my focus on the 
uncanny as the possible site of freedom in psychoanalytic practice and theory, I found 
that Schelling’s middle and late texts offered insights into the understanding of the 
unconscious and of temporality that are essential to developing such a framework. 
Moreover, I began to understand Schelling’s later works as themselves metaphysical and 
ethical elaborations of a fundamentally therapeutic system: a theory of freedom 
inextricably bound to its practical realization.  
Before long, I discovered a sub-set of Schelling scholars that attend to the resonances 
between his philosophy and psychoanalysis (and an even smaller group of psychoanalysts 
that tackle Schelling); while I will deal with some of these contributions in the 
introduction, and several at greater length in the body of the dissertation, I briefly put 
                                                       
17 See: Derrida’s “Telepathy” and Loewald’s “The Experience of Time” in The Essential Loewald: 
Collected Papers and Monographs, pp. 138-147.  
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forth my own reading of Freud to highlight the psychoanalytic themes that will 
distinguish my approach to reading Schelling.  
 
1. Uncanny Freud 
 
Freud, citing Schelling, writes “unheimlich is the name for everything which ought to 
have remained…hidden and secret but has become visible” (SE Vol. XVII, p. 224).18  
This is the definition to which Freud returns after a long discussion of various 
etymologies. Importantly for Freud, the word “unheimlich” is itself ambiguous, 
suggesting both intimate knowledge and uncomfortable mystery—at-home-ness and not-
at-home-ness: “Thus heimlich is a word the meaning of which develops towards an 
ambivalence, until it finally coincides with its opposite, unheimlich.  Unheimlich is in 
some way or other a sub-species of heimlich” (p. 225). The word, divided in itself, 
simultaneously signals the ambiguity of alienation and absorption: it enacts the “un-
homely home” that marks the dual anxieties of life.  The possibility of going “home,” of 
return, is precluded by the language that pronounces this desire. It is not unimportant, 
then, that Freud’s analysis of the uncanny centers on literature; although he is careful to 
point out that he uses aesthetic here in its widest sense, encompassing both feeling and 
art, it is our experience with literature that Freud focuses on.19 His analysis is thus not 
                                                       
18 In the original version of the essay Freud attributes the definition to Schleiermacher instead of Schelling 
(Beach, 289). 
19 It is perhaps worth noting here that Lacan sees Freud’s “The Uncanny” as the most important reflection 
on anxiety, which he deals with in Seminar X. Thus, in part, the “psychoanalytic import” of the uncanny 
has much to do with what can be discovered about anxiety more generally. As Roberto Harari writes in 
Lacan’s Seminar on “Anxiety”: An Introduction, “The key text in understanding anxiety in its various 
manifestations is simply ‘The Uncanny,’ as Lacan points out so well…As we have written elsewhere, do 
not expect Freud to show up for an appointment if it is to take place in a conventionally defined place. One 
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only concerned with the feeling of the uncanny, but also and in no small part with the 
manner in which we must be affected in and by artistic creations: 
The story-teller has this license among many others, that he can select his 
world of representation so that it either coincides with the realities we are 
familiar with or departs from them in what particulars he pleases…The 
situation is altered as soon as the writer pretends to move in the world of 
common reality. In this case he accepts all the conditions operating to 
producing uncanny feelings in real life…He takes advantage, as it were, of our 
supposedly surmounted superstitiousness; he deceives us into thinking that he 
is giving us the sober truth, and then after all oversteps the bounds of 
possibility. We react to his inventions as we should have reacted to real 
experiences (pp. 249-250). 
 
Freud comes close here to recognizing that there is an element of deceit at the heart of 
our experience of art or of language more generally: the same deception that gives rise to 
our feeling of the uncanny. This suspension of the boundaries between truth and fantasy 
evoked by the artist, the presentation of reality as unreality and vice versa, is itself a 
repetition of the real, permeable limits characterizing a more primitive interaction with 
reality. The infantile relationship between ego and world that returns to us in the feeling 
of the uncanny is one of imaginary omnipotence and authentic helplessness—the anxiety 
which emerges from this ambiguity marks a space in which we may feel ourselves both 
absolutely guilty (our thoughts become reality, we control nature) and entirely passive 
(subject to fate, victims of determinism, etc.): in Schellingian terms, we have either 
renounced freedom in choosing evil (a separation from and presumed control over nature) 
                                                       
has to proceed very cautiously with Freud because when we believe that the texts will provide answers we 
expect they do not; they go to unexpected, unforeseen places” (p. 63). See also: The Seminar of Jacques 
Lacan: Anxiety 1962-1963 Book X, trans. Cormac Gallagher (from unedited French manuscripts). 
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or do not yet belong to freedom at all (a naïve absorption in things that allows for no 
reflection). 20  As Schelling puts it in the Freiheitsschrift,  
So the beginning of sin consists in man’s going over from being to non-being, from 
truth to falsehood, from light into darkness, in order himself to become the creative 
basis and to rule over all things with the power of the center which he contains…In 
evil there is that contradiction which devours and always negates itself, which just 
while striving to become creature destroys the nexus of creation and, in its ambition 
to be everything, falls into non-being (SW, p. 390). 
 
It turns out that one of the consequences of accepting the Freudian unconscious is that we 
do not and cannot know the extent of our freedom or our guilt. Rather, we feel 
uncanniness: we feel freedom as it escapes us, as loss—which is, perhaps, the only way to 
feel freedom at all. 
The uncanny is the effect of a certain form of repetition, an experience that brings into 
relief past and future in their fundamental resistance to presence: our ordinary sense of 
history and possibility as modes of presence gives way to a feeling of their 
disruptiveness. In a reading that at points coincides with the work of Hans Loewald, 
Jacques Derrida and Julia Kristeva, I argue that via the uncanny Freud finds a place for 
experiences of subjectivity—projection, identification and omnipotence of thought—
which are at work in and constitutive of reality at higher levels of organization. The aim 
                                                       
20 This dynamic of union with and separation from Nature, particularly as evidenced through art, is also 
evident in Schiller’s On Naïve and Sentimental Poetry: “How is it that we are so infinitely surpassed by the 
ancients in everything that is natural, and yet at precisely this point we are able to revere nature to a higher 
degree, to cling to it more intimately, and to embrace even the inanimate world with the tenderest feelings? 
This is so because nature has disappeared from our humanity, and we reencounter it in its genuineness only 
outside of humanity in the inanimate world. Not our greater naturalness but the very opposite, the 
unnaturalness of our relationships, conditions, and mores forces us to fashion a satisfaction in the physical 
world that is not to be hoped for in the moral world. This is the satisfaction of that awakening urge for truth 
and simplicity that lies, like the moral predisposition from which it flows, in all human hearts as something 
indestructible and ineradicable…This road taken by the modern poets is, moreover, the same road human 
beings in general must travel, both as individuals and as a whole. Nature makes a human being one with 
himself, art separates and divides him; by means of the ideal he returns to the unity. Yet because the ideal 
is an infinite one that he never reaches, the cultured human being in his way can never become complete as 
the natural human being can be in his way” (my italics p. 194, p. 202).  
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of Freudian therapy is to remain available to these relationships rather than to overcome 
them. 
In focusing on Freud’s work on telepathy and the uncanny we see specific ways in 
which reality must encompass more primitive ego-reality experience; further, that this 
integration must be dynamic, without limiting itself to the kind of static explanation that 
distances psychoanalysis from the very subject it must always transform and disturb.  
Indeed, there seems to be something about the nature of occult phenomena that tempts 
Freud to perform such a distancing.21 I would like to suggest that it is freedom (in its 
relation to the determined) that Freud finds so threatening to psychoanalysis, leading him 
to this rhetorical and methodical separation from the subjects of telepathy and the 
uncanny even as he feels himself compelled to approach them. Freud’s repeated efforts to 
differentiate psychoanalysis from the occult arts are always also possibilities for an 
acknowledgement of the indestructible, primary reality that Freud discloses just as he 
conceals it from us. Though earlier than his three main works on telepathy, “The 
Uncanny” also deals with what we might call a “border region;”22 the uncanny is on the 
“border” insofar as Freud locates it on the fringe of psychoanalysis and, more 
importantly, the uncanny is a “border,” an experience that returns us to earlier ego-reality 
experience, that both shapes and reflects the inherently unstable connection between 
                                                       
21 Equally, as we see particularly in The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud is always ready to point out how 
psychoanalysis comes to the defense of folk wisdom against science and intellectualism: “As we have seen, 
the scientific theories of dreams leave no room for any problem of interpreting them, since in their view a 
dream is not a mental act at all...Lay opinion has taken a different attitude throughout the ages.  It has 
exercised its indefeasible right to behave inconsistently; and though admitting that dreams are unintelligible 
and absurd, it cannot bring itself to declare that they have no significance at all.  Led by some obscure 
feeling, it seems to assume that, in spite of everything, every dream has a meaning, though a hidden one, 
that dreams are designed to take the place of some other process of thought, and that we have only to undo 
the substitution correctly in order to arrive at this hidden meaning (SE Vol. IV, p.128).” 
22 See: “Psychoanalysis and Telepathy” (SE Vol. XVIII, pp. 173-193); “Dreams and Telepathy” (SE Vol. 
XVIII, pp. 195-220); “Dreams and Occultism” (SE Vol. XXII, pp. 31-56).  
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inner and outer, fantasy and reality.23 In Strangers to Ourselves, Julia Kristeva also 
argues that the uncanny is a “border” experience and, further, one that might lead the way 
not only to an ethics of psychoanalysis, but also to a politics:  
Confronting the foreigner whom I reject and with whom at the same time I 
identify, I lose my boundaries, I no longer have a container, the memory 
of experiences when I had been abandoned overwhelm me, I lose my 
composure. I feel ‘lost,’ ‘indistinct,’ ‘hazy.’ The uncanny strangeness 
allows for many variations: they all repeat the difficulty I have in situating 
myself with respect to the other and keep going over the course of 
identification-projection that lies at the foundation of my reaching 
autonomy (p. 187).24  
 
At times, my reading of the Freudian uncanny converges with Kristeva’s, particularly in 
terms of the positive possibilities of dissolving subject/object boundaries. And although 
Kristeva gives no real philosophical account of the structure of freedom in her text, she 
does gesture towards the deep connection between an ethics of the uncanny and the 
matrix of death, drive and the feminine in ways that would support, to anticipate the work 
of the next section, a Schellingian reading of Freud:  
The death and the feminine, the end and the beginning that engross and 
compose us only to frighten us when they break through...Such malevolent 
powers would amount to a weaving together of the symbolic and the 
organic—perhaps drive itself, on the border of the psyche and biology, 
overriding the breaking imposed by organic homeostasis (p. 185). 
  
Kristeva’s intuitions concerning the fundamental transitionality of the uncanny suggests a 
way to ground human community in something other than and indeed prior to the law. 
Whereas Kristeva limits herself in this text to an imagining of the uncanny that would 
                                                       
23 The subjects of the uncanny and telepathy—insofar as they both illuminate and deconstruct the defensive 
oppositions of reality and fantasy, internal and external, present and absent—are inherently related to the 
kind of porous, transitional reality that Loewald sets up in contrast to “neurotic” reality. 
24 Julia Kristeva, Strangers To Ourselves. Trans., Leon S. Roudiez, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1991). 
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only act as a blueprint for a cosmopolitanism of foreignness without giving much 
attention to its metaphysical grounds or consequences, it is the essence of my project to 
illustrate the ways in which an ontology of the uncanny must be bound up with a radical 
rethinking of freedom and the therapeutic. To this purpose, I will turn to another of her 
texts in the course of this dissertation, Powers of Horror, which while dealing less 
explicitly with the uncanny is more relevant to my work here:  
It is no longer I who expel, “I” is expelled… Deprived of world, therefore, 
I fall in a faint. In that compelling, raw, insolent thing in the morgue’s full 
sunlight, in that thing that no longer matches and therefore no longer 
signifies anything, I behold the breaking down of a world that has erased 
its borders: fainting away. The corpse, seen without God and outside of 
science, is the utmost of abjection. It is death infecting life. Abject. It is 
something rejected from which one does not part, from which one does 
not protect oneself as from an object. Imaginary uncanniness and real 
threat, it beckons us and ends up engulfing us (pp. 231-232).25 
 
It is Kristeva’s notion of the abject as the peculiar, even devastating site of the 
transitional, that I will take up as an essential and fruitful point of contact between 
Schelling’s philosophy and Freudian psychoanalysis. 
It is the far-reaching repercussions of the uncanny, its inevitable drawing together of 
the metaphysical, the epistemological and the ethical, that motivates Freud’s peculiar 
approach. As he does with telepathy, Freud begins his paper on the uncanny by 
distinguishing between his intended subject and the more traditional material of 
psychoanalytic work. Specifically, he wants to make sure that psychoanalysis not be 
confused with aesthetics—art, no less than the occult, is shamelessly unscientific: 
It is only rarely that a psycho-analyst feels impelled to investigate the 
study of aesthetics…But it does occasionally happen that he has to interest 
himself in some particular province of that subject; and this project usually 
                                                       
25 Kelly Oliver, The Portable Kristeva, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). 
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proves to be a rather remote one, and one which has been neglected in the 
specialist literature of aesthetics (p. 219). 
 
And it is not only in this introductory excuse for the subject matter that Freud’s language 
suggests his work on telepathy—we also have a foretaste of Freud’s later, and repeated, 
denials of any personal experience with the occult. At the same moment that Freud 
despairs of his own lack of uncanny experiences, he also performs the role of the 
medium: 
The writer of the present contribution, indeed, must himself plead guilty to 
a special obtuseness in the matter, where extreme delicacy of perception 
would be more in place.  It is long since he has experienced or heard 
anything which has given him an uncanny impression, and he must start 
by translating himself into that state of feeling, by awakening in himself 
the possibility of experiencing it (p. 220). 
 
He is calling up his own double, long ago and far from the Freud he is now.26 Where else 
do we find Freud so self-consciously summoning a “feeling” in order to better serve his 
“science”, while at the same time dissociating himself from it?27 As Freud wills himself 
to be literally possessed, we see again the rhetorical distancing that is so pervasive in the 
                                                       
26 We might compare this attempt by Freud to Loewald’s view of ego-reality development, where progress 
requires a “sinking back” into more primitive relationships with the world: “In fact, it would seem that the 
more alive people are (though not necessarily more stable), the broader their range of ego-reality levels is. 
Perhaps the so-called fully developed, mature ego is not one that has become fixated at the presumably 
highest or latest stage of development, having left the others behind it, but is an ego that integrates its 
reality in such a way that the earlier and deeper levels of ego-reality integration remain alive as dynamic 
sources of higher organization” (TEL, p. 20)  
27 Interestingly, Loewald points out that in fact Freud faces a similar difficulty “translating himself into a 
feeling” when he considers the nature of primary narcissism and its relation to religious feeling.  I would 
argue that this inability to locate the “oceanic feeling” in himself is very much related to Freud’s claims to 
be poor in experiences of uncanny and telepathic nature, both dealing with Eros and its relationship to 
primary narcissism.  It is precisely the possibility of giving up static, deterministic reality, and in doing so 
acknowledging reality that necessarily encompasses fantasy and more primitive ego-reality experiences, 
that draws Freud to the uncanny and telepathy and simultaneously forces him to hesitate and step back. 
Loewald cites Freud from Civilization and its Discontents and goes on: “Freud continues that he cannot 
discover this oceanic feeling in himself and that for this and other reasons he can approach this subject 
only with misgivings and hesitations (TEL, p.568, my italics).” 
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telepathy papers, which are written in the third person.28 Just as he does in the telepathy 
papers, Freud eventually concedes his own “uncanny” experience—in the former with his 
own dreams and the “Forsythe Saga,” and in the latter with his account of circling around 
a foreign town, always ending up, seemingly, where he started.29 
It is this “seemingly” that must really be at issue for us here; as Derrida indicates in 
his reading of Freud in “Telepathy,” Freud’s approach to the uncanny and telepathy is 
evidence of his ambivalence over the nature of reality—both recognizing and refusing 
that his contributions in these areas demand a rethinking of the division between 
“material” and “virtual” reality that psychoanalysis uniquely calls into question.  Derrida, 
posing as Freud’s uncanny double, writes: 
An annunciation can be accomplished, something can happen without for 
all that being realized.  An event can take place that is not real.  My 
customary distinction between internal and external reality is perhaps not 
sufficient here.  It signals toward some event that no idea of “reality” helps 
us think…So the telepathic annunciation / has come true even if / it is not 
itself in external reality, that is the hypothesis that I offer to be read at the 
very moment I foreclose it on the surface of my text (p. 248).30 
 
The question of what would count as a truly telepathic event—what counts as real—
arises silently and urgently.  Further on, again as Freud, he writes that “I have never been 
in a position to witness or take part in, miterleben, a dream that is truly, precisely, 
‘correctly’ telepathic… (p. 249).”  And in Freud’s own words:  
                                                       
28 See note 21. 
29 The passage from “The Uncanny” is mirrored in “Psycho-Analysis and Telepathy”: “My own life, as I 
have already openly admitted, has been particularly poor in an occult sense (SE Vol. XVIII, p.193).”  The 
language in the passage quoted suggests that Freud is somehow forced, despite his resistance, to venture 
into this material: “But it does occasionally happen that he has to interest himself…” In his first paper on 
telepathy Freud makes a similar suggestion that he does not want to discuss this material, but must:  “It no 
longer seems possible to keep away from the study of what are known as ‘occult’ phenomena…(SE Vol. 
XVIII, p.177, my emphasis).”  
30 Jacques Derrida, “Telepathy” in Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Volume I, pp. 226-261 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2007). 
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But I have never had a ‘telepathic’ dream.  Not that I have been without 
dreams of the kind that convey the impression that a certain definite event 
is happening at some distant place, leaving it to the dreamer to decide 
whether the event is happening at that moment or will do so at some later 
time.  In waking life, too, I have often become aware of presentiments of 
distant events.  But these hints, foretellings and premonitions have none of 
them ‘come true,’ as we say; there proved to be no external reality 
corresponding to them, and they had therefore to be regarded as purely 
subjective anticipations (SE Vol. XVIII, p.197).      
 
Freud forces us to consider what it means for an event to “come true”.  Once again, he 
simultaneously falls back into the simple distinction between “external reality” and 
“subjective anticipations” even as he “offers to be read” the more complicated reality that 
psychoanalysis reveals: 
We must add, however, that no one has a right to take exception to 
telepathic occurrences if the event and the intimation (or message) do not 
exactly coincide in astronomical time…The laws of unconscious mental 
life may then be taken for granted as applying to telepathy (p. 219).  
 
He has never had a truly telepathic dream—but now he suggests that there are other ways 
for dreams to ‘come true’.  Freud reminds us—and perhaps he himself has forgotten—
that it is the distinctly other temporality and logic of the unconscious that psychoanalysis 
is concerned with: the traces of its irreducible alterity compel us to reconsider what it is 
for something to be real, to open ourselves to a truth that goes beyond the 
correspondence of internal and external presence.   
Through Freud’s work on telepathy, psychoanalysis reveals its simultaneous 
assumption and rejection of a reality detached from fantasy. Despite his claims to the 
contrary, Freud does make progress: a strange, circular motion, where “bare” reality 
comes to signify the end goal of psychoanalytic treatment, while the fantastic 
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impossibility of such a reality remains its foundational discovery. In “The Uncanny,” 
Freud immediately rejects the notion that the uncanny experience is a form of 
“intellectual insecurity;” he explicitly places his project in this essay beyond the realm of 
knowledge, though the question of knowing and what is knowable plays a crucial role 
here.  What we have the opportunity to see in these works is not so much a movement 
away from psychoanalysis as science, but rather toward a psychoanalytic view of reality 
that allows for an expansion of what counts as science—what counts as real.31  
In “The Uncanny,” Freud is obviously much less concerned than in the telepathy 
papers that his work will threaten the tenuous link between traditional science and 
psychoanalysis, or call into question the supposition of an objective reality that is always 
already there. And yet, his work on the uncanny is surely a movement in this direction, 
echoing Freud’s earlier, defining step in giving up the distinction between “real” 
seduction and fantasy.32 In his treatment of the uncanny, Freud recalls the fluidity of the 
boundary, creating an undecidable space between science and fiction within which he 
                                                       
31 Freud himself is aware, at least at some points, that there is an important reciprocity between the 
discoveries of psychoanalysis and revolutionary changes occurring in the sciences during his time.  In 
“Psychoanalysis and Telepathy” he writes: “The discovery of radium has confused no less than it has 
advanced the possibilities of explaining the physical world; and the knowledge that has been so very 
recently acquired of what is called the theory of relativity has had the effect upon many of those who 
admire without comprehending it of diminishing their belief in the objective trustworthiness of science 
(p.178).” 
32 Freud goes back and forth on the “reality” of the primal scene, for instance, as he writes in his case 
history of the Wolf Man: “If neurotics are endowed with the evil characteristic of diverting their interest 
from the present and of attaching it to these regressive substitutes, the products of their imagination, then 
there is absolutely nothing for it but to follow upon their tracks and bring these unconscious productions 
into consciousness; for, if we disregard their objective unimportance, they are of the utmost importance 
from our point of view…the analysis would have to run the precisely the same course as one which had a 
naïf faith in the truth of the phantasies.  The difference would only come at the end of the analysis, after the 
phantasies had been laid bare.  We should then say to the patient: ‘Very well, then; your neurosis proceeded 
as though you had received these impressions and spun them out in your childhood (SE Vol. XVII, pp. 49-
50).’”  He goes on later in the same essay: “Let us assume as an uncontradicted premise that a primal scene 
of this kind has been correctly evolved technically, that it is indispensible to a comprehensive solution of 
all the conundrums that are set us by the symptoms of the infantile disorder, that all the consequences 
radiate out from it, just as all the threads of the analysis have led up to it.  Then, in view of its content, it is 
impossible that it can be anything else than a reproduction of a reality experienced by the child (p. 55).” 
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will never be entirely comfortable.33 The source of this feeling is a return of the 
repressed, an eerie reminder of unconscious, infantile wishes/fantasies that evokes a more 
primitive, permeable ego-reality situation. For Freud, it is psychoanalysis itself that 
allows us insight into that which is so familiar it is alien; into that which touches us so 
deeply that we can no longer recognize it as our own.  The very word “telepathy,” like 
the Heimlich/Unheimlich ambivalence Freud remarks upon, draws us into this realm of 
the connection-at-a-distance, connection that in fact requires distance, differentiation that 
demands integration. In Freud’s work on telepathy and the uncanny we find intimations 
of the transitional reality that paves the way for—and in fact surpasses—the opposition 
between fantasy and reality. 
Focusing on the uncanny feelings associated with the compulsion to repeat and the 
infantile fear/fantasy of omnipotence of thought, Freud mentions telepathy in the paper, 
significantly in reference to the ‘phenomenon of the double’:   
…Thus we have characters who are to be considered identical because 
they look alike.  This relation is accentuated by mental processes leaping 
from one of these characters to another—by what we should call 
telepathy—,so that the one possesses knowledge, feelings and experience 
in common with the other.  Or it is marked by the fact that the subject 
identifies himself with someone else, so he is in doubt to which his self is, 
or substitutes the extraneous self for his own.  In other words there is a 
doubling, a dividing and interchanging of the self (p. 234). 
 
                                                       
33 Loewald also remarks on Freud’s discomfort here.  He writes in “Psychoanalysis and the History of the 
Individual”: “Freud hesitated to attribute reality to the mind and contented himself with calling the 
psychical a ‘particular form of existence’, not to be confused with material or ‘factual’ reality…what in his 
view tends to confer a reality-like character on psychic life is the undeniable fact of the power of the 
unconscious (Loewald, 1976, p.537).” And later in the same paper: “In declaring them to be psychic 
processes, he took the step of investigating them from the standpoint of man’s full mental life, from the 
perspective of man as a moral being, and not from the reductive perspective of modern natural science.  But 
he never was wholly comfortable with his decision (542).” 
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But it is not only this compulsion to repeat that returns in the uncanny experience of 
telepathy—there is also the infantile fantasy of omnipotence of thought, “characterized 
by…the subject’s narcissistic evaluation of his own mental processes (p. 240).”34 The 
compulsion to repeat and the belief in the omnipotence of thought are always and 
everywhere linked—the one allowing for, making manifest, the (re)appearance of the 
other—no less so in the case of what Freud says we “should call” telepathy.  In the 
infantile fantasy of omnipotence of thought we return to the fluidity of the reality/fantasy 
distinction that Freud himself, compulsively perhaps, repeats and often misrecognizes.   
Freud’s relative comfort with the uncanny, in contrast to his later work on telepathy, 
may in no small part derive from his use of fictional works instead of case histories.  In 
comparing the dearth of uncanny experience in fairy tales to its abundance in more 
realistic literature, Freud says:  
The situation is altered as soon as the writer pretends to move in the world 
of common reality.  In this case he accepts as well all the conditions 
operating to produce the uncanny feelings in real life; and everything that 
would have an uncanny effect in reality has it in his story…he deceives us 
by promising the sober truth, and then after all overstepping it.  We react 
to his inventions as we would have reacted to real experiences (p. 250, my 
italics). 
 
We cannot read this last line without thinking of Freud’s initial discovery about the 
unconscious: there is no separation between fantasy/fiction from reality.35 While Freud 
seems to be making a clear distinction between the weight of fictive evidence and that of 
                                                       
34 In “Mes Chances” Derrida draws our attention to Freud’s failed attempts to distinguish psychoanalysis 
from a certain form of paranoia, where psychic life cannot be clearly separated from “material reality:”  
“For example, what is the difference between superstition or paranoia on the one hand, and science on the 
other, if they all mark a compulsive propensity to interpret random signs so as to restore to them a meaning, 
necessity, destination?” (Psyche, p. 365).   
35 See note 32.  
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real accounts, this occurs precisely where the problem of such a division becomes most 
pressing. Where Freud seems most insistent on the givenness of the division between 
reality and fantasy, he is always simultaneously opening up the possibility of rethinking 
this separation.   
Freud makes it clear that he worries any discussion of the occult will only cast a 
shadow on the legitimacy of psychoanalysis. He seems paranoid—as if merely by 
broaching the topic psychoanalysis will inevitably fall into the same category.  And yet 
he goes on, possessed, unable to turn away. As Derrida points out in a comparison 
between paranoia and psychoanalysis, the possibility of this “fall” is a real one, not so 
easily dismissed: 
If the superstitious person projects, if he casts outward the “motivations” 
that Freud, for his part, says he seeks on the inside, if he interprets chance 
from the standpoint of an external ‘event’ where Freud reduces it or brings 
it back to a ‘thought’ it is because at bottom the superstitious person does 
not believe, any more than Freud does, in the solidity of the spaces 
isolated by our Western stereotomy.  He does not believe in the 
contextualizing and framing, but not real, limits between the psychical and 
the physical, inside and outside, not to mention all of the other adjoining 
oppositions (Psyche, p.370, my italics). 
 
Like the paranoid worldview, psychoanalytic interpretation invariably reshapes the 
boundaries of reality and its oppositions. Perhaps recognizing this shared tendency, in 
“The Uncanny” Freud acknowledges an association with the “occult”:  
Indeed, I should not be surprised to hear that psychoanalysis, which is 
concerned with laying bare these hidden forces, has itself become uncanny 
to many people for that reason.  In one case, after I succeeded—though 
none too rapidly—in effecting a cure in a girl who had been an invalid for 
many years, I myself heard this view expressed by the patient’s mother 
after her long recovery (p. 243).  
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Freud emphasizes the difficulty, the duration and the process of the cure—as if to remind 
himself of the difference between the analyst and the medium. The threat is minimal, the 
resistance small, and yet we have an indicator of what is to come—a fore-telling.36 If 
Freud is unable to distinguish their visions of reality, he is at least able to draw attention 
to a difference in time. Freud’s focus on time in contrasting his work with that of the 
occult arts might be related to the other temporality that “astronomical” time protects us 
from.37 
Capturing this reversal concerning telepathy, which is not quite a reversal, 
Derrida/Freud writes: 
Previously, I am going back still, I had recalled that the psychoanalytic   
interpretation of dreams lifts up, suppresses and preserves the difference 
between the dream and the event, giving the same content to both…one 
sees the disappearance of all the objections in principle to telepathy.  The 
system of objections rested on a thousand naivetes with regard to the 
subject, the ego, consciousness, perception, and so on, but above all on a 
determination of the “reality” of the event, of the event as essentially 
“real”; now that belongs to a history of grandad’s philosophy, and by 
appearing to reduce telepathy to the name of a psychoanalytic 
neopositivism, I open up its field.  For that they must also free themselves 
from the massively Oedipal training by which I pretend to maintain law 
and order in my class.  I wanted to delay the arrival of the ghosts (Psyche, 
p.253, my italics). 38 
 
                                                       
36 In “Telepathy” Derrida writes: “…ah! There is a lot of interest in the occult today, and because I’ve put 
Telepathy on the bill, here you are, all excited about it.  You have always taken me, like Fliess, for a ‘mind 
reader’ (Psyche, p.245).”  Freud has already expressed his fear (in a letter to Fliess) that his work would be 
taken as the tricks of a mind-reader. 
37 Freud writes in “Dreams and Telepathy”: “We must add, however, that no one has a right to take 
exception to telepathic occurrences if the event and the intimation (or message) do not exactly coincide in 
astronomical time…The laws of unconscious mental life may then be taken for granted as applying to 
telepathy (SE Vol. XVIII, p. 219).” 
38 Derrida here refers to a passage from “Dreams and Telepathy”: “The psychoanalytic interpretation of 
dreams, however, does away with this difference between the dream and the event, and gives both the same 
content (p. 206).” 
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Derrida points to Freud’s hesitation in formulating a reality that encompasses the non-
present and fantasy—both aspects of the virtual more generally; he threatens Freud with 
a reality that would acknowledges the ghostly trace of the non-present and the real 
presence of the ghosts of our past—with the truth of fantasy and the unconscious. 
Loewald also uses the term “ghost” and does so in a similar gesture towards Freud’s 
failure to acknowledge that different ego-reality structures must be integrated into and 
transform reality itself; but more specifically, and unlike Derrida, Loewald uses “ghosts” 
in order to differentiate between the unconscious that is frozen out of the ego (“ghosts”) 
and the unconscious that has been incorporated into its organization (“ancestors”): 
Transference is pathological insofar as the unconscious is a crowd of 
ghosts…ghosts of the unconscious, imprisoned by defenses but haunting 
the patient in the dark of his defenses and symptoms, are allowed to taste 
blood, are let loose.  In the daylight of analysis the ghosts of the 
unconscious are laid and led to rest as ancestors whose power is taken 
over and transformed into the newer intensity of present life…(TEL, p. 
249).  
 
The fluidity and non-presence that Derrida considers “ghostly” are for Loewald 
fundamental attributes of the reality psychoanalysis exposes and Freud “delays.”  
For psychoanalysis to be “in a position to create a Weltanschauung of its own,” it must 
grope towards the forgotten, the unutterable, the refused; Loewald’s contribution comes 
in no small part in critically turning Freud’s discovery of unconscious processes back 
upon the presuppositions of a given, material reality. Loewald, like Derrida, maintains 
that Freud shies away from the consequences of the reality of the unconscious, opening 
up a wider metaphysical horizon at the same moment that he reverts to the dichotomous, 
comfortable paradigms from which he constructed his therapeutic method. 
Psychoanalysis is a metaphysical view of the universe, and one that must be committed to 
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articulating and transforming its interpretation of reality: it is the unique possibility of 
psychoanalysis to consistently put pressure on and reinterpret its own foundations, 
including the nature of scientific activity and the structure of knowledge it implies.39 
Painful in the way becoming a person must be, psychoanalysis is a gathering together 
of our essential contradictions—the alterity of an unconscious which is at the same time 
our deepest selves (heimlich/unheimlich), the structure of knowing that requires subjects 
independent of their objects while at the same time insisting on a subject that 
simultaneously discovers and transforms its objects (telepathy/therapy). Just as the 
individual must recuperate the otherness of his past, so too must psychoanalysis be 
unsettled by its origins—by the disrupted/disrupting truth that the unconscious bears. The 
challenge for psychoanalysis is to recognize its foundations, which is always to transform 
them, and to find a way to live with those ghostly structures of reality that demand and 
resist translation.   
 
2. Uncanny Schelling 
 
Such a reading of Freud opens up a new approach to interpreting Schelling’s more 
“mystical” texts—works like Clara, the Weltalter and the lectures on the philosophy of 
mythology which are too quickly dismissed as un-philosophical. Because I deal with the 
Weltalter and his work on mythology at length in Chapters III and IV, I would like to 
focus here on Clara—perhaps the least attended to by scholars—in order to illustrate the 
                                                       
39 See Freud’s discussion of psychoanalysis and the scientific Weltanschauung in “The Question of a 
Weltanschauung”, SE Vol. XXII pp. 158-184. He writes: “The unified nature of the explanation of the 
universe is, it is true, accepted by science, but only as a programme whose fulfillment is postponed to the 
future” (pp. 158-159). 
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resonances between the Freudian Weltanschauung I am proposing and the metaphysics 
emerging from Schelling’s “ghostly” works.40 
In the form of a fictional tale, Schelling presents a three-way dialogue between a 
woman in mourning and her friends, a doctor and a priest, concerning death and the 
divide (or lack thereof) between the spiritual and the physical. As we also saw in Freud, 
Schelling’s insistence on the literary form in approaching these matters is by no means an 
arbitrary decision: it is through art, through “realistic fiction” in particular, that the 
problem of the limit can show itself. Within the narrative, the philosophical relevance of 
these matters is explicitly pointed out by Clara: 
Why do today’s philosophers find it so impossible to write at least a little 
in the same way that they speak?...That discussions fitting to our time 
[could] be devised as if they were taken from the present, but without 
trying to imitate any particular person; discussions as they could be held 
now and that, without doubt, really are held. I repeat the question: why 
can’t discussions such as we have between ourselves be written down, 
whether they be made up or ones that really have taken place? (p. 65).  
 
Drawing attention to the artifice of writing, Schelling implies that the tenuous distinction 
between what is “really” done, and what is fictionally presented is intrinsically related to 
the subject matter at hand: the limit between life and death, between the spiritual and the 
corporeal.  In the concluding paragraphs, Clara once again compares the identity of the 
spiritual and corporeal with the artist’s work: 
Corporeality is not imperfection, but when the body is suffused by the 
soul, then it is perfection in its plenitude. The merely spiritual life doesn’t 
satisfy our heart. There is something in us that desires a more essential 
reality; our thoughts come to rest only at the final unity…And as the artist 
does not find peace in thinking about his work, but only when he has 
represented it physically, and as anyone fired by an ideal wants to find or 
                                                       
40 F.W.J. Schelling, Clara: or, On Nature’s Connection to the Spirit World. Trans. Fiona Steinkamp 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002). 
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reveal it in a physical-visible form, the goal of all longing is likewise the 
very perfection of corporeality as a reflection and mirror of perfect 
spirituality (p. 80). 
 
More than discussions of ghost stories, clairvoyance and the after-life, taken together 
these passages suggest the extent to which the work of the philosopher and the artist 
converge in the personal—in our uncanny belonging to what-could-have-been and what-
could-yet-be, to death and to life. 
Without explicitly entering into the issues of freedom and temporality that occupy him 
in his later works, we can see Schelling transitioning towards a thinking of the 
impenetrable and the unconscious—of the horrific and “irreducible” remainder persisting 
ever in the depths.  The priest and Clara discuss the incomplete transformation of the dark 
particularity of the human into light, reason and divinity: 
P: So, do they believe that if man has already striven towards morality in 
this life, this is the only thing he takes with him and is that through which 
he can unite himself completely with the Divine in that other life? 
C: They must indeed believe this, she said. 
P: So, I said, nothing physical follows him there? 
C: Nothing; so it seems. 
P: Not even that initial dark and obscure germ, which only gradually 
receives clarity and light into itself through a kind of divine 
transformation? 
C: Not even this. 
P: And which nevertheless never denies its primal nature when completely 
transformed? 
C: It seems to me that this is as unlikely as the clearest diamond thereby 
ceasing to be hard or material. 
P: But even when this dark and obscure speck of our existence, I 
continued, is completely liberated and transfigured, it nevertheless always 
leaves something behind in us that was not from God (p. 53). 
 
This suggestion of the “germ” of personality, in terms of the unresolved and opaque, 
returns as a fundamental theme in Schelling’s Freiheitsschrift. That is, he begins to 
 33 
understand freedom as a mode of personality, as a disclosure of the “dark and obscure 
speck of our existence.” The real possibility of evil is not this ineradicable, obscure 
particularity in itself, but its self-destructive tendency to become what it is not—the 
universal and omnipotent. Schelling writes, “Thus the ego, or individuality, is indeed in 
general the basis, foundation or natural center of every creature’s life; but as soon as it 
ceases to be the ministering center and enters as sovereign into the periphery, it burns in 
it like Tantalus’ malice in its selfishness and egoism” (p. 368). Schelling’s insight that 
freedom is an active negotiation between omnipotence and vulnerability is essential to 
developing a psychoanalytic account of freedom. While Freud’s work on the uncanny 
and telepathy emphasize the horrific, anxiety-inducing aspects of this negotiation, it is 
also the cornerstone of his therapeutic model. The capacity to not only live with, but to 
transform the boundaries between self and world—tasks of responsibility and 
forgiveness—is the aim and process of psychoanalytic practice.  
Schelling’s relevance to a properly Freudian account of freedom is perhaps most 
evident in his reflections on temporality and meaning in the Weltalter and his lectures on 
mythology. In these works Schelling argues that time is a generative, procreative and 
desirous activity—that history, whether at the level of the individual or of existence as 
such, is an interpretive process. This leads Schelling to consider how the reality of the 
unconscious—as a ground that can never be fully integrated into existence or reason—
threatens linear temporality. Much as Freud sketches out a uniquely psychoanalytic time 
(Nachträglichkeit) in order to account for trauma and repression, so the “crisis” of 
creation drives Schelling to articulate a past that remains vulnerable to the present.41 My 
                                                       
41 In The Language of Psychoanalysis, Laplanche and Pontalis translate Nachträglichkeit as “deferred 
action,” explaining that “The first thing the introduction of the notion [deferred action] does is to rule out 
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contention is that in rethinking temporality in the ways they do, in terms of meaning, 
desire and trauma, freedom takes on a tragic dimension. Their persistent attention to 
Oedipus, and to the central role of the mythological and familial in psychic life more 
generally, signals an ongoing interrogation of what it means to inherit more than we can 
know: to be born and to be free. It is a similarly quiet truth that Hölderlin finds at the 
center of the tragedy, muted by the deafening cries of the real: 
…[I]n the appearance of the terrible ceremonious forms, the drama 
imparts itself like an inquisition, like a language for a world of plague and 
confusion of the senses…so that in quiet times, in order that the course of 
the world will have no gaps and that the memory of the heavenly ones will 
not cease, God and man reveal themselves in the all-forgetting form of 
unfaithfulness…Here man forgets himself because he is wholly in the 
moment; the God, because he is nothing but time; and both are unfaithful, 
time, because, in such moments, it turns categorically so beginning and 
end simply cannot rhyme with one another in it; man, because in such 
moments he must follow this categorical reversal and can thus obviously 
no longer be identical to the beginning (“Remarks on Oedipus”, p. 201).42 
 
3. Ugly Freud, Ugly Schelling and the Politics of the Unconscious 
 
Along with the recent surge in Schelling scholarship more generally, there have been a 
number of works that focus on the proto-psychoanalytic strains in his philosophy. Most 
notably, Odo Marquard, Slavoj Zizek, Sean McGrath and Matthew Ffytch have made 
rich and varied contributions in this area. I will briefly point to the kinds of resonances 
(or lack thereof) between Schelling and Freud that these thinkers are sensitive to; I hope 
to show, at the very least, that the reading of Freud can both benefit from and offer 
                                                       
the summary interpretation which reduces the psycho-analytic view of the subject’s history to a linear 
determinism envisaging nothing but the action of the past upon the present…It is not lived experience in 
general that undergoes a deferred revision but, specifically, whatever it has been impossible in the first 
instance to incorporate fully into a meaningful context. The traumatic event is the epitome of such 
unassimilated experience” (p. 112). 
42 J.M. Bernstein, Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006). 
 35 
insight into the problems raised in Schelling’s work on the unconscious, freedom, 
temporality and myth. It will be the aim of the main chapters of the dissertation to read 
Schelling with the creative entanglement of theory and practice proper to psychoanalysis 
always in mind, and, at the same time, to consider whether and how such a reading must 
revitalize the psychoanalytic project.  
Slavoj Zizek, one of the most prolific writers on psychoanalysis and Schelling, does 
not even pretend to be talking about Freud in his major works on the subject (The Abyss 
of Freedom, The Indivisible Remainder and Mythology, Madness and Laughter.) He is 
quite clear that his Freud is actually Lacan’s. So while I appreciate many of Zizek’s 
insights and explanations, Lacan’s Freud is a rather forced intellectual companion for 
Schelling; I call this the “ugly” Freud, inspired by the thoughtful comparison Zizek 
makes between the excess of the ugly and of the Real: explaining the irreducible 
remainder at the heart of the Weltalter he writes, 
Contrary to the standard idealist argument that conceives ugliness as the 
defective mode of beauty, as its distortion, one should assert the 
ontological primacy of ugliness: it is beauty that is a kind of defense 
against the Ugly in its repulsive existence—or, rather, against existence 
tout court, since, as we shall see, what is ugly is ultimately the brutal fact 
of existence (of the real) as such….The ontological presupposition of 
ugliness is therefore a gap between an object and the space it occupies, 
or—to make the same point in a different way—between the outside 
(surface) of an object (captured by its representation) and its inside 
(formless stuff).  In the case of beauty, we have in both cases a perfect 
isomorphism, while in the case of ugliness, the inside of an object 
somehow is (appears) larger than the outside of its surface representation 
(like the uncanny buildings in Kafka’s novels that, once we enter them, 
appear much more voluminous than they seemed from the outside) (AW, 
p. 21). 
 
In adopting Lacan’s Freud, Zizek takes up Lacan’s version of subjectivity as an 
inherently meaningless play of desire; the subject is lack, or the gap between reality and 
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the Real that the symbolic order inaugurates and conceals. Therapy is no longer primarily 
a method for acquiring self-knowledge as the self drops out of the picture, although it 
remains a way of confronting unbearable truths. In stark contrast with Freud, Lacanian 
discourse is concerned with subjects and symbols, rather than personalities and meaning. 
If Freud sometimes seems to naively count on a world that is or will be knowable, thus 
idealizing science as the objective and impersonal, Lacan tends to fetishize the 
unknowable—to presume that absence and loss are more real than existence and love. In 
this sense, Freud is closer to Schelling not only because of his insistence on attending to 
the personal, but also in the extent to which the personal can and indeed should relate to 
even the most radical alterity; here it is love—the empathy and integrative possibilities of 
the therapeutic situation—that draws Schelling into the psychoanalytic project.  
There is a certain remove from reality in Lacan, and while this might be for the 
purpose of exposing the threat of the Real, that makes it difficult to read Schelling’s later 
work in this vein. Clearly, Lacan follows through with an important aspect of Freud’s 
work, where defense and hostility characterize our primary relationships to an essentially 
chaotic and excessive world. So while I do not mean to make light of the value and 
viability of Zizek’s reading, nor Lacan’s for that matter, I am trying to draw attention to a 
reading of psychoanalytic reality that emphasizes different themes in Schelling’s work. It 
is not so much the distance from or proximity to the Real that I find provocative in 
Schelling’s thought or in Freud’s; it is rather their shared interest in the nature of the 
personal as the site of confronting and remaking the limits of self-knowledge—the 
seriousness with which they approach the kinds of relating that would hold such terror 
and ecstasy together.  
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As we shall see, Zizek’s formulation takes at face value Freud’s too-tidy appeal to the 
distinction between the pleasure and reality principles—a distinction that, along with that 
between ego and world, should remain open to transformation.  Zizek takes it for granted 
that what Freud intends by opposing pleasure and reality in this way, and by extension 
what Schelling has in mind in emphasizing  the absolute rupture of decision, can be 
unproblematically translated into Lacan’s terminology of the divide between the Real and 
the Imaginary/Symbolic.43 My issue with this concerns the (in)accessibility of the 
origin—the ease with which Zizek dismisses the transitional space between the 
expressible and the inexpressible. In other words, in contrast to Zizek’s claim that reality 
is sufficiently defined as the prohibition of inscrutable desire, Freud and Schelling see 
that reality (as represented, communicated and universal) and the Real (as traumatic, 
unspeakable and individual) are, or at least can be, related to each other in ways that are 
not simply antagonistic.  
Still, Zizek rightly points out Freud’s underlying claim that the development of the 
ego—and with it the formation of (Imaginary/Symbolic) reality—is always also a 
response to the threat of disintegration into and through its Other, whether this latter is 
conceived of as Ungrund or the Absolute Past, primary narcissism or the Real. Zizek 
takes this to mean that reality simply is the repression of its undifferentiated origin, a 
refusal of the drives insofar as they resist the order of presence. I will suggest that 
Schelling and Freud understand the dynamics between repression and reality differently, 
particularly insofar as they view non-presence and presence, disintegration and limitation, 
as mutually dependent moments integral to the therapeutic process.  
                                                       
43 See: Lacan’s Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1996).  
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The danger in approaching Schelling this way, however, should not be avoided by 
simply denying the “ugly” Schelling altogether. In Sean McGrath’s masterful Dark 
Ground of Spirit, a “teleological,” religious Schelling is positioned at a great remove 
from what he calls the “tragic,” godless Freud.44 It is as if McGrath’s defense against 
Zizek’s collapse of Schelling into Lacan is a reading of Schelling that has nothing at all to 
gain from psychoanalysis. If Zizek focuses on Schelling as a thinker of the horrific Real 
and the irretrievable past, then we might say that McGrath understands him as a 
philosopher of ecstatic Love and the redemptive future. In both cases, Schelling’s 
overarching interest in ceaseless self-transformation is passed over. The attempt to 
systematize Schelling’s thinking risks minimizing his defining insights into the fluid 
borders of identity and the strange, liminal creatures that must be both at home and not-
at-home in such transitional spaces.  
Focusing on Schelling’s debt to Christian mysticism, and particularly to Jakob 
Boehme, McGrath does a masterful job of detailing Schelling’s concerns with Eros. 
Further, he gives the impression of letting Schelling speak for himself, without imposing 
upon him some alien structure or terminology. And yet Freud does not benefit from the 
same treatment: the tragic Freud, to whom McGrath ascribes an almost caricatured 
position, is an incorrigible determinist, atheist and anti-philosopher. I fear that this 
cursory account limits McGrath’s ability to recognize a different strain of thinking in 
Freud, one that is undoubtedly there even if it never congeals into a single argument or 
text. While he carefully attends to Schelling’s texts, Freud does not receive the same care, 
precluding the kind of (dis-)integrative dialogue that both Freud and Schelling, in their 
own ways, make possible: a conversation in the most therapeutic sense.  
                                                       
44 S.J. McGrath, The Dark Ground of Spirit: Schelling and the Unconscious (London: Routledge, 2012). 
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The argument that for Schelling the future will come to presence—that the completion 
of God and His creation through love, the sublimation of darkness into light, is an event 
that must occur—can certainly find support in the various drafts of the Weltalter. 
However, the more essential insight here and in the surrounding works is that the future 
(where such completion would occur) and the past (the repression of the ground) are 
qualitatively different from the present and from each other. While we may still talk 
about a telos in Schelling, it cannot be in the sense of our relation to a future that must or 
will be present, but in terms of a meaningful relationship to its essential non-presence or 
incompleteness. Indeed, this shift towards telos as the interpenetration of meaning and 
temporalization comes much closer to Freud’s deepest concerns than does the reductive, 
nihilistic atheism McGrath finds so fundamentally at odds with Schelling’s philosophy.  
Matt Ffytche’s The Foundation of the Unconscious: Schelling, Freud and the Birth of 
the Modern Psyche at first glance seems most closely related to the work I will be 
engaged in here.45 Offering a detailed analysis of the development of the concept of the 
unconscious from Schelling to Freud, Ffytche takes great care with the nuances of 
Freud’s texts in a way that separates him from both Zizek and McGrath. However, 
Ffytche’s main argument in this text centers on the emergence of ineradicable fault-lines 
within the modern liberal sense of autonomy and the status of the individual this would 
imply or depend upon. So while I share Ffytche’s intuition about the deep connection 
between Freud and Schelling in terms of the possibilities for autonomy and experience of 
self, my project focuses on the ontological implications of this fractured freedom and 
individuality. Furthermore, an essential impetus to my comparison between Schelling and 
                                                       
45 Matt Ffytche, The Foundation of the Unconscious: Schelling, Freud and the Birth of the Modern Psyche 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
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Freud comes from their radical insights concerning the relationship between time and 
drive. If Ffytche develops an account of how the unconscious is necessary for 
reimagining autonomy from the perspective of the destabilization of religious, social and 
political power structures, I consider, as it were, the metaphysical irreducibility of this 
insecurity as it is made manifest in Freudian psychoanalysis and Schelling’s philosophy.  
The difference between Ffytche’s project and this dissertation might be usefully 
compared to the way Ffytche distinguishes his own work from that of Odo Marquard; 
equally, the former’s critique of Marquard helps clarify the distance between Marquard’s 
concerns and my own. In his encyclopedic Transzendentaler Idealismus, Romantische 
Naturphilosophie, Psychoanalyse, Marquard argues that the German focus on aesthetics 
as the revelatory site of human freedom, beginning in the late 18th Century, is a turning 
away from the social and political.46 The freedom that the unconscious discloses is thus 
bereft of any real potency. Schelling’s work results in a freedom abstracted from its 
rightful space—its sphere of action—that finds culmination in Freudian psychoanalysis, 
where there is no longer any possibility for radically disrupting the socio-political 
structure from which it emerges. Ffytche writes of Marquard’s opus, 
In his reading, psychoanalysis is a final symptom of transcendental 
philosophy’s falling away (implicitly through a lack of critical nerve) from 
an engagement with political reason. For Marquard, psychoanalytic 
psychology is shot through with appeals to historical experience—to the 
past, to recollection, to unconscious grounds—which function culturally as 
a way of displacing conscious historical experience (social and political) 
into these speculatively constructed and somewhat mythical unconscious 
dimensions of human life. But what from Marquard’s standpoint of 
‘political reason’ appears as a narrative of Verfall, might be recast, from 
an alternative disciplinary perspective, as a narrative about the emergence 
of new sciences of human life and experience. For surely, what he is 
                                                       
46 Odo Marquard, Transzendentaler Idealismus, Romantische Naturphilosophie, Psychoanalyse (Dinter, 
1987). 
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charting, without ever acknowledging it, is also the emergence of a more 
empirical and secular psychology, which draws on medicine and 
philosophy as well as aesthetics and new theories of organic nature in 
order to develop an account of human being adequate to the post-
Enlightenment age. What happens when such a narrative is retold from the 
perspective of a history of psychology, as a discipline which, rather than 
merely perverting the course of political philosophy, is seeking its own 
new foundations by transforming the moral and spiritual languages of 
body, soul and mind? (p. 18). 
 
It is clear that Ffytche understands his own contribution as an exemplary response to this 
concluding question. The appeal to and evolution of the concept of the unconscious need 
not be the death knell of political philosophy, or of concrete interventions, but instead a 
fruitful point of contact between several strains of human sciences seeking to discover 
new methods and frameworks of self-knowledge (and thus socio-political possibilities). 
But just as Ffytche recognizes a counter-narrative at work in Marquard (where the fall 
away from the political might just as easily be read as its rejuvenation), so too can we 
find another story within Ffytche’s efforts to reintegrate the political and the psychical.  
His argument depends on a privileging of the individual that, through a socio-politically 
motivated evolution, transforms our concept of autonomy. I would argue that the 
“evolutionary” approach that Ffytche appeals to, within which Schelling and Freud 
represent transitional moments in a larger liberalizing arc, actually serves to undermine 
the genuine value of their texts. What Ffytche fails to see is that it is precisely the 
therapeutic dimension of Schelling’s and Freud’s theories, and the ways in which the 
therapeutic transforms the very concepts of evolution and progress, that challenges liberal 
conceptions of selfhood and freedom. 
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4. A Therapeutic Engagement 
An authentic dialogue with Schelling depends upon a reading of Freud as essentially a 
thinker of the therapeutic: therapy, in the Freudian sense, is neither a process of facing up 
to the essential meaninglessness of desire, nor progress towards an arbitrarily chosen 
happiness, normalcy or good. It goes without saying that there are and must be aims that 
guide psychoanalytic treatment (functioning in society, feeling connected, getting rid of a 
particular symptom, showing up on time, etc.); but it is also unique to psychoanalysis that 
even these aims—purposes and desires both practical and theoretical—are ever 
interpretable, bringing into relief the uncertainty of all foundations and all grounding. 
Consider, for example, Freud’s famous passage concerning the dream’s navel in 
Interpretation of Dreams: 
The best-interpreted dreams often have a passage that has to be left in the 
dark, because we notice in the course of interpretation that a knot of 
dream-thoughts shows itself just there, refusing to be unraveled, but also 
making no further contribution to the dream-content. This is the dream’s 
navel, and the place beneath which lies the Unknown. Indeed, the dream-
thoughts we come upon as we interpret cannot in general but remain 
without closure, spinning out on all sides into the web-like fabric of our 
thoughts. Out of a denser patch in this tissue the dream-wish then arises 
like a mushroom from its mycelium (p. 341).47 
 
None of this is to suggest that psychoanalysis conceals or is in need of an existential 
purpose. And yet, Freud’s method of interpreting the objectively present (words, actions) 
as an expression or distortion of the non-present (dream, wish) or not-yet present 
(fantasy, future) does imply a kind of metaphysical telos. Freud’s presupposition that the 
defining wishes of an individual or a people must be concealed, withdrawn from presence 
                                                       
47 Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams. Trans. Joyce Crick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008). SE Vol. V, p. 525. 
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or consciousness, offers us a way to understand Schelling’s teleology in the Weltalter as 
something other than religious faith. If McGrath only means to say that for Freud the 
meaningfulness of our existence is not dependent upon the occurence of a particular 
future, or upon the eventual revelation of the ultimate purpose of creation, I would argue 
that this is true for Schelling as well. Freud insists on the efficacy of therapy—on the 
possibility of a talking cure—even as he recognizes its incompleteness. For the late 
Schelling, similarly, it is the impenetrability of reality—not its eventual, absolute 
disclosure—that guarantees the meaningfulness of existence.      
In order to begin to outline the possibility for Freud of metaphysical grounding in 
Schelling, and for Schelling a therapeutic metaphysics supported by Freudian 
psychoanalysis, I propose an uncanny structure of being itself. Where Freud finds in the 
uncanny the return of the repressed, I will argue that Schelling understands existence 
itself as uncanny. Schelling claims in his Freiheitsschrift that identity as such, A=A or 
the grounding proposition of reason, is duplicitous. That is, identity is already an activity 
of differentiation and union; the predicate is not an empty reflection of the subject but its 
consequence.48  The seeming duplication is thus reconceived as mutual production, such 
that the predicate also recreates and redefines the subject as ground, and each depends 
upon the other without being reducible to it.49 In dismantling the equation of truth with 
self-evidence, by deriving reason from a generative and reciprocal act, Schelling gives us 
a metaphysics of the uncanny: as we will see in Freud’s account, it is that which appears 
identical but is not that most reliably results in the anxiety of the uncanny. Moreover, 
                                                       
48 “The profound logic of the ancients distinguished subject and predicate as the antecedent and consequent 
and thus expressed the real meaning of the law of identity” (FS, p. 342). 
49 This returns us to Laplanche’s discussion of Nachträglichkeit in Life and Death in Psychoanalysis, where 
trauma is both a product and creation of altered temporality: “it may be said that, in a sense, the trauma is 
situated entirely in the play of ‘deceit’ producing a kind of see-saw effect between the two events” (p. 41).  
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such logic is found not merely in our various experiences of the uncanny, but in the 
creative longing that allows for any and all experience.  In other words, the very fact that 
what is is—a fact we feel in the overwhelming necessity of freedom that marks existential 
crisis—profoundly broadens the scope of the uncanny.    
I would like to conclude by addressing the duplicity of the uncanny, the therapeutic 
possibility where psychoanalytic fantasy and the Schellingian imagination converge. 
After a detailed account of one of Hoffman’s tales, The Sand-man, to which Freud 
attributes great uncanny effects deriving from the return of infantile fears and desires he 
comes to the following conclusions:  
We must content ourselves with selecting those themes of uncanniness 
which are most prominent, and seeing whether we can fairly trace them 
also back to infantile sources. These themes are all concerned with the 
idea of a “double” in every shape and degree, with persons, therefore, who 
are to be considered identical by reason of looking alike; Hoffman 
accentuates this relation by transferring mental processes from the one 
person to the other—what we should call telepathy—so that the one 
possesses knowledge, feeling and experience in common with the other, 
identifies himself with another person, so that his self becomes 
confounded, or the foreign self is substituted for his own—in other words, 
by doubling, dividing and interchanging the self (p. 233). 
 
It is not simply the resurgence of infantile fears that makes us anxious; as Freud points 
out in this passage, perfectly innocuous infantile wishes may also be uncanny. This 
suggests that it is the very structure of return—of the re-appearance of groundlessness 
and non-presence as the root of our being—that gives rise to the uncanny. In other words, 
the feeling of uncanniness is dependent upon the primordial fantasy of reason—a stable 
identity; the uncanniness of the double is an echo of an original uncanniness, or better 
put, of uncanniness as originary. We then experience the brute reality of that which 
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cannot show itself as itself—the barest structure of fantasy as that which threatens to 
reveal the insecurity and absence it works to conceal.50    
This is, in truth, not far from Schelling’s own account of the duplicity inherent in 
being, where the identity of ground and existence is always already divided by the 
longing for just such a union: “But the more this composure is profoundly deep and 
intrinsically full of bliss, the sooner must a quiet longing produce itself in eternity…This 
is a longing to come to itself, to find and savor itself” (AW, p. 136). Schelling’s 
discussion of the copula in his Freiheitsschrift marks a concern with nothing less than 
constructing a system of freedom—where the structure of his system requires the 
thinking of a ground that belongs to the Absolute but is not identical to it:  
For if, at the first glance, it seems that freedom, unable to maintain itself in 
opposition to God, is here submerged in identity, it may be said that this 
apparent result is merely the consequence of an imperfect and empty 
conception of the law of identity. This principle does not express a unity 
which, revolving in the indifferent circle of sameness, would get us 
nowhere and remain meaningless and lifeless. The unity of this law is of 
an intrinsically creative kind. In the relation of subject to predicated itself, 
we have already pointed out the relation of ground and 
consequence…Dependence does not determine the nature of the 
dependent, and merely declares that the dependent entity, whatever else it 
may be, can only be as a consequence of that upon which it is 
dependent…Every organic individual, insofar as it has come into being, is 
dependent upon another organism with respect to its genesis but not at all 
with regard to its essential being (p. 346). 
 
His argument here is that in order for beings to be, the nature of identity must be 
rethought as a principle of unheimlichkeit: identity eternally and primordially requires 
                                                       
50 At first, this bears a strong resemblance to Lacan’s account of the uncanny as the “lack of lack”—where 
that which (objet a) simultaneously holds open and blocks off the abyss of desire is filled up, paradoxically 
forcing the subject into anxiety. However, although I am interested in the nature of the loss that appears for 
us in the uncanny, I do not see any deep connections between my interpretation of Freud’s essay and 
Lacan’s at this juncture. See: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Anxiety 1962-1963 Book X, trans. Cormac 
Gallagher (from unpublished French manuscript). In particular, Seminar VII. 
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difference.  The possibility of human freedom, for Schelling, is dependent upon the 
ambivalent identity/duplicity of the Absolute—dependent upon the space opened up by 
the ungrounded ground (Ungrund) that both is and is not the Absolute. Without a 
fracturing which seems, horrifically, to precede and derive from the Absolute there is 
nothing: we are anxious in the face of identity that requires self-division and of 
differentiation that depends upon self-identity. Such anxiety is the essence of the 
uncanny, the disturbed union of the Heimlich and Unheimlich, and that which should 
have remained secret and hidden becomes visible.51 
The Freud I develop here is uncanny precisely because of this therapeutically essential 
and theoretically inescapable duplicity: to cure is both to disentangle reality from fantasy 
and to acknowledge fantasy at the basis of reality.  The reality of redemption is a function 
of its remaining irreducibly yet-to-come—of our ability to remain open to and engaged 
with the meaningfulness we attribute to the past. In Freud’s works on the uncanny and 
telepathy, as he hovers around the possibility of an unconscious that exceeds the 
individual, we can begin to see how freedom must intrude upon the scientific 
Weltanschauung of psychoanalysis. It is no coincidence that it is in “The Uncanny” that 
Freud cites Schelling, as if to mark the strangeness of their similarity and, even more, of 
its deferred recognition. The uncanny, as “that which ought to remain hidden but has 
come to light,” is less an intrusion of the impenetrable Real, as Lacan/Zizek might have 
it, and more so a disturbing confrontation with the fragility of boundary—between self 
                                                       
51 Markus Gabriel suggests a similar reading of Schelling in Mythology Madness and Laughter, though 
only in passing: “This willingness to explore and even to embrace the uncanniness of existence grounded in 
its libidinal instability is certainly what makes Schelling extraordinarily contemporary” (p. 33). Markus 
Gabriel and Slavoj Zizek, Mythology, Madness and Laughter: Subjectivity in German Idealism (London: 
Continuum, 2009). Like Zizek, Gabriel’s reading of Schelling is (for the most part) grounded in the 
Lacanian interpretation rather than in Freud’s own texts, so the very sense of what “uncanny” means here 
needs to be—but is not—at issue.  
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and other, past and future, fantasy and reality. This is the place where Freud comes 
closest to articulating the incompatibility of his scientific, objective sense of truth with a 
truth that would be properly psychoanalytic. It is, after all, psychoanalysis that ensures 
the entanglement of psychic reality—drive and wish—with all perception, memory, 
action and speech. In the uncanny, then, it is not that a particular piece of repressed 
material returns to us; but rather that the very givenness of existence becomes 
questionable, we feel the instability of the ground as such show up for us personally, 
intimately. And, as it turns out, for Freud this feeling is always one of the 
expansion/contraction of identity—the very space of Schelling’s egoic evil and erotic 
good.  
Although I do not claim to have given an exhaustive account of the work of Marquard, 
Zizek, McGrath and Ffytche, I do hope to have sufficiently and fairly distinguished their 
projects from my own in two fundamental ways: First, their readings of Freudian theory 
differ markedly from my own, in some cases not engaging with Freud’s own texts at all, 
in others relying on the interpretations of others. These tend to be either psychoanalytic 
readings of Schelling’s work, taking for granted what a psychoanalytic reading should 
entail, or refutations of such readings.  Second, and perhaps more important, they 
generally fail to account for the unique relationship between theory and therapy that 
defines psychoanalysis and, by extension, ignore the therapeutic metaphysics Schelling 
develops. Not only do I want to argue that Schelling’s late philosophy suggest the kind of 
metaphysics Freudian therapy depends upon; the vitality and viability of Freudian 
therapy also offers a genuine alternative to contemporary methods of interpreting 
Schelling’s concerns with evil, freedom, temporality and myth.  
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4. Chapter Overview 
 
Chapter I: Sublime Freedom  
Beginning with Kant’s Critique of Judgment, and Schiller’s “Letters on the Aesthetic 
Education of Man,” I suggest that Schelling takes up certain pivotal moments in their 
accounts of freedom as it is disclosed in the sublime. Ultimately, I suggest that Schelling 
departs from what I consider Kant’s repressive moral duty, and Schiller’s intimation of 
complete integration between desire and reason, in favor of a nuanced investigation of the 
role of the unconscious.  
 
Chapter II: Uncanny Freedom  
I look at the Freiheitsschrift in conjunction with Schelling’s reading of tragedy in the 
Philosophy of Art, and his account of repression in the System of Transcendental 
Idealism, to illuminate the former text as a meditation on the vital relationship between 
ground and existence—between the unconscious and consciousness. Through Schelling’s 
notion of freedom as it is revealed in tragedy, I turn to the tragic dimension of 
psychoanalytic therapy—particularly in regards to the temporal disruption of the 
traumatic that Schelling only begins to articulate in his Freiheitsschrift. It is through the 
uncanny, as worked out in Freud, that I bring together sublime and tragic freedom: the 
sublime and the tragic are uncanny insofar as they return us to the experience of limits 
that both are and are not of our own making. I then go back to Kant’s Religion Within the 
Bounds of Reason Alone and the rudiments of a theory of the unconscious that is gestured 
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at there, suggesting a way to understand the precarious negotiation between ground and 
existence as it develops into the possibility of good and evil, or of psychic health and 
sickness, dependent upon a choice that lies outside of time.  
 
 
Chapter III: The Absolute Past 
 
The uncanny freedom I point to in the previous chapter leads to an investigation of the 
traumatic/tragic time that is fleshed out in Schelling’s various drafts of the Weltalter. The 
question the texts revolve around is how the tranquil, unexpressed will of the Ungrund 
transforms itself—opening up temporality as such—into the contracting and expanding 
wills Schelling investigates in his earlier essay on freedom. The connection Schelling 
makes here between drive and the Absolute Past is worked out through a close reading of 
the function and action of the unconscious as the site of will and repetition. 
I go on to consider Freud’s own ceaseless rethinking of the drives, the 
foundational concept of psychoanalysis, that turns on the same set of questions: in 
particular, I consider here Freud’s hesitancy in sketching out primary narcissism—that is, 
the primacy of a subject-less, object-less beginning, where desire has not yet disrupted 
the union of pre-ego and world. I consider the viability of such an undifferentiated stage 
through its reappearance in auto-erotism and primary masochism. Finally, I look to 
Freud’s late drive theory, the seeming antagonism of Eros and Thanatos, to show that 
psychoanalysis, too, can acknowledge a primary, non-oppositional ground.    
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The problem of beginnings Schelling lays out, destabilizing the past and any 
possible narration of it, is importantly connected to the structure of the drives and the 
nature of their opposition and force. It is the work of this section to understand the 
connection between the structure of the drives and the emergence of time. Although I will 
consider this on greater detail in the next chapter, I touch upon the way in which the 
historicity of creation, as well as the efficacy of psychoanalytic therapy for the individual, 
must be dependent upon the development of a properly unconscious (as drive, wish and 
fantasy) temporality. 
 
Chapter IV: The Mythical Symptom 
 
The goal of this chapter is to flesh out the theoretical connection between historicity and 
the unconscious, developed in Chapter III, therapeutically. Through Schelling’s positive 
philosophy, and particularly Historical-Critical Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Mythology, I consider the dual function of language as both symptom and cure. Insofar as 
Schelling’s reading of mythology is literal—claiming that mythology means what it is—I 
reconsider Freud’s interpretive method in similar fashion. Further, I call attention to the 
way in which Freud comes to understand the truth of fantasy, or the indifference 
psychoanalytic history assumes towards the physical or psychical reality of memory, 
trauma and the primal scene. This will involve a discussion of the temporality of 
Nachträglichkeit where, as with Schelling’s account of mythology, trauma disturbs the 
very possibility of origins and identity.  
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I. Sublime Freedom 
 
 
Everything that is hidden, everything full of mystery, contributes to what is terrifying and is 
therefore capable of sublimity—Schiller, “On the Sublime” 
 
 
 
Despite his claims to the contrary in “The Uncanny,” Freud’s interest in the aesthetic is in 
no way peripheral to the work of psychoanalysis. Through the aesthetic, Freud explores a 
reality that encompasses the unconscious, opening up a psychoanalytic Weltanschauung 
that fundamentally diverges from the scientific. Freud thus inherits a set of issues that 
pervade Schelling’s middle and late philosophy, issues arising from attempts to 
systematize a subjectivity no longer centered in consciousness. This chapter serves the 
preparatory function of establishing Freud’s place in a larger tradition of aesthetic 
philosophy, one that includes Kant, Schiller and the early Schelling, wherein the 
systematicity of reason collides with the disruptive forces of desire and feeling in 
important and unique ways. My hope is to show that for Freud and his predecessors, the 
aesthetic becomes the opportunity for reformulating the conflict between freedom and 
determinism.  
Kant’s Critique of Judgment, a sustained meditation on the philosophical import 
of the aesthetic, opens up the problematic relationship between system and subjectivity 
that will guide the Idealist project as well as psychoanalysis. In this text, the abyss 
separating nature and freedom that transcendental philosophy depends upon for its 
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coherency is given over to the unifying domain of feeling.52 Although Kant does not posit 
the unconscious in this regard, as Schelling will go on to do, he reveals a dimension of 
experience that is similarly irreducible to the determinism of nature and the determination 
of reason. This aesthetic encroachment into the Critical Philosophy, a privileging of 
feeling and artistic genius that inspires Schiller, Fichte, Hegel and the young Schelling 
among others, implies that pleasure and pain transform the system of reason, as it were, 
from within: 
Hence we must suppose, at least provisionally, that judgment also contains 
an a priori principle of its own, and also suppose that since the power of 
desire is necessarily connected with pleasure or displeasure…judgment 
will bring about a transition from the pure cognitive power, i.e. from the 
domain of concepts of nature, to the domain of the concept of freedom, 
just as in its logical use it makes possible the transition from 
understanding to reason (CJ, p. 18/179).  
 
It is feeling, and most fundamentally pleasure and pain, that simultaneously challenges 
and saves Kant’s rational system. As I will suggest, the dangerous possibility that belongs 
to the Critique of Judgment concerns this notion of “transition”: The centrality of the 
aesthetic—and particularly through returning to the bodily and natural—undermines 
Kant’s ultimate claims in this work about the realization of freedom.  
                                                       
52 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment. Trans., Werner S. Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1987. Hereafter CJ, with pagination also from the Akademie edition. This is merely to say that 
the dualism between phenomena (as determined by the concepts of the understanding) and noumena (as 
produced in the ideas of reason) is problematized by the spontaneity of feeling and imagination. Kant is 
quite explicit in his introduction to the Critique of Judgment the faculty of judgment is a mediating faculty 
between understanding (the domain of nature) and reason (the domain of freedom): “And yet the family of 
our higher cognitive powers also includes a mediating link between understanding and reason. This is 
judgment, about which we have cause to suppose, by analogy, that it too may contain a priori, if not a 
legislation of its own, then at least a principle of its own, perhaps merely a subjective one, by which to 
search for laws” (p. 177). He goes on to make it clear that just as the domains of understanding and reason 
must be cognition and desire, respectively, the similarly mediating domain or territory of judgment is 
feeling: “Now between the cognitive power and the power of desire lies the feeling of pleasure, just as 
judgment lies between understanding and reason” (p. 178). 
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Although Kant spends much more time on the analysis of the beautiful, his account of 
its structure focuses on the harmony of this reflective, aesthetic judgment. In the 
judgment of the beautiful, it is the unproblematic union of imaginative and cognitive 
faculties that comes to the fore. However, his inclusion of an analysis of the sublime 
under the umbrella of aesthetic judgments, while at the same time insisting that the 
sublime has no real connection to products of nature or of art but only in feeling, brings 
into relief the conflict between Kant’s dual conceptions of freedom: the sublime, an 
experience of pleasure in pain and of transition more generally, is reduced to an 
expression of reason’s superiority over and absolute rupture from nature (and the body). 
In this insistence, Kant minimizes the much more radical consequences of aesthetic 
freedom.  
In what follows, I argue that Schiller and the early Schelling develop an aesthetics 
that is in fact truer to Kant’s own hopes of attending to the transition between nature and 
freedom, between a concept and its realization. Specifically, they illustrate the ways in 
which the insights of the Critique of Judgment must bring into relief the tensions within 
the Kantian conception of freedom—as imaginative, productive spontaneity on the one 
hand, and as repressive prohibition and refusal of feeling and nature on the other.53 It is 
with this in mind that my discussion of the Kantian sublime in The Critique of Judgment 
is followed by Schiller’s elaborations of it, primarily in “Letters on the Aesthetic 
Education of Man” and “Concerning the Sublime”; 54 and Schelling’s incorporation of 
                                                       
53 See: Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 257/B 152. Hereafter, CPR. 
54 Friedrich Schiller, Essays. Eds. Walter Hinderer and Daniel O. Dahlstrom (New York: Continuum, 
2001). All citations and paginations are from this collection unless otherwise noted. 
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these views in System of Transcendental Idealism and The Philosophy of Art.55 These 
works share the basic intuition of the Critique of Judgment that art and aesthetics, in 
some way or another, unite the sensible and the supersensible; Schiller and Schelling, 
however, regard the feeling of the sublime (whether in art or in nature) as the privileged 
site for the disclosure of freedom that is prior to and more fundamental than the law. My 
focus here will be on tracing the different qualities and moments of this feeling, including 
the horror and confusion that anticipate the Freudian uncanny, and how such feelings 
must alter our conception of the freedom they make manifest. Schiller and Schelling 
argue that freedom is not merely the constraint of desire or nature; they call for an 
aesthetic freedom that recognizes the human to be in excess of the rational.  In Kant, 
sublimity contracts into the moment in which fear and helplessness in the face of nature 
disappears into reverence for the supremacy of reason.  For Schiller, and to an even 
greater degree for Schelling, the sublime is human activity—it is the process of holding 
together alienation and integration rather than what results. The sublime is not a failure of 
the imagination but evidence of its re-inscription as the root of freedom. In similar 
fashion, we might consider the development from Kant to Schelling, mediated by 
Schiller’s emphasis on wholeness and play, in terms of the role of aesthetics more 
generally: what begins in Kant as an understanding of art and nature as symbols or tools 
for recognizing our dutiful, rational, universal freedom, culminates in an aesthetic 
experience that must be an enactment of our creative, desirous, personal freedom. 
 
 
                                                       
55 F.W.J. Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism. Trans. Peter Heath. Charlottesville: University 
Press of Virginia, 1978. All paginations for the German are from Vol. III of the Sämtliche Werke. 
--The Philosophy of Art. Trans. Douglas W. Stott (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989). 
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1. A Painful Interruption 
 
Kant’s Critique of Judgment, like the reflective judgment it treats, is essentially an act of 
unification—the faculty to which feeling belongs offers a transitional space between 
deterministic nature in The Critique of Pure Reason, and rational, law-giving freedom in 
The Critique of Practical Reason.56 Kant gives us some reason to believe that reflective 
judgments not only unify, but also exceed and even ground, deterministic and 
autonomous cause.57  As Andrew Bowie writes in Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant 
to Nietzsche, 
Kant therefore seems to suggest both that our most fundamental 
relationship to the world and each other is at the level of the immediate 
‘feeling’ which is the basis of the postulate of ‘common sense’, and that 
there is a purposive sense in our cognitive capacity which goes beyond its 
subsumption of intuitions under rules. Given that he also suggests that our 
representation of ourselves is ‘nothing more than a feeling of an existence 
without the least concept’, the role of the non-conceptual aspects of the 
                                                       
56 “For all of the soul’s powers or capacities can be reduced to three that cannot be derived further from a 
common basis: the cognitive power, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and the power of desire” (CJ 
p. 18/179). Kant continues, “Now between the cognitive power and the power of desire lies the feeling of 
pleasure, just as judgment lies between understanding and reason. Hence we must suppose, at least 
provisionally, that judgment also contains an a priori principle of its own, and also suppose that since the 
power of desire is necessarily connected with pleasure or displeasure” (ibid.). Finally, he concludes, 
“judgment will bring about a transition from the pure cognitive power, i.e., from the domain of concepts of 
nature, to the domain of the concept of freedom, just as in its logical use it makes possible the transition 
from understanding to reason” (ibid.). 
57 In Henry Allison’s Kant’s Theory of Taste: A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, citing the 
work of Béatrice Longuenesse, the author argues that reflective judgments, and particularly the principle of 
purposiveness that governs them more generally, introduced in the Critique of Judgment offer a way to 
better understand the development of the schematism sketched out in the Critique of Pure Reason. Allison 
states the problem of the schemata as follows: “How, for example, could one apply the concept of causality 
to a given occurrence unless it were already conceived as an event of a certain kind, for example, the 
freezing of water?” (p. 24).  Allison goes on to agree with Longuenesse’s response, for the most part: “If I 
understand her correctly, the gist of Longuenesse’s answer is that this comparison does not begin with a 
blank slate. This is because the mind, in its universalizing comparison, is guided by the very same concepts 
of reflection that are operative in the comparison of schemata that leads to the formation of reflected 
concepts. Presumably, at this level, however, the comparison leads the mind to seek similarities and 
differences, which can first be codified as schemata governing apprehension and then reflected as concepts. 
And this is possible, according to Longuenesse, because this comparison is oriented from the beginning 
toward the acquisition of concepts applicable in judgments” (p. 27). See also: Béatrice Longuenesse, Kant 
and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of 
Pure Reason, Charles T. Wolfe, trans. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.  
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subject in central parts of his philosophy becomes inescapable, and this is 
why the aesthetic becomes so significant (p. 30).58 
 
Kant’s explorations of aesthetic judgments in particular, a sub-set of reflective 
judgments, open up a connection between the supersensible and the sensible, between the 
universal and the individual. Through his explanation of the a priori principle of 
purposiveness that grounds our experience of the beautiful and the sublime, Kant 
intimates a third way: a form of relating to the world and to ourselves fundamentally 
unlike the theoretical domination of knowing (experiences subsumed under rules of the 
understanding) and the practical domination of acting (feelings subsumed under the 
moral law). Ultimately, it is through this capacity of aesthetic judgment for bridging the 
personal and the universal, rather than collapsing the former into the latter, that Kant 
exposes the crucial question haunting his Critical Philosophy: How can the noumenal 
freedom of The Critique of Practical Reason express itself in and indeed alter the 
phenomenal world of The Critique of Pure Reason? And how could the seemingly 
ancillary field of aesthetics perform the philosophical task of bridging the noumenal and 
phenomenal realms?59  
Kant distinguishes aesthetic judgments from cognitive judgments insofar as they 
are reflective, rather than determinative.60 That is, these judgments do not determine their 
                                                       
58 Hereafter, cited as AS. 
59 “Hence an immense gulf is fixed between the domain of the concept of nature, the sensible, and the 
domain of the concept of freedom, the supersensible, so that no transition from the sensible to the 
supersensible (and hence by means of the theoretical use of reason) is possible, just as if there were two 
different worlds, the first of which cannot have any influence on the second; and yet the second is to have 
an influence on the first, i.e., the concept of freedom is to actualize in the world of sense the purpose 
enjoined by its laws”(CJ, p. 14/176). 
60 “Judgment in general is the ability to think the particular as contained under the universal. If the 
universal (the rule, principle, law) is given, then the judgment, which subsumes the particular under it, is 
determinative (even though [in its role] as transcendental judgment it states a priori the conditions that must 
be met for subsumption under that universal to be possible). But if only a particular is given and judgment 
has to find the universal for it, then this power is merely reflective” (CJ, p. 19/180). 
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objects, or subsume particular experiences under already-given concepts or laws, but 
rather create or seek the universal for the particular. As a form of reflective judgment, the 
necessity and universality belonging to aesthetic judgments is not a function of a priori 
concepts or intuitions; rather, the necessity and universality involved in judgments of 
taste is attributable to our capacity for a common experience of the ways in which the 
faculties of imagination, understanding and reason relate to each other.  It is feeling—not 
knowledge or duty—that initiates us into the universality of reflective judgments. Kant 
argues that aesthetic judgments offer a form of relating—albeit hypothetical—that allows 
us to feel the transition between the determinism of the first critique and the autonomy of 
the second. When faced with the workings of genius, or with a living organism, we 
realize that these opposed forms of causation are inadequate. Through aesthetic 
judgments of the beautiful, Kant emphasizes a notion of freedom which not only 
separates us from sensible nature, but also brings us closer to supersensible nature. That 
is, the tension between moral and spontaneous freedom in Kant comes to the fore in the 
disinterested engagement proper to judgments of the beautiful. This tension, which was 
already evident in the Critique of Pure Reason, could be reformulated in terms of the 
distinction between the productive and reproductive imagination in that text. As Bowie 
reminds us, Kant’s aesthetics draws our attention to the shifting boundaries, not only 
between subject and object, but more fundamentally within the subject, that disturb the 
Critical Philosophy from the beginning: 
In the ‘B’ version of the CPR (1787) Kant changes the role of the 
imagination, in order to sustain the boundary between what we contribute 
to the world’s intelligibility and what the world contributes, by 
subordinating the reproductive imagination to the functioning of the 
categories of the understanding. He therefore planned (but did not actually 
do so) to remove the famous description of the imagination as a ‘blind but 
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indispensible function of the soul without which we would have no 
knowledge’ (B p.103, A p.78) and replace it with the assertion that all 
synthesis is based on the understanding. The problems lurking in the idea 
of a boundary between spontaneity and receptivity become most apparent 
in the decisive part of Kant’s account of the structure of our subjectivity, 
the attempt of the I to describe itself. It is this account, the ‘transcendental 
deduction of the categories’, which will have a major effect on German 
Idealism and early Romanticism, and thus upon the history of aesthetics 
(AS, p. 20). 
 
Kant’s aesthetics expose (and also perpetuate) a pervasive fault-line in the Critical 
Philosophy, the need to develop a reflexive space between activity and passivity, whether 
we are dealing with self-consciousness or our experience in the world.  It is not by chance 
that this exposure comes about through the artwork—an object that forces us to question 
where its meaning rests, that dares us to distinguish (universal) truth from (individual) 
interpretation. 
In the judgment of the beautiful, the form of an object sets in motion our powers 
of cognition, but in such a way that they remain in “free play” [freien Spiele]: our 
cognitive faculties do not determine their object, but are engaged harmoniously in their 
proper functions despite the lack of any attainable goal or end.61  It is not only the 
beautiful form that is purposive, but also the feeling of this play; the beautiful form 
incites a feeling that the world is there for us, and this feeling of an underlying unity 
between subject and object is pleasure. This is mirrored in Kant’s account of genius, 
where the creation of an art work—like the pleasurable play that grounds our judgment of 
                                                       
61 “But the way of presenting [which occurs] in a judgment of taste is to have a subjective universal 
communicability without presupposing a determinate concept; hence this subjective universally 
communicability can be nothing but [that of] the mental state in which we are when imagination and 
understanding are in free play (insofar as they harmonize with each other as required for cognition in 
general)” (CJ, p. 62/218). See: Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Ureteilskraft. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 
2001. “Die subjektive allgemeine Mitteilarkeit der Vorstellungsart in einem Geschmacksurteile, da sie, 
ohne einen bestimmten Begriff vorauszusetzen, stattfinden soll, kann nichts anderes as der Gemütszustand 
in dem freien Spiele der Einbildungskraft und des Verstandes (sofern sie unter einander, wie es zu einem 
Erkenntnisse überhaupt erforderlich ist, zusammenstimmen”, (p. 67/218). Hereafter cited as KU.  
 59 
the beautiful—is not determined by rules; the activity of rule-making itself comes to the 
fore—the work of the understanding and the imagination—and becomes playful, creative 
and spontaneous without devolving into chaos.62  Freedom is here understood in its 
creative capacity, and our vocation is realized through the playful activity of imagining 
rather than obeying the law. Kant’s invocation of purposiveness in accounting for the 
pleasure of the beautiful allows him to consider a subject’s relation to nature (and to 
art)—both within and external to him—that is neither reducible to the necessity of 
judgments of fact nor merely analogous to autonomy: 
 
On the other hand, we do call objects, states of mind, or acts purposive 
even if their possibility does not necessarily presuppose the presentation of 
a purpose; we do this merely because we can explain and grasp them only 
if we assume that they are based on a causality [that operates] according to 
purposes, i.e., on a will that would have so arranged them in accordance 
with the presentation of a certain rule. Hence there can be purposiveness 
without a purpose insofar as we do not posit the causes of this form in a 
will, and yet can grasp the explanation of its possibility only by deriving it 
from a will (p. 65/220).63 
 
 
But Kant is clear that such purposiveness remains on the level of the hypothetical—that 
we must treat nature as if it were organized, that we approach the beautiful form as if it 
                                                       
62 “Genius is the talent (natural endowment) that gives the rule to art. Since talent is an innate productive 
ability of the artist and as such belongs itself to nature, we could also put it this way: Genius is the innate 
mental predisposition (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art” (CJ p. 174/307). [“Genie ist 
das Talent (Naturgabe), welches der Kunst die Regel gibt. Da das Talent, als angeborenes produktives 
Vermögen des Künstlers, selbst zur Natur gehört, so könnte man sich auch so ausdrücken: Genie ist die 
angeborene Gemütsanlage (ingenium), durch welche die Nature der Kunst die Regel gibt” (KU, p. 
192/307).] 
63 “Zweckmäßig aber heißt ein Objekt oder Gemütszustand oder eine Handlung auch, wenn gleich ihre 
Möglichkeit von uns nur erklärt und begriffen werden kann, sofern wir eine Kausalität nach Zwecken, d.i. 
einen Willen, der sie nach der Vorstellung einer gewissen Regel so angeordnet hätte, zum Grunde 
derselben annehemen. Die Zweckmäßigkeit kann also ohne Zweck sein, sofern wir die Ursachen dieser 
Form nicht in einen Willen setzen, aber doch die Erklärung ihrer Möglichkeit nur, indem wir sie von einem 
Willen ableiten, uns begreiflich machen können” (KU, p. 70/220). 
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were meant to harmonize our cognitive powers, only in order to explain particular 
appearances. Although Kant points beyond the determinism of nature and the self-
determination of reason through the reflective principle of purposiveness, he stops short 
of recognizing this as a truly other causality. 
 In the sublime, however, this pleasurable sense of purposiveness that 
characterizes the beautiful (and the teleological) gives way: not only does the sublime 
painfully interrupt the proper functioning of our cognitive powers, but it also recalls our 
supersensible vocation only negatively, through violently exposing our sensible—
imaginative and bodily—helplessness. The harmonious union of imagination and 
understanding that we feel in the beautiful is sundered in the awe of the sublime; the 
creativity and sense of belonging to nature that we experience as pleasure in the beautiful 
is lost. The sublime is predicated on our alienation from nature, disclosing a world that is 
distinctly not for our comprehension or pleasure, where even our own sensible nature 
becomes impossibly disconnected from the supersensible. In his efforts to distinguish the 
sublime from the beautiful, it begins to seem that Kant does not see the sublime as an 
aesthetic judgment at all. The sublime is rarely, if at all, the product of artistic genius; and 
although it remains tied to reflective judgment, it is only in the failure of the imagination 
that we can experience the sublime. The feeling of the sublime is only tangentially related 
to an object, a cue that reminds us that autonomy depends upon an insurmountable divide 
between freedom and nature. In contrast to his account of the beautiful, Kant’s 
description of the sublime does not seem to tell us anything about how the supersensible 
and the sensible might practically affect each other. Such a vision of the sublime reifies 
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Kantian freedom as a form of domination—as a repression64 of drive, nature and 
individuality—while freedom as playfulness is relegated to the subjunctive voice, to a 
mere symbol of morality.65 However, in claiming that our experience of the sublime is 
fundamentally the feeling of self-consciousness—of the internal contrast between the 
weakness of our flesh and understanding on the one hand, and the strength of reason on 
the other—Kant himself suggests an alternative approach to the sublime: What kind of 
freedom does such essential self-division lay bare? How might the violence of the 
sublime threaten the integrity of the subject? In order to respond to these questions, we 
need to consider in some detail what distinguishes the universality of the sublime from 
the universality of the beautiful. In the latter, of course, it is the shared, harmonious 
functioning of the imagination and understanding that is felt as pleasure. The universality 
of the sublime, however, is more problematic: grounded in disruption—in the pain of 
separation and division—the sublime seems to defy unity at the most intimate level. I will 
suggest that, paradoxically, the sublime deconstructs the Kantian equation of freedom 
with the universality of reason.  
                                                       
64 In Kyriaki Goudeli’s Challenges to German Idealism, she suggests a similar conception of a peculiarly 
Kantian repression, only here at the most basic level of cognition in the CPR: “The self can secure its unity 
only so long as its representations and corresponding states can be synthesized in an a priori way. 
However, these representations are already inwardly determined by the understanding: the legal contract 
turns into the domination of the understanding upon sensibility” (p. 36).  
65 As Andrew Bowie argues in his Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietszche, Kant’s departure 
from earlier aesthetic theories, like Baumgarten’s and Hamann’s, involves a turn from the value of the 
individual or particular experience (grounded in a secure theological worldview) and towards the universal: 
“Baumgarten’s Aesthetica, and Hamann’s Aesthetica in nuce, begin to suggest what is at stake in the 
emergence of aesthetics as an independent branch of philosophy. Despite their obvious differences, 
Baumgarten and Hamann share a concern with the failure of the rationalist traditions of the eighteenth 
century to do justice to the immediacy of the individual’s sensuous relationship to the world which is part 
of aesthetic pleasure…Aesthetic theory from Kant onwards, in contrast, often searches for the whole into 
which a single phenomenon can fit, once theological certainties have been abandoned, and this search is 
related to other ways in which modernity attempts to make the world cohere, from the political to the 
scientific” (p. 5).  
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It is in part because of Kant’s insistence that the universality of the sublime is a 
function of the universality of reason that he does not really discuss its role in art; as we 
will see, Schiller’s emphasis on the sublime in art, and in tragedy particularly, is a 
function of his understanding freedom as integrative wholeness rather than repressive 
autonomy. Still, Kant does make gestures towards the fractured universality of the 
sublime, possibilities that Schiller and Schelling develop in their own ways, through the 
fragmentary completeness of poetry: 
 
A poet ventures to give sensible expression to rational ideas of invisible 
beings, the realm of the blessed, the realm of hell, eternity, creation and so 
on…but then, by means of an imagination that emulates the example of 
reason in reaching [for] a maximum, he ventures to give these sensible 
expression in a way that goes beyond the limits of experience, namely, 
with a completeness for which no example can be found in nature…Now 
if a concept is provided with a presentation of the imagination such that, 
even though this presentation belongs to the exhibition of the concept, yet 
it prompts, even by itself, so much thought as can never be comprehended 
within a determinate concept and thereby the presentation aesthetically 
expands the concept itself in an unlimited way, then the imagination is 
creative in [all of] this and sets the power of intellectual ideas in motion 
(CJ, pp.182-183/314-315, my italics).66 
 
 
Kant describes the completeness the poet uncovers as without likeness in nature, 
expanding indefinitely, limitless. The completeness the poet communicates is not any 
determinable content, but a feeling of recognizing ourselves precisely in the non-
                                                       
66 “Der Dichter wagt es, Vernuftideen von unsichtbaren Wesen, das Reich der Seligen, das Höllenreich, die 
Ewigkeit, die Schöpfund u. dgl. zu versinnlichen…die Schranken der Erfahrung hinaus, vermittelst einer 
Einbildungskraft, die dem Vernunft-Vorspiele in Erreichung eines Größten nacheifert, in einer 
Vollständigkeit sinnlich zu machen, für die sich in der Natur kein Beispeil findet…Wenn nun einem Begriffe 
eine Vorstellung der Einbildungskraft untergelegt wird, die zu seiner Darstellung gehört, aber für sich 
allein so viel zu denken veranlaßt, als sich niemals in einem bestimmten Begriff zusammenfassen läßt, 
mithin den Begriff selbst auf unbegrenzte Art ästhetisch erweitert, so ist die Einbildungskraft hierbei 
shöpferisch und bringt das Vermögen intellektueller Ideen (die Vernunft) in Bewegung…” (KU, pp. 202-
203/314-315). 
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conceptual and incomplete.  In Kant’s view, the universality of the sublime, like that of 
beauty, derives from our shared cognitive powers. In the latter, it is the play between 
imagination and the understanding that binds us together, and in the former it is the 
limitlessness of reason.  However, through these brief remarks on the nature of poetry, 
we can begin to see in Kant another vision, one that Schiller and later Schelling 
acknowledge, of how it is that we speak the sublime—how language itself, in its very 
failure to translate the sublime, suggests a universality that allows us to be ourselves and 
to be with others.  It is not only, and not even primarily, the moral law that captivates us 
in the sublime; rather, feeling this universal lack compels us to speak, drives us to 
recognize and be recognized by each other and nature.  
 Although Kant does not offer much more on the language of the sublime, he does 
make strange and fruitful claims about the language of nature: “It will be said that this 
construal of aesthetic judgments in terms of a kinship with moral feeling looks rather too 
studied to be considered as the true interpretation of that cipher through which nature 
speaks to us figuratively in its beautiful forms” (CJ, p. 167/301).67 Although Kant is quite 
clear that nature speaks to us through its beautiful forms, not its sublimity, it is worth 
noting that, like the poetic genius, nature does speak to us. Moreover, he preemptively 
defends himself against the charge that translating our connection to nature into moral 
feeling is a denial and falsification of its excessive truth. If our appreciation of the 
beautiful implies a familiarity with the language of nature, our capacity for the sublime 
would be a confrontation with the precariousness of our translation: an expression of the 
dialectics of chaos and order, of differentiation and renewed integration. As speaker, 
                                                       
67 “Man wird sagen, diese Deutung ästhetischer Urteile auf Verwandtschaft mit dem moralischen Gefühl 
sehe gar zu studiert aus, um sie für die wahre Auslegung der Chiffreschrift zu halten, wodurch die Natur in 
ihren schönen Formen figürlich zu uns spricht” (KU, p. 184/301). 
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nature reveals itself in its double aspect—as an objectified text that ought to be read and 
as an expressing that exceeds all interpretations. In the face of the sublime it is not merely 
our dual nature that surfaces, but the duality of nature itself.  
In the shock of the sublime, we suddenly find nature indecipherable and 
unfamiliar—our habitual forms of communication lost; and yet, it is only this 
discontinuity that allows us to recognize that nature does speak and, like all speakers, also 
communicates meaning kept in silent reserve.  Indeed, it is the silence of nature that 
makes language possible and necessary. The silence that would seem to characterize the 
sublime, and through this silence an intimation of what it is like to authentically 
understand and be understood, reminds us of the ways in which language serves to unify 
and to divide us.  To name something is at once to appropriate it and to put it at a 
distance—it is, like freedom, simultaneously a movement away from wholeness and the 
struggle to recapture it in another form. It seems that in reducing our experience of the 
sublime to moral fortitude, and nature to a decipherable message, Kant violates their 
unsettling and captivating excess.  But this is not to say that all efforts at speaking the 
sublime must do so.  It is no easy task to say just what it is that we, as humans, share—
nor that what we share is inherently good; and yet to persist in our efforts to speak it is 
our highest calling.  
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2.  Schiller at Play 
 
 For Schiller, it is precisely the challenge of a new language that sublime nature 
announces.  It is only when one “gives up trying to explain nature and makes this 
inscrutability itself the standpoint of the evaluation” that the language of the sublime, 
beyond knowledge or explanation, can be heard (“Concerning the Sublime”, p. 81).68  
The language of the sublime is the language of self-differing: 
The feeling of the sublime is a mixed feeling. It is a combination of being 
in anguish (at its peak it expresses itself as a shudder) and being happy 
(something that can escalate to a kind of ecstasy). This combination, 
although it is not actually pleasure, is still preferred by all noble souls over 
all pleasure. This synthesis of two contradictory sensations in a single 
feeling establishes our moral self-sufficiency in an irrefutable manner. 
For, since it is absolutely impossible for the same object to be related to us 
in two contradictory ways, it follows from the fact that we ourselves are 
related to the object in two contrasting ways, that two opposite natures 
must be united within us (p. 74).69 
 
Schiller’s hopes for aesthetics are a departure from Kant’s, insofar as the latter opens up 
the aesthetic realm as a way to resolve the conflict of embodied reason, arguing that the 
ideas of reason ought to control and overcome nature.  Though Schiller adheres to Kant’s 
vision of the sublime as the awakening within us of the power of reason, he also offers a 
radical rethinking of freedom in terms of the personal. Schiller manages to bring out the 
                                                       
68 “Wie ganz anders, wenn man darauf resigniert, sie zu erklären, und diese ihre Unbegreiflichkeit selbst 
zum Standpunkt der Beurteilung macht” (Theoretische Schriften, Sämtliche Werke, Fünfter Band 1962. 
“Über das Erhabene”, p. 804). Hereafter, TS. 
69 “Das Gefühl des Erhabenen ist ein gemischtes Gefühl. Es ist eine Zusammensetzung von Wehsein, das 
sich in seinem höchsten Grad als ein Schauer äußert, und von Frohsein, das bis zum Entzücken steigen 
kann und, ob es gleich nicht eigentlich Lust ist, von feinen Seelen aller Lust doch weit vorgezogen wird. 
Diese Verbindung zweier widersprechender Empfindungen in einem einzigen Gefühl beweist unsere 
moralische Selbständigkeit auf eine unwiderlegliche Weise. Denn da es absolut unmöglich ist, daß der 
nämliche Gegenstand in zwei entgegengesetzen Verhältnissen zu uns stehe, so folgt daraus, daß wir selbst 
in zwei verschiedenen Verhältnissen zu dem Gegenstand stehen, daß folglich zwei entgegengesetzte 
Naturen in uns vereiniget sein müssen, welche bei Vorstellung desselben auf ganz entgegengesetzte Art 
interessieret sind” (ibid. p. 796) 
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disorienting aspect of the sublime in such a way that, despite his proximity to Kant, 
universal reason and morality do not do justice to the feeling of human freedom. The 
vocation that the sublime calls us to cannot be the enactment of the categorical 
imperative, for this would entail dissociation from an essential aspect of our being—our 
natural desires; rather, wholeness, conceived as the integration of contradictory elements, 
would be the true expression of human freedom. Kant argues that the sublime is within 
us, and yet his account of what we are fails to capture the precarious unity of human 
being. In looking at the way we speak the sublime, Schiller points out that just as 
language allows us to know, explain and dominate, so too does its limitation reach 
beyond itself towards that which resists knowledge, explanation and domination; in the 
same manner, as we see already in Kant, it is only through an acknowledgment of our 
vulnerability—our limit—that the sublime reveals our true potency. By pointedly 
expanding Kant’s account of the sublime into our experience with art, Schiller shows that 
the sublime gestures towards the unspeakable lack that grounds us—towards the space 
from which language is born and to which it recalls us.  Tragically, we listen for the 
whispers of our freedom—freedom that breaks us apart.  Only through the silence and 
rupture of the sublime, in our stunned inability to know nature and ourselves, can we 
speak truthfully of freedom.       
By enlarging the value of the human to include desire and division, Schiller argues 
that the repression of our sensual nature and the totalizing of reason are anathema to 
freedom. Responding to Kant’s version of the sublime, Schiller insists that he fails to 
capture both the depth of our identity with nature and the severity of our isolation from 
nature. Because we, too, are part of the natural order, the ways in which we understand 
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ourselves to be united with and divided from nature are essentially tied up with self-
consciousness and the possibility of ethical life: for Schiller, aesthetics is not merely 
useful in developing our sense of freedom, as it seems to be for Kant, but necessary. In 
re-appropriating the human dimension of freedom, which is not exhausted by the 
paradigm of law and submission, Schiller critiques the abstractness of Kant’s account; it 
is in part due to Schiller’s emphasis on the whole, or fully human being, that Schelling 
goes on to reformulate subjectivity and human freedom in terms of personality.70 Where 
Schelling will eventually suggest that freedom itself is wrapped up in the dark and 
desirous unconscious, Schiller focuses on our mode of enacting that freedom, refusing the 
model of antagonism and constraint in favor of integration and reconciliation. Looking at 
Schiller’s playful sense of freedom as a convergence not only of nature and freedom, but 
also of the beautiful and the sublime, it is clear why within Kant’s dominating version 
these pairs must remain ever opposed.  
Though Schiller seems to accept Kant’s formulation of the sublime as the experience 
of reason’s supremacy over nature and desire, he also draws us more deeply into the 
feeling of devastation and self-division. The captivation (ergreift) of the sublime, rooted 
in contradiction, at first appears entirely removed from the pleasurable lingering (weilen) 
that belongs to the harmony of the beautiful71: 
In what is sublime, on the other hand, there is no harmony of reason and 
sensuousness and the spell that captivates our minds lies precisely in this 
contradiction. Here the physical and the moral sides of the human being 
are severed from one another in the sharpest possible way, for it is 
precisely when confronted by such objects that the physical side feels only 
                                                       
70 I deal with Schelling’s account of personality and its relation to freedom in the Freiheitsschrift in 
Chapter II. See also: Sean McGrath’s The Dark Ground of Spirit. 
71 Kant writes: “Wir weilen bei der Betrachtung des Schönen, weil diese Betrachtung sich selbst stärkt und 
reproduziert…” (KU, 222, my emphasis). And in Schiller, “Beim Erhabenen hingenen stimmen Vernunft 
und Sinnlichkeit nicht zusammen, und eben in diesem Widerspruch zwischen beiden liegt der Zauber, 
womit es unser Gemüt ergreift” (TS, p. 798, my emphasis) 
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its limitation, while the moral side experiences its power. The moral side 
of human nature is infinitely elevated by the very thing that forces the 
physical side of human nature into the ground (“Concerning the Sublime”, 
p. 75).  
 
Schiller continues to draw out this distinction, in agreement with Kant that “not gradually 
(since there is no transition from dependency to freedom), but only suddenly and through 
a kind of shock, does something sublime tear the independent spirit loose from the net a 
sophisticated sensuousness uses to ensnare it” (p. 77).72 As a “shock” (Erschütterung) 
and a “tear” (reißt), the sublime points to alienation at the root of our freedom.73 Beauty, 
Kant argues, is communicable because we all have the same capacity for experiencing the 
harmonious, free play of imagination and understanding; because the experience of the 
beautiful is the feeling of our self-identity, we recall our shared human identity. But how 
does the sublime—in its silence—unify us in our peculiarly human vocation?74  
Privileging the radical division and ensuing need for re-integration that the 
sublime entails, Schiller maintains that identity is predicated on an essential lack 
inscribed in the foundation of human being: 
The road taken by the modern poets is, moreover, the same road humans 
in general must travel, both as individuals and as a whole. Nature makes a 
human being one with himself, art separates and divides him; by means of 
the ideal he returns to the unity. Yet because the ideal is an infinite one 
that he never reaches, the cultured human being in his way can never 
                                                       
72 TS, p. 799. 
73 ibid.  
74 Although Schiller takes up Kant’s term he does not share his definition, as I hope to show in what 
follows. Whereas Kant claims that “it is a law (of reason) for us, and part of our vocation, to estimate any 
sense object in nature that is large for us as being small when compared with the ideas of reason,” Schiller 
emphasizes the very human aspect of our vocation: “Every individual human being, one may say, carries 
within him, potentially and prescriptively, an ideal man, the archetype of a human being, and it is his life’s 
task to be, through all his changing manifestations, in harmony with the unchanging unity of his ideal” 
(“Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man”, p. 93). He continues, explaining what this “ideal” would 
consist in, “Should there, however, be cases in which he were to have this twofold experience 
simultaneously, in which he were to be at once conscious of his freedom and sensible of his existence, 
were, at one and the same time, to feel himself matter and come to know himself as mind, then he would, in 
such cases, and in such cases only, have a complete intuition of his human nature…” (p. 126). 
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become complete as the natural human being can be in his way (“On 
Naïve and Sentimental Poetry,” p. 202).75  
 
The awareness of our freedom prohibits us from returning to an undivided, naïve unity; 
our freedom involves both the recognition of a lost wholeness—this lack that defines 
us—and a striving to recapture it. So although Schiller still believes that the sublime 
directs us towards a unity of will and action, human freedom itself remains irreducibly 
split: anguish and pleasure, fear and rapture, submission and domination. It is not 
surprising that the language of the sublime, for Kant as well as Schiller, is the language of 
violence, or at least of antagonistic forces. And it is not merely the language of violence 
that permeates the sublime, but also language as violence.  Kant argues that aesthetic 
judgment is both subjective and universal: in our experience of the beautiful and the 
sublime we are subject to the demand that it is not I that speaks but We.  Still, it is not 
altogether clear how through the disruption of the sublime we can speak at all—how it is 
that acknowledging our ruptured identity might make us whole.  It would seem that the 
sublime calls us to a moral duty that requires an act of self-domination, to unity at the 
cost of repression or disavowal; Schiller’s account of the sublime, particularly insofar as 
it converges with the beautiful, contributes to an account of freedom that isn’t 
conditioned by violence, as a possibility for self-consciousness that neither denies nor 
succumbs to the radical disjunction that unites us.  
While recognizing the chasm between nature and freedom, between passivity and 
activity, Schiller marks the sublime as the site of a centering contradiction.  In other 
words, it is not only our power to resist nature that we experience in the sublime, but, and 
precisely because of this resistance, a vital and universal alienation: we are at a distance 
                                                       
75 TS, p. 718.  
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both from nature and from ourselves and this separation makes us existentially 
uncomfortable, disturbing the unity of self-consciousness that ought to ground our 
freedom. Schiller allows us a way to think the disorienting aspect of the sublime as more 
than simply “a momentary inhibition of the vital forces,” as more than an unfortunate 
prelude to the resurgence of reason and its lawfulness (CJ/KU, p. 245). The sublime, in 
the uncertainty of its silence, gestures towards freedom’s paradoxical demands: there 
must be an infinite distance between reason and nature and, at the same time, reason only 
comes to itself in and through its engagement with nature.76  To speak this impossibility 
would be to deny its essential withdrawal; to remain silent would be inhuman.   
 The experience of the sublime is a discovery, rather than a proof, of the essence of 
our freedom. For Kant, the sublime discloses to us the impossible distance between 
reason and sensibility that ought to lead us to recognize the ultimate supremacy of the 
moral law. In a clear departure from Kant, and motivation for Schelling, Schiller suggests 
that the destabilizing effect of the sublime forces us to ask different sorts of questions: 
Can freedom be reduced to reason’s constraint of sensibility? Is true integration between 
reason and sensibility attainable?77 In other words, freedom is threatened from both 
sides—vulnerable to the dangers of sensibility overcoming reason and of reason 
                                                       
76 “At this point we must remind ourselves that we are dealing with a finite, not with an infinite, mind. The 
finite mind is that which cannot become active except through being passive, which only attains to the 
absolute by means of limitation, and only acts and fashions inasmuch as it receives material to fashion” 
(“Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man”, p. 141). 
77 Frederick Beiser also makes this point in Schiller as Philosopher: A Re-Examination: “The shortcoming 
of Kant’s conception becomes apparent, in Schiller’s view, as soon as we see that moral autonomy alone is 
compatible with a form of constraint. A person can do his duty for its own sake yet still feel an inner 
reluctance, a deep resistance within himself. In this case, though his action is autonomous, though he wills 
it as a rational being, the person is still not entirely free. While he is free as a rational being, he is not free 
as a whole being, for the simple reason that part of his self is under the domination of his reason. It is this 
thesis—the very idea that reason can dominate or create lack of freedom—that is completely alien to 
Kant’s moral philosophy, and that plays a fundamental role in Schiller’s thinking about freedom” (p. 217). 
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suppressing sensibility.78  As Schiller points out in his treatment of tragedy, “in aesthetic 
judgments we are interested, not in morality of itself, but simply in freedom, and morality 
can please our imagination only insofar as it makes that freedom visible” (“On the 
Pathetic”, p. 68).79  Thus in no uncertain terms, freedom exceeds our adherence to the 
moral law, creating a space for difference outside of opposition.80  Where Kant tries to 
resolve this difference through reason’s absolutism, Schiller allows us to see that 
freedom—in its playful and horrific reality—entails an insoluble tension: identity that is 
nourished by, rather than negated in, contradiction. 
If Kant focuses on the empowering aspect of the sublime, as an answer to the 
question that is freedom, we might say that Schiller emphasizes the suffering such 
questioning inspires.81 It is precisely the rift within us, as much as that between man and 
nature, which the sublime forces us to acknowledge.  We can see the consequences of 
this shift clearly in Schiller’s treatment of tragedy; while Kant limits his account of the 
sublime to nature, Schiller’s interpretation extends into the realm of art—and particularly 
into inter- and intra-personal relationships.  Part of his motivation is to show that our 
                                                       
78 “Reason does indeed demand unity; but nature demands multiplicity; and both these kinds of law make 
their claim upon man. The law of reason is imprinted upon him by an incorruptible consciousness; the law 
of nature by an ineradicable feeling. Hence it will always argue a still defective education if the moral 
character is able to assert itself only by sacrificing the natural” (“Letters on the Aesthetic Education of 
Man”, p. 93). 
79 “In ästhetischen Urteilen sind wir also nicht für die Sittlichkeit an sich selbst, sondern bloß für die 
Freiheit interessiert, und jene kann nur insofern unserer Einbildungskraft gefallen, als sie die letzere 
sichtbar macht” (TS, p. 536).  
80 Schiller suggests that freedom is the ability to choose to follow or refuse to follow the moral law: “Now, 
at the bottom of every moral evaluation there lies a demand by reason that things be done morally, and 
there is an unconditioned exigency at hand that we intend what is right. But because the will is free, it is 
(physically) a contingent matter whether we actually do it [Weil aber der Will frei ist, so ist es (physisch) 
zufällig, ob wir es wirklich tun]” (“On the Pathetic”, p. 62/TS, p. 529). 
81 “Since, then, the entire essence of the sublime rests upon the consciousness of this rational freedom of 
ours, and all pleasure afforded by the sublime is grounded precisely in this consciousness alone, it follows 
of itself (as experience also teaches) that the aesthetic image of what is frightful [Furchtbare] must stir us 
more powerfully and more pleasantly than the representation of the infinite does, and that the practically-
sublime has, accordingly, a very great advantage over the theoretically-sublime, as far as the strength of the 
feeling is concerned” (“On the Sublime,” p. 26/TS, p. 492). 
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involvement with tragedy—and with poetry—involves a feeling of freedom that reaches 
beyond the law of reason, an expression of the human as that which holds together order 
and chaos, necessity and freedom. In sublime art, as in nature, there needs to be a 
separation that provides security: we are far enough away that the ocean will not devour 
us, we know that we are audience members and not Antigone. And yet there must also be 
empathy, insofar as the sublime demands an intimacy with finitude and fear that 
motivates our realization of the infinite moral demand. Indeed, it is through our 
acknowledgment of the frightening gulf between unlimited, chaotic nature on the one 
hand, and limited sensibility on the other, that the sublime comes to the fore.  Tragedy, as 
Schiller points out, depends upon our capacity to relate and to feel—upon our ability to 
remain at a properly human distance from ourselves and from others.  That is, the 
universality that belongs to our judgments of the sublime is the suffering of human 
distance and proximity: 
 
Hence, the aesthetic power with which sublimeness of character and 
action take hold of us rests in no way upon reason’s interest in things 
being done rightly, but rather upon imagination’s interest in it being 
possible that things are done rightly. This is to say, it is in the interest of 
the imagination that no feeling, however powerful, be capable of subduing 
the freedom of the mind. This possibility lies, however, in every hardy 
expression of freedom and the power of the will, and only where the poet 
hits upon this, has he found a fitting subject matter to portray (“On the 
Pathetic”, p. 67/TS, p. 535). 
 
It is not the victory of the moral law that tragedy communicates, that would unite us in 
our shared vocation, but rather the weight of possibility—the burden of identity that 
remains ever in transition. Kant traces the progression of the sublime from weakness and 
fear, through a recollection of unbounded reason, toward a triumphant restoration of the 
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moral law. For Schiller, as we see most readily in his account of tragedy, freedom is not 
the capacity to deny this vulnerability, but the possibility of living with it as our own. The 
tragic hero is not above fate; rather, his acceptance of fate is also a reaffirmation of his 
world-view that, while remaining authentic and secure, yet recognizes its own 
vulnerability. The sublimity of tragedy derives from its presentation of our essential 
duality—of freedom as suffering: 
 
Thus beings who declare themselves free from all morality, such as the 
evil demons painted by folk superstition or by a writer’s imagination, and 
humans similar to them; also beings who are free from the coercion of 
sensuousness, such as we regard pure intellects, and humans who have 
extricated themselves from this coercion to a greater extent than human 
weakness permits—all these are equally unfit for tragedy. In general, the 
concept of suffering and of a suffering in which we are supposed to 
participate already determines that only human beings in the full sense of 
the word can be the object of the suffering (“The Art of Tragedy” p. 
19/TS, p. 391). 
 
 
Taking seriously Schiller’s reference to “human beings in the full sense of the word,” 
[Menschen im vollen Sinne dieses Worts] the sublime would demand a radical rethinking 
of freedom as grounding disorientation, as identity founded in difference.82 It is precisely 
this paradoxical identity, where in acknowledging self-division we are most profoundly 
ourselves, that Schiller deems the “sublime spiritual disposition” [Diese erhabene 
Geistesstimmung] that “is the lot of strong and philosophical minds” [Los starker und 
philosophischer Gemüter]:  
Even the most painful loss does not drive them beyond the sort of 
composed melancholy that is always capable of being combined with a 
noticeable degree of pleasure. Only such minds, who alone are capable of 
                                                       
82 TS, p. 391. 
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separating themselves from themselves, enjoy the privilege of taking part 
in themselves and feeling their own suffering in the gentle reflection of 
sympathy (“On the Art of Tragedy”, my italics, p. 4/TS, p. 391).83 
 
Although this passage points to a certain tranquility that belongs to the sublime, bringing 
it yet closer to the beautiful, Schiller also makes the provocative claim that “taking part” 
in one’s own experience already implies that identity is an integrating activity—that to 
“feel” one’s own suffering requires an essentially disjointed subject.  Again, where Kant 
defines freedom as reason’s power to refuse this self-separation, Schiller demands the 
preservation of this difference: to feel whole is already to feel ourselves divided.  This 
notion of wholeness within the individual also informs Schiller’s account of human 
community, marking an important departure from Kant. While Kant locates the universal 
aspect of the sublime solely in our shared capacity to construct and adhere to the moral 
law, Schiller recognizes that, more fundamentally, we share in suffering the division of 
our being: unable to exhaust what we are able to feel in what we can know and do.  
The problematic notions of wholeness and totality pervade both Kant’s and 
Schiller’s works on the sublime. Kant writes that in our experience of the sublime “our 
imagination strives to progress towards infinity, while our reason demands absolute 
totality as a real idea…” (CJ/KU, p. 250).  For Kant, our realization of the 
unboundedness of nature, via the limitation of sensibility, leads to an awareness of 
reason’s limitlessness and our own supersensible freedom.84 Schiller’s concern with 
                                                       
83 “Auch der schmerzhafte Verlust führt sie nicht über eine Wehmut hinaus, mit der sich noch immer ein 
merklicher Grad des Vergnügens gatten kann. Sie, die allein fähig sind, sich von sich selbst zu trennen, 
genießen allein das Vorrecht, an sich selbst telizunehmen und eigenes Leiden in dem milden Widerschein 
der Sympathie zu empfinden” (ibid. p. 375). 
84 “[What happens is that] our imagination strives to progress towards infinity, while our reasons demands 
absolute totality as a real idea, and so [the imagination,] our power of estimating the magnitude of things in 
the world of sense, is inadequate to the idea. Yet this inadequacy itself is the arousal in us of the feeling that 
we have within us a supersensible power…” (CJ/KU, 250). 
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human totality involves an analogous development: the experience of the sublime moves 
us from the unfathomable infinity of nature to the human desire for wholeness, for self-
identity that is not self-denial.  In both cases the sublime turns us back to ourselves, 
suggesting a deeper reading of Kant’s claim that the sublime is not tied to the object, but 
to a particular form of self-relating.85  However, for Schiller this self-relating is not 
resolved in the suppression of the sensible by the law-giving capacity of reason; it 
remains instead as a questioning of wholeness that depends on human empathy.86  This 
idea of wholeness gets lost in Kant, as his account of the sublime veers towards a 
disembodied freedom as our highest calling and deepest sense of community.87 Schiller 
reminds us that the identity proper to human being cannot be the same as the totality of 
nature or of reason: 
It is, after all, peculiar to man that he unites in his nature the highest and 
the lowest; and if his moral dignity depends on his distinguishing strictly 
between the one and the other, his hope of joy and blessedness depends on 
                                                       
85 “We see from this at once that we express ourselves entirely incorrectly when we call this or that object 
of nature sublime, even though we might quite correctly call a great many natural objects 
beautiful…Instead, all we are entitled to say is that the object is suitable for exhibiting a sublimity that can 
be found in the mind [Wir können nicht mehr sagen, als daß der Gegenstand zur Darstellung einer 
erhabenheit tauglich sei, die im Gemüte angetroffen werden kann” (CJ/KU, 245). 
86 Beiser makes a similar argument, suggesting that Kant identifies human being with reason, while Schiller 
take a more holistic approach: “It is important to see that Schiller’s account of the will does not define its 
freedom simply in terms of its power to act on the moral law. Unlike Kant in his Grundlegung and second 
Kritik, Schiller does not think that the freedom of a human being consists in its acting on the moral law 
independent of motives and sensibility. Rather, Schiller explains its freedom in terms of its power to act or 
not act on the moral law. He states that the will stands between two domains: that of morality and that of 
nature. It can choose from which of these domains it receives its law. We use our freedom even when we 
follow the law of nature contrary to reason” (Schiller as Philosopher: A Re-Examination, p. 112).  Beiser 
also puts forth a connected claim concerning their views on the highest good: “While Schiller is indeed 
correct that Kant does not exclude sensibility as a motive for moral action, he underplays his deeper 
difference with Kant here: that the highest good consists in an equal cultivation and synthesis of sensibility 
and reason, individuality and universality” (p. 145). 
87 “Hence sublimity is contained not in any thing of nature, but only in our mind, insofar as we can become 
conscious of our superiority to nature within us, and thereby also to nature outside us (as far as it 
influences). Whatever arouses this feeling in us, and this includes the might [Macht] of nature that 
challenges our forces, is then (although improperly) called sublime.  And it is only by presupposing this 
idea within us, and by referring to it, that we can arrive at the idea of the sublimity of that being who 
arouses deep respect in us, not just by his might as demonstrated in nature, but even more by the ability, 
with which we have been endowed, to judge nature without fear and to think of our vocation as being 
sublimely above nature [über dieselbe]” (CJ/KU, 264, my italics). 
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a due and proper reconciliation of the opposites he has distinguished. An 
education that is to bring his dignity into harmony with his happiness will, 
therefore, have to see to it that those two principles are maintained in their 
utmost purity even while they are being most intimately fused (“Letters on 
the Aesthetic Education of Man”, p. 158).88               
 
It is clear that Schiller, like Kant, understands the sublime as a disclosure of a crucial 
difference; however he does not seek the essence of human freedom beyond this divided 
and dividing moment, but remains precariously within it. 
    Making himself at home in the unsettling space of difference, Schiller offers 
another approach to the violence that characterizes the sublime.  Kant suggests a number 
of ways in which the sublime violates; there is the violence of nature itself in the dynamic 
(or what Schiller calls the practical-) sublime—its threat to our existence; further, Kant 
presents reason as an oppressive force that should conquer nature and desire alike.89 But I 
would like to draw attention to Kant’s intimation of a much more nuanced form of 
violence, when he claims that in our experience of the sublime there is “a subjective 
movement of the imagination by which it does violence to the inner sense [eine subjektive 
Bewegung der Einbildungskraft, worduch sie dem inneren Sinne Gewalt antut]” (CJ/KU, 
259).  In introducing a rupture in time—the inner sense—Kant points to a conflict 
between the multiplicity of sense and the unity of comprehension that results in a 
specifically temporal paralysis. Kant provides us an opening to understand the 
                                                       
88 “Es ist dem Menschen einmal eigen, das Höchste und das Niedrigste in seiner Natur zu vereinigen, und 
wenn seine Würde auf einer strengen Unterscheidung des einen von dem andern beruht, so beruht auf 
einer geschickten Aufhebung dieses Untershieds seine Glückseligkeit. Die Kultur, welche seine Würde mit 
seiner Glückseligkeit in Übereinstimmung bringen soll, wird also für die höchste Reinheit jener beiden 
Prinzipien in ihrer innigsten Vermischung zu sorgen haben” (TS, 647). 
89 “In the case of what is theoretically-sublime, the cognitive instinct is contradicted by nature as an object 
of knowledge. In the case of what is practically-sublime, the instinct to preserve ourselves is contradicted 
by nature as an object of feeling. In the former scenario nature is considered merely as an object that should 
have expanded our knowledge; in the latter case it is represented as a power that can determine our own 
condition” (“On the Sublime,” p. 23/TS, p. 490). 
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captivating pain of the sublime: the sublime captures us—that is, it both engages and 
stills us—precisely because holding together difference is our vocation, our connection to 
the supersensible. Although Kant sees this paralysis as preliminary, Schiller suggests that 
returning to the space between passivity and activity—to the site where being and 
becoming converge—is our highest calling:  
 
In order, therefore, not to be mere world, he must impart form to matter; in 
order not to be mere form, he must give reality to the predisposition he 
carries within him. He gives reality to form when he brings time into 
being, when he confronts changelessness with change, the eternal unity of 
his own self with the manifold variety of the world. He gives form to 
matter when he annuls time again, when he affirms persistence within 
change, and subjugates the manifold variety of the world to the unity of 
his own self (“Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man”, p. 117).90 
 
There is a reformulation here of the strange temporality that Kant discovers in the 
experience of the sublime; what is for Kant a mere shock of timelessness becomes for 
Schiller time created, and annulled, in the reciprocity of freedom and nature, of self and 
reality. Schiller equates the opposition between the eternal and the temporal, or being and 
becoming, with that between the sensuous drive and the formal drive. And rather than 
attributing the paralysis of the sublime to the irreducible conflict between them, he 
introduces a third drive that makes their reconciliation possible: the play drive, which 
“would be directed toward annulling time within time, reconciling becoming with 
absolute being and change with identity [“der Spieltrieb also würde dahin gerichtet sein, 
                                                       
90 “Solange er bloß empfindet, bloß begehrt, und aus bloßer Begierde wirkt, ist er noch weiter nichts als 
Welt, wenn wir unter diesem Namen bloß den formlosen Inhalt der Zeit verstehen. Seine sinnlichkeit ist 
zwar allein, die sein Vermögen zur wirkenden Kraft macht, aber nur seine Persönlichkeit ist es, die sein 
Wirken zu dem seinigen macht. Um also bloß Welt zu sein, muß er der Anlage, die er in sich trägt, 
Wirklichkeit geben. Er verwirklichet die Form, wenn er die Zeit erschafft und dem Beharrlichen die 
Veränderung, der ewigen Einheit seines Ichs die Mannigfaltigkeit der Welt gegenüberstellt; er formt die 
Materie, wenn er die Zeit wieder aufhebt, Beharrlichkeit im Wechsel behauptet und die Mannigfaltifkeit der 
Welt der Einheit seines Ichs unterwürfig macht” (TS, p. 603). 
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die Zeit in der Zeit, aufzuheben, Werden mit absolutem Sein, Veränderung mit Identität 
zu vareinbaren]” (“Letters,” p. 126/TS, pp. 612-613). If along with Schiller we 
understand the sensuous drive as physical constraint (determinism), and the formal drive 
as moral constraint (autonomy), this would suggest that their harmony in freedom is a 
reciprocal play. Both the sensuous and the formal drive constrain us by constraining each 
other, and it is only through the action of the play drive that we can encounter the 
transitional space where freedom and necessity converge. 91 
Although Schiller argues that this intermediate drive is directed at and promoted 
by the beautiful, the sublime must have a place here too. Returning to the same language 
he uses in his account of the sublime character of tragedy, Schiller writes: “For, to mince 
matters no longer, man only plays when he is in the fullest sense of the word a human 
being, and he is only fully a human being when he plays” (p. 131).  Surely, the human 
being in the fullest sense of the world is not merely rational, but also made whole. While 
Schiller clearly connects the play drive with pleasure, the play drive also gives us access 
to a determinability that is not empty, and to a destabilizing uncertainty that is beyond 
and prior to both pleasure and pain: 
 
In the aesthetic state, then, man is naught, if we are thinking of any 
particular result rather than the totality of his powers, and considering the 
absence in him of any specific determination…By means of aesthetic 
culture, therefore, the personal worth of a man, or his dignity, inasmuch as 
this can depend solely on himself, remains completely indeterminate; and 
nothing more is achieved by it than that he is henceforth enabled by the 
grace of nature to make of himself what he will—that the freedom to be 
                                                       
91 “Both drives, therefore, exert constraint upon the psyche; the former through the laws of nature, the latter 
through the laws of reason. The play drive, in consequence, as the one in which both the others act in 
concert, will exert upon the psyche at once a moral and a physical constraint; it will, therefore, since it 
annuls all contingency, annul all constraint too, and set man free both physically and morally” (“Letters”, p. 
127). 
 79 
what he ought to be is completely restored to him (“Letters”, p. 147/TS, p. 
635). 
 
The determinability of the aesthetic state is not nothing, but rather openness or 
permeability; between the activity of self-determination, and the passivity of sensual 
becoming, there is a possibility for identity that recognizes its need for otherness. 
Freedom is not the ability to give the rule to nature in all its forms, but our infinite 
capacity to play with and suffer the limits of our responsibility. Schiller’s use of the term 
play need not remain fixed by its pleasurable connotations—indeed, as Freud astutely 
notes, it is precisely through play that we first begin to work out our fundamental 
anxieties and insecurities and to respond to the unknown.92 The sublime would represent 
this latter sense of play, where the same capacity to contemplate and reshape our 
relationship to the world and to ourselves might be both frightening and freeing. It is thus 
not only nature, but also play, that give the rule to art through genius. 
We can see the intimate connection between Schiller’s account of freedom—as 
the playful integration of the dual aspects of our being—and of self-consciousness.  In 
Kant’s terms, the process of unifying the manifold of intuition, or the unity of 
transcendental apperception, is the structure of self-consciousness: the “I” is the 
imaginative jointure of identity and division. Schiller transforms this foundational, 
spontaneous and mediating act of the imagination—the possibility of self-
consciousness—into the synthesizing play of freedom. In other words, Schiller makes an 
important move beyond Kant in clarifying how the structure of the “I” relates to the 
particular nature of our human freedom. Self-consciousness, like the freedom that is its 
                                                       
92 See: Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, SE Vol. XVIII, pp. 14-17 for a discussion of the 
Fort/Da game Freud’s grandson engages in to deal with his mother’s and father’s (Freud’s daughter’s) 
absence. See also: pp. 56-60 in Dufresne’s translation. 
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source and fulfillment, is the active identity of our sensible and supersensible natures, of 
change and changelessness. This relationship between freedom and self-consciousness 
that Schiller presents allows us to better understand how it is that the disorienting 
transition we experience in the sublime—not merely its resolution through the order of 
reason—leads us towards our highest calling.  Moreover, it is in bringing together 
freedom and self-consciousness in this way that Schiller can defend his inclusion of art in 
the realm of sublime experience.  It is not merely our separation from nature that 
announces itself in the sublime but, more importantly, an abyssal self-division as well.  
The alienation from ourselves that we experience in the sublime is thus also an essential 
aspect of self-consciousness—a stepping outside ourselves that allows us to become 
whole.  In order to grasp the possibility of our freedom we must allow ourselves to feel 
this intrinsic disjunction; for, as I have suggested, this possibility too is grounded in our 
ability to endure—to play and to suffer—in this place of (dis-) integration.  
   
3. Breaking Boundaries  
 
In Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism, a work widely associated with his 
“Fichtean” period and considered one of his more traditionally philosophical texts, the 
work of art and philosophical reflection are paired together as the culminating 
experiences of freedom.93  Taking up where Schiller leaves off, Schelling makes his own 
contributions towards a theory of aesthetic freedom. He intensifies the connection 
between art and freedom by developing an account of our relation to the unconscious as 
                                                       
93 “This universally acknowledged and altogether incontestable objectivity of intellectual intuition is art 
itself. For the aesthetic intuition is the intellectual intuition become objective” (System of Transcendental 
Idealism, p. 229/624). Herafter, cited as STI. 
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the essential activity of self-consciousness. Here, artistic creation and philosophy are 
complementary modes of expressing identity-in-difference—freedom neither collapses 
into Kantian constraint nor resolves itself within Schiller’s harmonious human being. The 
structure of the text is itself an enactment of forging a single narrative through a double 
history: the phases of self-consciousness are considered alongside the philosopher’s 
privileged observation of these phases, as Schelling deepens Schiller’s insights into the 
distance from ourselves that characterizes the feeling of the sublime and our engagement 
with tragedy. In his attempt to complete the transcendental philosophy of Kant and 
Fichte, Schelling comes to see freedom as a holding together of difference—a relating 
between consciousness and the unconscious (a relating both to ourselves and to nature) 
that is not reducible to Schiller’s form of integration.  
Schelling does maintain in this work that “the same powers of intuition which 
reside in the self can also be exhibited up to a certain point in nature,” illustrating his 
continued support of the Fichtean identity between the “I” and the “not-I” (p. 3).94  That 
is, it first appears that Schelling is merely reiterating Fichte’s account of the self-positing 
“I” as the unifying principle of both the Real and the Ideal—claiming that our knowledge 
of and activity in nature is grounded in the universalized structure of the “I”: 
Now it is certainly a productive activity that finds expression in willing; 
all free action is productive, albeit consciously productive. If we now 
suppose, since the two activities have only to be one in principle, that the 
same activity which is consciously productive in free action, is productive 
without consciousness in bringing about the world, then our predetermined 
                                                       
94 Fichte. Goudeli summarizes Fichte’s Wissenschaftlehre in the following, concise manner: 
“Consequently, Fichte’s major project is to provide an account of apperceptive subjectivity that would be 
liberated from the perplexities of the reflexive model. This task is carried out through Fichte’s major 
insight, which consists in his conception of the subject in terms of activity, as opposed to a static 
substratum or a logical concept…Through the introduction of the subject as sheer activity, indeed as 
productivity, Fichte mainly attempts to give a unified account of theoretical and practical reason, which 
would found the unitary nature of subjectivity. One of the fundamental goals of his thought, as he declares 
in 1795, is to ‘bring unity and coherence into the entire human being’” (p. 65). 
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harmony is real, and the contradiction resolved. Supposing that all this is 
really the case, then this fundamental identity, of the activity concerned in 
producing the world with that which finds expression in willing, will 
display itself in the former’s products, and these will have to appear as 
products of an activity at once conscious and nonconscious (STI, 
p.12/348-349).  
 
 
It is worth noting, however, that Schelling already concerns himself with a creativity that 
is “at once conscious and nonconscious;” whereas Fichte argues that the “Not-I” ought to 
be transformed by and into the “I” Schelling subtly shifts into a thinking of freedom in 
terms of the inseparability and mutual dependence of the conscious and nonconscious.95 
Further, this shift is made possible in part by Schelling’s linguistic move away from the 
“Not-I” as that which needs to be re-appropriated by the “I,” and in the direction of a 
more nuanced account of the unconscious/nonconscious in its identity with and resistance 
to consciousness: for Schelling, both consciousness (“I”) and the unconscious (“Not-I”) 
break down further into dualities of productivity and passivity.96 Despite his undeniable 
proximity to Fichte—as well as to Kant and Schiller—Schelling offers a way to 
understand the alterity of the unconscious as a condition for the realization of freedom. 
I will suggest that there are two, interconnected ways in which Schelling 
approaches the reality of freedom in the System: 1) through the identity of the 
unconscious/consciousness expressed in the sublime or beautiful art product and 2) in 
terms of the philosopher’s approach to what must exceed consciousness in order for self-
                                                       
95 See “Some Lectures Concerning the Scholar’s Vocation”, pp. 144-184 in: Daniel Breazeale, ed. Fichte: 
Early Philosophical Writings (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).  
96 Although as far as I can tell Schelling uses the terms nonconscious and unconscious interchangeably in 
this work, I limit myself to the latter term both for clarity and in the hopes that it leaves more room to 
understand the identity of activity and passivity that constitute it; further, insofar as I hope to develop a 
comparison with Freud, it is important to understand the unconscious in Schelling too as more than the lack 
of consciousness. 
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consciousness to be possible. Of course, the concept of the unconscious belongs to a long 
and varied philosophical history; I limit myself here to pointing out a certain thinking of 
the unconscious in terms of a nuanced account of repression, unique to Schelling’s early 
conception of freedom and developed in myriad ways throughout his work. To get an 
idea of the essential role repression plays in this regard, consider the following claim: 
“Since I seek to ground my knowledge only in itself, I enquire no further as to the 
ultimate ground of this primary knowledge (self-consciousness), which, if it exists, must 
necessarily lie outside knowledge. Self-consciousness is the lamp of the whole system of 
knowledge, but it casts its light ahead only, not behind” (p.18/357-358). Notice that, on 
the one hand, Schelling insists along with Fichte that self-consciousness is the bedrock of 
knowledge and the original, free deed of philosophy; on the other hand, Schelling 
hesitantly marks out space beyond knowledge (“ultimate ground”)—even though he 
disavows it (“I enquire no further”) as soon as it appears. As we will see, this logic in 
which the recognition or creation of a boundary already reaches out beyond the boundary, 
is essential to Schelling’s explanation of the dialectic of consciousness and the 
unconscious. In retracing the mutual development of self and reality, Schelling relies on 
the philosopher’s unique ability to locate and interpret the symptoms of unconscious 
activity.  In contrast to Kant’s account of freedom as a form of repression, and Schiller’s 
integrative freedom that would claim to eliminate repression, Schelling’s freedom is an 
active, therapeutic engagement with the process of repression: this engagement is 
aesthetic insofar as it occurs in intuition, resistant to the dictates of reason and the 
understanding, whether in the intellectual intuition of the philosopher or the sensible 
intuition of the artwork. As with Kant and Schiller, it is the feeling of freedom that 
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Schelling concerns himself with. However, for Schelling, it is neither a feeling of our 
superiority over nature nor of our harmony with nature, but precisely the feeling of our 
identity as a relating to the irreducibly other that discloses our freedom: the point of 
convergence between the beautiful and the sublime. 
 In order to understand this feeling of identity, Schelling maintains that we need to 
begin from ordinary experience: from the opposition between subject and object that 
would seem to refute such identity. This opposition is not—as with Fichte—merely a 
semblance, an error that awaits correction; rather, Schelling immediately draws our 
attention to the truth of this ordinary experience—taking up a properly philosophical 
approach to identity that is itself grounded in a sympathetic distance, a detached 
attentiveness. It is towards this end that Schelling posits the distinction (and connection) 
between the philosopher and the self that is under investigation: 
 
Here for the first time we may perceive very clearly the difference 
between the philosopher’s standpoint and that of his object. We, who 
philosophize, know that the limitation of the objective has its sole ground 
in the intuitant or subjective. The intuiting self as such does not and cannot 
know this, as now becomes clear. Intuiting and limitation are originally 
one. But the self cannot simultaneously intuit and intuit itself as intuiting, 
and so cannot intuit itself as limiting either (p. 54/403-404). 
 
The demand of philosophy, which “is therefore nothing else but the free imitation, the 
free recapitulation of the original series of acts into which the one act of self-
consciousness evolves,” is the bringing to light of what must have been repressed from 
consciousness (p. 49/397-398).  In order for there to be consciousness, which requires 
opposition or limitation, there must already be a repression of its creative, non-
oppositional ground—a repression of its origin. The self’s inability to know that it is the 
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ground of the objective is part of what it means to be a self; but because the philosopher 
is able to think beyond this defining limitation, it appears that some sort of encounter 
with this unknowability is equally essential.  We are confronted with the passive/active 
duality that, for Schelling, constitutes consciousness as well as the unconscious. The 
viability of this philosophical dissociation depends upon the possibility of transforming 
the structure of the self—of recognizing its structure as self-transformation—which 
Schelling equates with freedom. Schelling understands philosophy as an enactment of 
freedom insofar as it is the conscious reconstruction of unconscious self-limitation.  And 
it is only in the “free imitation” of the epochs of self-consciousness, where the 
philosopher dwells in the liminal as such, that the repressed becomes available to us as 
the beyond such a boundary exposes even as it distances us from it.  The philosopher’s 
identity, too, is divided: in consciously reconstructing the limitations of the self, these 
very limits show themselves in their double relation—as both a withdrawal from, and an 
openness to, that which resists limitation. Freedom is just this capacity to reopen the 
boundaries of the self, to “interrupt this [unconscious] evolution” and to disentangle the 
transitionality of self-consciousness from the stability of self-knowledge (p.49/397-398). 
The philosopher approaches the repressed, then, not as an object of possible cognition 
unavailable to the layman, but as a limit—as an intimation of freedom grounded in 
vulnerability. Schelling is not claiming that, from the philosophical perspective, we can 
finally know the self-limitating activity or shed light “behind” it; as with the Freudian 
model, the philosopher only gains access to the unconscious through the conflicts 
manifested in its return—in this case, these traces are the distinguishing oppositional 
structures of each epoch of self-consciousness.   
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 Part of what makes Schelling’s approach to repression so important, in contrast to 
Hegelian dialectic for example, is his insistence on a grounding activity that is not 
surpassed or exhausted in the development of self-consciousness; it is precisely because 
the repressed can never be entirely appropriated, because the “I” requires resistance to be 
what it is, that the unconscious is the impetus for consciousness and its development 
towards freedom.97 We would do well to return to Schelling’s introductory remarks, 
where he relates the nonconscious productivity of nature to the conscious productivity of 
human freedom:  
 
How both the objective world accommodates to presentations in us, and 
presentations in us to the objective world, is unintelligible unless between 
the two worlds, the ideal and the real, there exists a predetermined 
harmony. But this latter is itself unthinkable unless the activity, whereby 
the objective world is produced, is at bottom identical with that which 
expresses itself in volition, and vice versa (p. 12/348-349). 
 
The identity Schelling points to here, between the activities resulting in nature and 
freedom, suggests there is also a common form of repression; just as the productivity of 
nature is concealed in its inhibited products, while at the same time expressing itself 
through them, it must also be the case that the productivity of freedom both withdraws 
from and is realized through our actions. Repression, as a process both limiting and 
                                                       
97 Edward Beach develops a useful set of terms to deal with the differences between Schelling’s and 
Hegel’s dialectical thinking in The Potencies of God(s): Schelling’s Philosophy of Mythology in terms of 
Erzeugengsdialektik and Aufhebungsdialektik. He writes, “Hegelian dialectic typically operates by 
subjecting each concept to a series of ‘thought experiments’ or tests for internal coherency. In the course of 
these tests, the concept’s manifest purport becomes ‘sublated’ (aufgehoben)—that is to say, the surface 
significance, which gives rise to incoherencies, is cancelled, while at the same time the deeper kernel of 
truth is retained…Schellingian dialectic, by contrast, seeks to infuse the process of reasoning with a strong 
volitional component, so as to be capable of recovering the willing that allegedly precedes rational thought 
itself…Schelling’s treatment of dialectic obtains its successive forms not as though implicitly contained in 
the foregoing ones, but rather as produced or reproduced (erzeugt) by a kind of procreative causality which 
is supposed to reenact the processes by which the outer universe itself has evolved” (pp. 84-85). 
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necessary to self-consciousness, discloses an essential aspect of our identity with nature. 
Schelling’s notion of aesthetic freedom thus evokes an unknowable, repressed 
unconscious that we nonetheless must relate to; this marks a decisive move beyond 
Fichte’s negatively defined, nonconscious “Not-I” and Kant’s absolute exclusion of the 
noumenal realm. Schelling’s intellectual intuition, or the grasping of the unity of 
consciousness and the unconscious in reflection, is ultimately a free relation to the self-
constituting, grounding act of repression.  
 This idea of the repressed as inaccessible to knowledge and yet interpretable is 
brought into relief through Schelling’s emphasis on the boundary; he argues that the 
development of self-consciousness depends upon a conflict between and reconciliation of 
the self as ideal activity or that which “goes beyond the boundary,” and self as real 
activity or a “becoming bounded” (p. 66/418-19). I would suggest that this is one way to 
bring together Schelling’s understanding of our freedom with the repressed: insofar as 
consciousness is a limitless demand for the construction of limits, it must exceed the 
opposition of “within” and “without;” the original activity where real and ideal are 
posited in their identity, “both inside and outside the boundary at once,” is also the 
original activity of repression (p. 67/419-420). Thus the self, an essentially boundary 
phenomenon, turns on a questioning of that which is fundamentally transitional—of that 
which, as in the return of the repressed, opens up precisely what it seems to foreclose.  It 
is the availability of this transitional structure—rather than any particular material that 
has been repressed—that characterizes intellectual intuition and the work of genius.  
 I will consider only briefly the way this structure is made manifest in intellectual 
intuition, before going on to its expression in the work of art. Schelling writes, 
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The self is such an [intellectual] intuition, since it is through the self’s own 
knowledge of itself that that very self (the object) first comes into being. 
For since the self (as object) is nothing else but the very knowledge of 
itself, it arises simply out of the fact that it knows itself; the self itself is 
thus a knowing that simultaneously produces itself (as object). Intellectual 
intuition is the organ of all transcendental thinking. For the latter sets out 
to objectify itself through freedom, what is otherwise not an object; it 
presupposes a capacity, simultaneously to produce certain acts of mind, 
and so to intuit that the producing of the object and the intuiting itself are 
absolutely one; but this very capacity is that of intellectual intuition (p. 27/ 
368-369).   
 
Schelling argues that intellectual intuition is not a mysterious or magical revelation; 
rather, it is the free action of grasping identity, paradoxically, insofar as it is rooted in 
duality. Although he uses the term knowledge here, Schelling is essentially discovering a 
different kind of relationship between subject and object altogether. The activity that 
grounds subject and object—the self as self-producing/knowing or intellectual 
intuition—is non-conceptual: it is the site where activity and passivity, knowing and 
feeling, are not yet opposed. It is the intuiting of the holding together (or identity) of 
duality and identity that Schelling terms intellectual intuition; it is not the unconscious 
that is made conscious through intellectual intuition, but the boundary that unites and 
divides them. I only want to point out that Schelling is primarily interested in the activity 
that binds duplicity and unity; his focus is on the status of the boundary itself—of the 
boundary as the paradigmatically repressed—rather than the reality or ideality it delimits.   
Not only does the very positing of intellectual intuition present a marked contrast 
with Kant, the freedom that is intuited through it hardly bears a resemblance to autonomy 
or moral obligation. Schelling implies that freedom is in fact an acknowledgment of 
irreducible resistance, distancing himself as much from Schiller’s harmonious 
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reconciliation of nature and reason as from Kant. It is really only through his 
understanding of art as “the only true and eternal organ and document of philosophy,” 
however, that Schelling’s original contributions to aesthetic freedom are realized. 
Schelling contends that which is expressed sensibly in the intuition of art, and 
intellectually in the intuition of the philosopher, is not an object of knowledge. The 
unconscious is not appropriated by consciousness—nature is neither overcome by (Kant, 
Fichte) nor in harmony with (Schiller) reason—but grasped, in its very otherness, as its 
own: 
 
The intuition we have postulated [intuition of art] is to bring together that 
which exists in separation in the appearance of freedom and in the 
intuition of the natural product; namely identity of the conscious and the 
unconscious in the self, and consciousness of this identity (p. 219/612). 
 
Feeling ourselves to be the identity of the conscious and the unconscious—this is what art 
can offer us that neither practical nor theoretical philosophy can. It is important to note 
that it is not the unconscious as such that is grasped in aesthetic intuition, but rather its 
unity with consciousness. In contrast to Kant and to Schiller, Schelling posits that the 
highest act of freedom is one “in which freedom and necessity are absolutely united”: 
consciousness intuits its connection to the unconscious while allowing it to maintain its 
integrity as unconscious (p. 220/613-14).  
The work of art is no longer a useful enjoinder towards the categorical imperative, 
nor even a necessary moment in human progress towards moral perfection. It is quite 
simply the true expression of our freedom and the free expression of truth: 
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If aesthetic intuition is merely transcendental [intellectual] intuition 
become objective, it is self-evident that art is at once the only true and 
eternal organ and document of philosophy, which ever and again 
continues to speak to us of what philosophy cannot depict in external 
form, namely the unconscious element in acting and producing, and its 
original identity with the conscious. Art is paramount to the philosopher 
precisely because it opens to him, as it were, the holy of holies, where 
burns in eternal and original unity as if in a single flame, that which in 
nature and history is rent asunder, and in life and action, no less than in 
though, must forever fly apart (p. 231/626-628). 
 
Although Schelling’s language here is that of identity, it is more specifically the language 
of identity as opening.  The work of genius does not present us with the “holy of holies,” 
but lets us confront it in a way that feels true. Aesthetic freedom, for Schelling, is a 
transformative communication—a communication of truth that exists only as resistance 
and in transition. This is the case both for the genius that produces the work of art and the 
one that can receive it; there is no knowledge passed on here, but only the opening 
itself—the active receptivity. As “an unconscious infinity [synthesis of freedom and 
nature],” the work of art is a testament to the possibility of renegotiating the boundaries 
of our existence.  
 It is at this point in his exposition of the art product/production that Schelling 
invokes the sublime: 
 
Every aesthetic production proceeds from the feeling of an infinite 
contradiction, and hence also the feeling which accompanies completion 
of the art-product must be one of an infinite tranquility…However, the 
opposition between beauty and sublimity is one which occurs only in 
regard to the object, not in regard to the subject of intuition. For the 
difference between the beautiful and the sublime work of art consists 
simply in this, that where beauty is present, the infinite contradiction is 
eliminated in the object itself; whereas when sublimity is present, the 
conflict is not reconciled in the object itself, but merely uplifted to a point 
at which it is involuntarily eliminated (pp. 225-226/620-622). 
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Like Kant, Schelling seems to differentiate between the beautiful and the sublime in 
terms of the subject/object divide; as with Schiller, they are reconciled in the highest 
expression of freedom. Schelling suggests that while the beautiful and the sublime are 
present in the object as distinct forms, they are present in the subject in their identity. By 
asserting that the sublime does not merely belong to the subject but is transformed 
through it, Schelling intimates that there is something about the sublime that complicates 
the correspondence or communication between subject and object as such. While it is 
unclear what Schelling intends in claiming that through the sublime conflict is “uplifted 
to a point at which it is involuntarily eliminated,” it might best be understood as a 
disruption and recreation of the boundary between subject and object. Thus it is not the 
infinite contradiction between consciousness and the unconscious that is “eliminated:” 
instead, the boundaries of this conflict—between subject and object, freedom and 
nature—show themselves to be neither objectively there nor subjectively produced. 
Schelling reminds us that the work of art, and particularly the sublime work of art, 
essentially opens up the limits of self and world.     
 
 
4. The Mythological Imagination 
 
Foreshadowing several strands of thinking prominent in The Philosophy of Art, as well as 
in many of his later works, Schelling ties the unconscious to Greek mythology in The 
System of Transcendental Idealism: 
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To explain what we mean by a single example: the mythology of the 
Greeks, which undeniably contains an infinite meaning and a symbolism 
for all ideas, arose among a people, and in a fashion, which both make it 
impossible to suppose any comprehensive forethought in devising it, or in 
the harmony whereby everything is united into one great whole. So it is 
with every true work of art, in that every one of them is capable of being 
expounded ad infinitum, as though it contained an infinity of purposes, 
while yet one is never able to say whether this infinity has lain within the 
artist himself, or resides only within the artwork (p. 225/619-620). 
 
Again, Schelling problematizes the boundary between subject and object—the infinity of 
purposes cannot be located in the producer, the art product nor its interpreter. In the case 
of mythology, Schelling suggests, this inability to locate the meaning is particularly 
evident. The world that Greek mythology brings into being is at the same time so 
organically whole and so excessively meaningful that it resists or expands the 
possibilities of artifice (which needs an author) and of nature (which has none). In The 
Philosophy of Art Schelling reasserts the privileged position of art that he began to lay 
out in his System, and in particular focuses on mythology as its culmination. This section 
will deal with his arguments towards this claim, emphasizing the notion of symbolism 
that Schelling puts forth here. I hope to show that the highest expression of freedom—
which is also necessity—must be transformational: a reframing of our relationship to the 
world that must also destabilize us. Already provoking comparison with Freud in that 
mythology becomes fundamental to our self-understanding, Schelling also moves closer 
to a psychoanalytic account of the uncanny: mythology, Schelling argues, is intrinsically 
related to a shifting boundary between fantasy and truth.98 He writes, “The world of the 
gods is the object neither of mere understanding nor of reason, but rather can be 
comprehended only by fantasy” (p. 38).  Further, as we will see, Schelling’s approach to 
                                                       
98 It is in fact in Schelling’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Mythology that the definition Freud makes use of 
first appears. 
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the chaos and formlessness proper to the sublime is similarly implicated in this dialectic 
of imagination and truth: 
 
For reason and fantasy limitation, too, becomes either simply a form of the 
absolute or, considered as limitation, an inexhaustible source of jest and 
play, for one is allowed to joke with limitation, since it takes nothing away 
from the essence and is within itself nullity or nothingness. Hence, the 
most brazen jesting plays about within the world of the Greek gods with 
fantasy’s images of the gods (p. 37). 
   
This sense of playing with limitation should recall Schiller’s conciliatory play drive, and 
indeed his works are cited quite often and at some length throughout The Philosophy of 
Art. The limitations of the gods, Schelling argues, represent the perfect union of form and 
formlessness: it is “precisely the missing characteristics in the manifestations of the gods 
that lend them the highest charm and yet still weave them back together into various 
relationships. The mystery of all life is the synthesis of the absolute with limitation” (36). 
In other words, it is only in the play of limitations, in playing with limitations, that the 
limitless can be felt. 
 The meaning of Schelling’s claim that mythology is “the necessary condition and 
first content of all art” is not by any means obvious; that is, just what makes the union of 
the absolute and the particular in mythology so fundamental still needs to be worked out. 
One approach comes through Schelling’s understanding of mythology as symbolism and, 
specifically, as a primal symbolism: “Representation of the absolute with absolute 
indifference of the universal and the particular within the particular is possible only 
symbolically” (p. 45). It remains to be seen what symbolic representation is for Schelling 
and how mythology can be its founding moment. Schelling defines symbolism in contrast 
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to, or rather as the indifference point between, schematism and allegory. The schema of a 
work of art, and here Schelling reinvigorates the Kantian term, is the artist’s guiding 
“rule”:99  
 
The schema is the rule guiding his production, but he intuits this universal 
simultaneously in the particular. First he will produce only a rough outline 
of the whole according to this intuition; then he develops the individual 
parts completely until the schema gradually becomes for him a fully 
concrete image, and the work itself is completed simultaneously with the 
fully determined image in his imagination (p. 46). 
   
The schema of the genius suggests that what the artist imagines (the universal) is 
inseparable from what he produces (the particular), where each element of the production 
is meaningful only in its relation to a whole that is continuously created anew. As 
Schelling is quick to point out, language is perhaps the best example of schematism—
where we “make use of merely universal designations even for the designation of the 
particular. To that extent even language itself is nothing more than perpetual 
schematization” (p. 46). This process of re-discovering and reshaping the whole through 
the particular, while at the same time already having to rely on an intuition of the whole, 
is the essential contradiction of language: in speaking, we invoke the shared experience 
that emerges through and is transformed by such speaking. As we will see, this will be 
                                                       
99 It is interesting and useful in this context to consider Kant’s definition of schematism, and its relation to 
the imagination, from his Critique of Pure Reason: “We will call this formal and pure condition of the 
sensibility, to which the use of the understanding is restricted, the schema of this concept of the 
understanding, and we will call the procedure of the understanding with these schemata the schematism of 
the pure understanding. The schema is in itself always only a product of the imagination; but since the 
synthesis of the latter has as its aim no individual intuition but rather only the unity in the determination of 
sensibility, the schema is to be distinguished from an image” (CPR, p. 273/A140/B179). 
 95 
essential in understanding Schelling’s later conception of language as “faded 
mythology.”100 
 If schematism suggests a peculiar vulnerability of the universal to its particular 
manifestations, where the meaning remains as it were ‘in transition’ or beholden to its 
concrete expressions, Schelling tells us that allegory must be the reverse. Rather than the 
particular being always already imbued with the quality of the universal, its meaning 
dependent on the system of which it is a part, here the universal takes on the aspect of the 
particular—the stability and limitation of an object. In allegory, the artwork sheds light 
on the framework of meaning we already share; in schematism, such a framework is 
shown to be malleable, itself the product of imagination and freedom. It is as if in 
schematism the living quality—the capacity for transformation—belongs to the creation 
of meaning; in allegory, to our ability to receive it.  
Mythology, then, would be the living union of the universal and particular, of 
meaning and its instantiation. Myths do not signify the universal, the worldview from 
which they emerge, as allegory does; nor do myths produce the universal, a reality within 
which it can be meaningful, as schematism does. Rather, intention and production 
converge in mythology precisely because in its particularity “it itself is simultaneously 
also the universal”(p. 47).  The world of mythology is thus neither created nor given. In a 
departure from his discussion of freedom and the work of art in his System, Schelling 
shifts his emphasis toward the role of meaning (Sinn). There is a mutual dependency 
between being and meaning in mythology—a life or personality—that defines the 
symbolic. Or, as Schelling puts it, “Meaning here is simultaneously being itself, passed 
                                                       
100 “One is almost tempted to say: language itself is only faded mythology; what mythology still preserves 
in living and concrete differences is preserved in language only in abstract and formal differences” 
(Historical-Critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology, p. 52). 
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over into the object itself and one with it. As soon as we allow these beings to mean or 
signify something, they themselves are no longer anything” (p. 49). Although we can 
discover allegorical and schematic meaning in mythology, this is only because 
symbolism creates the space for both; indeed, the very possibilities of allegory and 
schematism already depend upon the union of meaning and being in symbolism, which is 
fundamentally expressed for Schelling in mythology: 
 
Hence, one can also demonstrate convincingly—and I will do so in what 
follows—that the Homeric myth, and to that extent Homer himself, was 
absolutely the first element in the beginning of Greek poesy. The 
allegorical poesy and philosopheme, as Heyne calls it, were entirely the 
work of later periods. The synthesis is first (p. 48). 
 
Insofar as Schelling insists that all “thinking is simple schematization” (theoretical) and 
that “all action, in contrast, is allegorical,” (practical) the primacy of their synthesis 
would entail a primacy of feeling (of the aesthetic). 
 Schelling sees that this simultaneity of meaning and being that characterizes the 
mythological challenges certain conceptions of freedom and sublimity. Indeed, Schelling 
suggests that morality “like sickness and death, only plagues mortals,” and that the 
freedom of the gods—the freedom expressed in mythology—has nothing to do with 
morality at all. Equally, the sublime character of tragedy depends upon a realization that 
even the highest morality, the most righteous suffering, still evidences “the boundaries 
and limitations to which human beings are subject” (p. 55). But the freedom of the gods, 
unrelated to autonomy and obligation, is yet tied up with necessity and fate; we know this 
through the prophesies fulfilled by Uranus, Kronos and Zeus, their struggles no less futile 
than Oedipus’. The mythological world is a primordial working out of the boundaries 
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between thinking and acting, desire and truth—freedom and necessity. As we might learn 
from the gods, freedom is not the absence of limitations but the capacity to play with 
them.      	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II. Uncanny Freedom 
 
 
Let all come out, 
However vile! However base it be, 
I must unlock the secret of my birth. 
The woman, with more than woman’s pride, is shamed 
By my low origin. I am the child of Fortune, 
The giver of good, and I shall not be shamed. 
She is my mother; my sisters are the Seasons; 
My rising and my falling march with theirs. 
Born thus, I ask to be no other man 
Than that I am, and will know who I am—Sophocles, Oedipus Rex 
  
 
 
My hope in this chapter is to show that Schelling’s intuition that tragedy is the 
convergence of freedom and necessity in The Philosophy of Art needs to be re-examined 
in light of his Freiheitsschrift. Ultimately, I will suggest that the irreducible remainder of 
the latter, its disruption of both past and future, is the tragic core of freedom itself. Before 
turning to the Freiheitsschift, and to his account of unconscious guilt and original sin that 
Schelling draws from Kant’s Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, I look at how 
the Oedipal tragedy and freedom outlined in the Philosophy of Art may be said to define 
the psychoanalytic project.101 It is worth recalling in this regard Sean McGrath’s 
description of Freud as a “tragic” thinker—a characterization that, in the context of that 
work, serves to minimize Freud’s relevance to Schelling’s later philosophy of 
                                                       
101 Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. Trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. 
Hudson (New York: HarperOne, 2008).  
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redemption. While McGrath claims that Freud’s worldview is tragic because he doesn’t 
grant any ultimate meaning to existence, I would suggest that psychoanalytic therapy is in 
fact motivated by and reliant upon the same tragic freedom that emerges from Schelling’s 
Freiheitsschrift.102  
The unity of necessity and freedom by which Schelling defines the tragic, 
exemplified in his reading of Oedipus, should be understood as a crucial deviation from 
both Kant’s and Schiller’s views on the sublimity of tragedy; as we saw in the last 
chapter, such a departure is already evident in Schelling’s insight into the transformation 
of subject/object relations that characterize the sublime. That is, it is essential to 
Schelling’s conception of the sublime that the limits between subject and object remain 
porous—that the sublime is, above all, a reawakening to freedom grounded in an 
irreducible liminality. After a brief recounting of the facts of the plot, Schelling writes of 
Oedipus: 
That this guilty person, a person who after all only succumbed to the 
superior power of fate, nevertheless is punished, was necessary precisely 
in order to show the triumph of freedom, and constituted a recognition of 
freedom and the honor due it. The protagonist had to struggle against fate; 
otherwise there was no struggle at all, no expression of freedom. He had to 
succumb within that which is subject to necessity. Yet in order not to 
allow necessity to overcome him without simultaneously overcoming it, 
the protagonist also had to atone voluntarily for this guilt—guilt imposed 
by fate itself. This is the most sublime idea and the greatest victory of 
freedom: voluntarily to bear the punishment for an unavoidable 
transgression in order to manifest his freedom precisely in the loss of that 
very same freedom, and to perish amid a declaration of that free will (The 
Philosophy of Art, p. 253).103 
                                                       
102 Heinz Politzer, Freud & Tragedy. Trans. Michael Mitchell (Riverside: Ariadne Press, 2006). Here, 
Politzer discusses several strains of Freud’s thought that converge with tragedy, including the idea of the 
tragedy endemic to the therapeutic process. 
103 See also Schmidt’s discussion of this point in reference to Schelling’s tenth letter in Letters on 
Dogmatism and Criticism, cited in On Germans and Other Greeks: “In order not to transgress the bounds 
of art, tragedy was obliged to have the mortal succumb; yet, in order to compensate for this humiliation of 
human freedom imposed by art, it also had to allow him to undergo punishment—even for a crime 
committed on account of fate…It was a great idea to have man willingly accept punishment even for an 
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It is not that freedom is manifested through the hero’s sublime sacrifice, as Kant and even 
the early Schelling would have it, but rather that freedom itself is revealed as tragic. 
Freedom is actualized only through relating to its Other—that is, through the force of 
necessity. Human freedom thus coincides with the act of divine creation, where the 
barren logic of the potencies only breaks through to existence in the perversion of order. 
In both cases, evil is the indispensible precondition of individuation and self-
consciousness—to be free is to take responsibility for the darkness of that decision which 
conditions and resists the harmony of reason. 
As we will see in Schelling’s Freiheitsschrift, the redemptive possibility of the future 
is dependent upon our continued engagement with the past: freedom, the decision for 
good or evil, is atemporal in the sense that it presses beyond the limits of consciousness 
and presence. In just this way, the unfolding of the Oedipal tragedy forces us to 
experience the uncanny temporality of a prophecy that arrives too early (before the first 
scene, before Oedipus is born) and too late (after the deeds have been done, after his 
punishment has begun).  The initial prophecy, external to the action that it sets in motion, 
is not yet an expression of the deeper unity of freedom and necessity: it is treated as an 
external given, and thus as something to be manipulated, controlled and avoided—a fact 
of nature. Only with the return of the prophecy, its (re-)appearance within the narrative as 
both memory and prediction, do we come to understand that the crucial error occurs in 
assuming that the past can be known and therein overcome.  
 
                                                       
inevitable crime; in this way he was able to demonstrate his freedom precisely through the loss of this 
freedom” (p. 77). 
 101 
 
 
 
1. The Fate of Freedom  
 
If Oedipus Rex were to begin at the beginning, with the prophecy given to Laius and 
Jocasta before the birth of their son, with the mutilation and banishment of Oedipus, it 
might still be a tragedy but not the tragedy of freedom; the belated arrival of Teirisius, 
however, is evocative of the haunting quality of the prophetic as such, displaced and 
pervasive, already and yet-to-come, that drives Schelling’s system of freedom. We learn 
that language, whether in the telling of Oedipus’ fate or in the peculiar discomfort of his 
own name, is both deceptive and revelatory. The prophecy protects neither Oedipus nor 
his family from evil; indeed, given the inevitability it lays claim to, we might wonder at 
how the speech act of the prophet assures the very future it proclaims. One is tempted to 
ask: If the prophecy were never received, would its truth have been secured in another 
fashion? The deeper impulse behind this question suggests that a central motif of 
Oedipus’ story is a destabilizing form of knowing—of receiving truth—that transforms 
what is known. It is in this space that prophecy and self-consciousness converge as acts 
of awareness that inevitably alter the truth they would get hold of. Here, where 
subjectivity and interpretability do not exclude truth, Oedipus discovers his freedom. 
Oedipus recognizes that fate, like freedom, can become a mode of questioning and 
disrupting necessity; that his past (the meaning of the prophecy) is no more secured than 
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his future (the nature of its fulfillment) and that the lifeless closure of objective 
knowledge is not possible in matters of blood and guilt.104    
Indeed, it is in regards to the familial—the abyssal beginning from which the 
prophet derives authority—that Schelling’s interpretation of Oedipus resonates with the 
aims of psychoanalytic therapy. The particular contents of the Oedipal complex are less 
important than the manner in which we take up its inexorable repetition. Oedipus, in 
killing his father and having sex with his mother, does not know what he is doing: his 
misrecognition of others, which offers the opportunity for authentic self-discovery, is a 
result of his conflating self-consciousness with objective knowledge. All of us, according 
to Freud, are destined to the same fate—to gain self-consciousness through 
acknowledging our blindness to the sources of our aggression and desire. One might 
think that Freud, an atheist and dismantler of superstition, would have no use for an 
antiquated concept like fate. Yet accepting responsibility for the unconscious—working 
out how this is possible and indeed beneficial—is the goal of psychoanalytic therapy. 
That is, Freud as analyst is interested in analyzing and thus interrupting fate through the 
interpretation and integration of the repressed. The victim of fate, the analysand, is 
alienated from his unconscious desires.  Or, as Freud puts it in Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle,  
What psychoanalysis reveals in the transference phenomena of neurotics 
appears also in the life of normal persons. With such persons, one has the 
impression of a persecuting fate or of something demonic in their 
experience, and from the outset psychoanalysis has considered such a fate 
to be mainly self-imposed by the individual and determined by early 
infantile influences (p. 63/SE XVIII p. 21). 
                                                       
104 Schelling’s emphasis on prophecy and the role of the prophet is particularly notable in Ages of the 
World; prophecy is there presented both as the power belonging to the writer of the would-be “heroic 
poem” (to whom, perhaps, the work is dedicated) and our mode of relating to the future (p. 119). In contrast 
to narrating the past and knowing the present—we “prophesize” the future (p. 113). 
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After briefly recounting the tale of Tancred and Clorinda, where the hero kills his 
beloved twice, Freud concludes: “Given such observations…we will be so courageous as 
to assume that in the mind there really is a repetition compulsion which supersedes the 
pleasure principle” (p. 64/p. 22). But this is not to say that fate remains unchanged in 
psychoanalysis; that the necessity of unknown, external forces is merely transferred from 
supernatural powers to the unconscious. Rather, it is the pleasure principle that grounds 
Freud’s determinism—that functions as a mechanical, quantifiable explanation for 
psychical acts. Only the gradually acknowledged force of the compulsion to repeat—the 
great exception to the pleasure principle—and the connection between this compulsion to 
notions of fate and the “demonic,” is intrinsically related to the free act of questioning the 
coherence of our constitutive stories. Which is to say: pleasure and death are forms of 
compulsion that, at the same time, must be acknowledged in order to bring us a measure 
of freedom. 
As I have suggested, the uncanny marks a similar disruption of reality—a 
possibility for the re-inscription of fate that presents itself as fate. More than that, the 
uncanny is a psychoanalytic acknowledgement of Schelling’s intuition that freedom is the 
hidden source of necessity—that order and reason can never entirely sublimate their dark 
and unruly origins:  
Following the eternal act of self-revelation, the world as we now behold it, 
is all rule, order and form; but the unruly lies ever in the depths as though 
it might again break through, and order and form nowhere appear as 
original, but it seems as though what had initially been unruly had been 
brought to order. This is the incomprehensible basis of reality in things, 
the irreducible remainder which cannot be resolved into reason by the 
greatest exertion but always remains in the depths (FS, p. 34/SW VII, 360). 
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For Oedipus (and Antigone after him), the tragic task of freedom is to actively engage 
with this “irreducible remainder,” to articulate and deconstruct the prophecies we live out 
with the priority of the “unruly” ever in mind. As Schelling reminds us, and Freud the 
analyst exhorts us, we have the capacity and the obligation to see that we are blind: only 
then can we begin to take responsibility for the unconscious structures and wishes that 
guide and give meaning to our experience and to existence itself. To be free is not just to 
accept guilt for what we could not or would not know; we must remain available to the 
empowerment and vulnerability this transformative knowing entails.  
All this is to suggest that the dichotomy of fate and freedom—a dichotomy that is 
sublimated for Schelling in his Philosophy of Art—itself demands interpretation. Odo 
Marquard, who has so fruitfully penetrated the interstices of psychoanalysis and 
Schelling’s philosophy (and of transcendental philosophy more generally), opens up such 
an analysis in “The End of Fate?” Already in the title, Marquard plays with the 
ambivalence of human ends: bearing finitude (death) and meaning (purpose), we 
question and struggle against fate while freedom is only proved in defeat. Tracing the 
development of the concept of fate in correlation with that of God, Marquard brings into 
focus our fixation on the rigid opposition: omnipotent or powerless. The death of God, no 
less than the death of (tragic) fate, signals a failed compromise-formation—betraying our 
resistance to the fundamental ambivalence and unknowability of the unconscious: 
God is the end of fate. If that is the case, what does the end of God 
mean?...Is it possible that the official and manifest tendency toward 
human omnipotence of making is counteracted by a latent and unofficial 
tendency; an indirect reempowerment of fate…or, putting it differently, 
the outcome of the modern disempowerment of divine omnipotence is not 
only the official triumph of human freedom but also the unofficial return 
of fate (p. 72).  
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At the height of our belief in human freedom, at least insofar as it is understood in terms 
of powers of production and domination, fate returns. Here the convergence of freedom 
and necessity is a deception that calls out for a therapeutic self-questioning: What 
satisfaction is met, what defensive maneuver played out, by reifying the opposition 
between omnipotence and powerlessness?  
Marquard’s analysis of the mutations of fate, from tragedy through divine 
providence, culminates in what we might call technological man. In Greek tragedy the 
prophesized fate was inescapable, personal and inscrutable; freedom was a defiant 
responsibility and a triumphant failure. In Christianity, necessity is reborn as providence; 
while fate remains personal and inscrutable, it differs from the tragic conception of 
freedom through faith in an ultimate end beyond this world. After the death of God, fate 
is given over to science—whether in the sense of a physical/psychical determinism that 
precludes freedom, or in the reappearance of divine omnipotence in the guise of human 
production and technology. Freud’s own account of fate, which would prove useful to 
Marquard here, is peculiar in that it straddles the modern/scientific and ancient/tragic 
views. Psychoanalysis offers a unique perspective on Marquard’s line of questioning: 
What desires (and defenses) lie hidden, repressed, in the concept(s) of fate? Might our 
philosophical accounts of freedom be similarly symptomatic?   
It is, nota bene, worth pondering the fact that what stood at the beginning 
of this depletion of God’s power was the extreme theology of 
omnipotence that marked the late Middle Ages. The path from the 
theology of the potentia absoluta (absolute power) by way of the theology 
of the Deus absconditus and the Deus caché (hidden God) and the 
theology of the Deus emeritus to theology after the death of God—is a 
remarkable sequence. Perhaps even omnipotence was already 
powerlessness by other means” (p. 72, my emphasis). 
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The repeated polarization of fate and freedom, passivity and activity, conceals a 
horrifying ambivalence: such clear oppositions would protect us from the overwhelming 
anxiety of fearing and desiring both power and vulnerability. The anxiety of the uncanny, 
marked by a return to the convergence of omnipotence and fate, signals a fault line in this 
dualistic structure. Freedom, insofar as it is equated with omnipotence (of God or Man), 
is only powerlessness—fate—in disguise.  
 
2. The Freedom of Fate 
 
For Freud, such a confrontation with fate—whether pathological or uncanny—must be 
dealt with therapeutically. The feeling of being plagued by fate, of victimization, cannot 
simply be replaced with psychic determinism. Rather, psychoanalysis shares in the 
cathartic work—the liberation through submission—of tragedy. We are accountable to a 
history that cannot be settled; escaping a future of unacknowledged repetition requires a 
reinterpretation of, and acknowledgment of our role in creating, the prophecies 
constituting our past. This will always also be a question of how to take responsibility for 
the unconscious without falling into the neurotic polarity of omnipotence or 
helplessness—the same polarity that, Marquard implies, precipitated the death of God 
and may well do the same for technological man.  
  It is telling that in his one description of a personal experience of the uncanny, 
Freud invokes fate. He writes, “this factor of involuntary repetition which surrounds what 
would otherwise be innocent enough with an uncanny atmosphere, and forces upon us the 
idea of something fateful and inescapable when otherwise we should have spoken only of 
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‘chance’” (SE Vol. XVII, p. 237). An aimless stroll through a foreign city leads Freud, 
again and again, to the neighborhood of “painted ladies.105” Yet Freud never interprets 
the particularities of this experience, unwilling to delve into the unconscious motivations 
that would normally occupy him, that would deconstruct providence, superstition or 
chance.  Instead, he leaves it as just a feeling of “involuntary repetition”—a repetition, 
more particularly, of an infantile helplessness the belief in which we should have 
overcome; what Freud leaves out precisely here, however, is the equally powerful sense 
of omnipotence governing infantile life. His unmasking of fate only goes half-way, 
failing to see that the feeling of omnipotence has only fled to the unconscious.  As Freud 
teaches us to suspect, it is the narrator’s omissions that tell the story: Isn’t it peculiar that 
                                                       
105 Freud writes: 
As I was walking, one hot summer afternoon, through the deserted streets of a provincial 
town in Italy which was unknown to me, I found myself in a quarter of whose character I 
could not long remain in doubt. Nothing but painted women were to be seen at the 
windows of the small houses, and I hastened to leave the narrow street at the next turning. 
But after having wandered about for a time without enquiring my way, I suddenly found 
myself back in the same street, where my presence was now beginning to excite attention. 
I hurried away once more, only to arrive by another detour at the same place yet a third 
time. Now, however, a feeling overcame me which I can only describe as uncanny…(p. 
237). 
 
However, this is not, in fact, the singular personal experience of the uncanny Freud mentions—but the only 
one that is in the body of the essay. In a footnote that follows some pages later, Freud relates another 
“adventure”, this time relating to the “double”: 
 
Since the uncanny effect of a ‘double’ also belongs to this same group it is interesting to 
observe what the effect is of meeting one’s own image unbidden and unexpected. Ernst 
Mach has related two such observations…I can report a similar adventure. I was sitting 
alone in my wagon-lit compartment when a more than usually violent jolt of the train 
swung back the door of the adjoining washing-cabinet, and an elderly gentleman in a 
dressing gown and a travelling cap came in. I assumed that in leaving the washing-
cabinet, which lay between the two compartments, he had taken the wrong direction and 
come into my compartment by mistake. Jumping up with the intention of putting him 
right, I at once realized to my dismay that the intruder was nothing but my own reflection 
in the looking-glass on the open door. I can still recollect that I thoroughly disliked his 
appearance. Instead, therefore, of being frightened by our ‘doubles,’ both Mach and I 
simply failed to recognize them as such. Is it not possible, though, that our dislike of 
them was a vestigial trace of the archaic reaction which feels the ‘double’ to be 
something uncanny? (p. 248). 
 
Here, it is the literal projection of one’s physical image, rather than the realization of unconscious, psychic 
structures and desires, that provokes the feeling of the uncanny.  
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Freud should end up repeatedly among the prostitutes and seductresses of the red light 
district? That sexuality would occupy a foreign [(un)heimliche] place? Moreover, Freud’s 
theoretical turn away from actual seduction, and towards fantasy, is indeed the founding 
gesture of psychoanalysis; and the therapeutic process that develops is itself a retracing, a 
circling back to the unconscious ambiguity surrounding activity and passivity that is so 
abhorrent to consciousness.  
 The permeable boundaries between self and world we experience in the uncanny, 
and the therapeutic demand to recognize these boundaries as our own productions, 
together suggest that fate cannot be so simply suffered or made: freedom is just this 
negotiation. The transition from real seduction (passivity, victimhood) to our 
interpretations and fantasies surrounding it (activity, agency) within psychoanalysis is 
also a movement from deterministic necessity to uncanny freedom. In giving up the 
seduction theory, there is no longer any absolute separation between what is real and 
what is desired (the essence of “omnipotent thought”), and yet we are still called to work 
out the limits of our guilt. It is worth noting that for Freud, no less than for Schelling, it is 
not the inevitability of Oedipus’ actions that makes him a tragic hero but his assumption 
of an inscrutable guilt. More than the theoretical significance of the Oedipal Complex, 
psychoanalysis relies on the therapeutic role of Oedipal awareness: on self-discovery that 
is neither futile nor absolute.    
Paradoxically, Oedipal knowledge—self-knowledge—turns out to be a form of 
ignorance: it is a knowing that negates itself by transforming the past it seeks to take hold 
of. Oedipus’ assumption of guilt and punishment, his acquisition of the deeper truth of his 
defining prophecies, depends upon an understanding of freedom as the capacity to 
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remake our personal narrative. Ancient tragedy, as opposed to its modern iteration, 
expresses the conflict between who we are and what we can know. Oedipus is tragic 
insofar as he presumes to know himself; he is a hero because he makes these limitations 
his own. This is not only illustrated through his physical appropriation of spiritual 
blindness, but also in returning to the role of father and guide as he makes his way to the 
grave in Oedipus at Colonus: “Follow, my children/It is my turn now to be your 
pathfinder,/As you have been to me. Come. Do not touch me/Leave me to find the way to 
sacred grave/Where this land’s soil is to enclose my bones” (p. 118/1529-1595).106  
Oedipus is free only when he becomes a prophet himself—cursing his son and anointing 
Theseus—and in doing so gathers the power to reshape the future. In the moment that 
Oedipus recognizes his great sin, and with it the provisional nature and creative potential 
inherent to memory and self-perception, vulnerability becomes his strength. The events 
of the past are transformed, indeed shown to be essentially transformable, and he with 
them. The puzzle at the heart Oedipus is, of course, a version of the Sphinx’s riddle: of 
the mystery of time as its inevitable course disrupts, and is disrupted by, the human. 
Prophecy, we might say, is the past’s claim on the future: it is not a denial of freedom, 
not necessarily, but an insistence on temporal order and continuity. Along with a greater 
emphasis on self-consciousness or interior life, it is the absence of prophecy that 
separates modern from ancient tragedy; and, I would argue, these are not unrelated. 
Schelling’s philosophical preference for ancient tragedy, and Freud’s as well, hinges on 
this distinction—the past is not something to be overcome and subjectivity is a great deal 
more than self-consciousness.  
                                                       
106 Sophocles, The Theban Plays. Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1970.  
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The fundamental claim of psychoanalysis is that the unconscious is the 
ineradicable past and the source of our identity. More importantly, even dangerously, this 
all-pervasive past is not simply given once and for all; it is not only the ground of the 
present, but also a creation of it. Freud’s term Nachträglichkeit, or delayed action, is an 
articulation of this temporal loop: Freud tells us that the Oedipal trauma, like all trauma, 
is not an event that has occurred.107 In fact, it traumatizes us precisely through its 
temporal disruption, insofar as it collapses the space between memory and fantasy—
between the meaning we suffer and the meaning we construct. Jean Laplanche’s return to 
the theory of seduction in Life and Death in Psychoanalysis offers a psychoanalytic 
account of this tragic entanglement of fate, freedom and Nachträglichkeit in terms of an 
essentially traumatized subjectivity: 
  
The “scene”—and we shall soon see how—must necessarily come into 
contact with the domain of sexuality. Moreover, two scenes, rather than a 
single one, will be found to be necessary; and it is in their hiatus, and in 
what one is inclined to call the impressive bit of deceptive trickery they 
gave rise to, that the objective lie we have translated as “deceit” is 
generated (p. 38).108 
 
The “objectivity” of the lie needs to be read in two importantly connected ways: first, the 
lie is itself objective (“inscribed in the facts”), and second, it is precisely the nature and 
possibility of objectivity (the lie of pure objectivity) that is at issue here.  On the former 
interpretation, deceit simply is the structure of sexuality—inevitably resistant to being 
                                                       
107 In Laplanche and Pontalis’ seminal The Language of Psychoanalysis, they write that Nachträlichkeit is a 
“Term frequently used by Freud in connection with his view of psychical temporality and causality: 
experiences, impressions and memory-traces may be revised at a later date to fit in with fresh experiences 
or with the attainment of a new stage of development. They may un!!! that event be endowed not only with 
a new meaning but also with psychical effectiveness” (p. 111). 
108 Jean Laplanche, Life and Death in Psychoanalysis, trans. Jeffrey Mehlman (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1993). 
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known; on the latter, sexuality reveals objectivity itself as a fantasy, disturbing our very 
conception of what truth—even or especially our own truth—is.  
Indeed, the realization of our helplessness in making sense of our own and others’ 
unconscious, and simultaneously of the powerful effects of our fantasies and desires on 
the world and those we share it with, traumatizes us. It is not merely that certain desires 
and events are repressed, but that our very conception of how “desires” and “events” 
come together must be disturbed here. We find ourselves, like Oedipus, too early and too 
late, between desire and seduction, helpless and omnipotent. The expansive role of 
sexuality in psychoanalysis, and particularly in its relation to the time and truth of 
subjectivity, can be read as an acknowledgment of unsettled and unsettling reality that 
must remain inextricably bound up with unconscious fantasy—with a ground that both is 
and is not our own. As we will see, Schelling similarly understands subjectivity—and in 
fact existence as such—as intrinsically bound to trauma, and particularly to the 
perversions that are desire and generation.  
Like prophecy, the traumatic is not confined by a beginning and an end, but acts 
as the atemporal event that would institute such order; the “event” is neither true nor false 
but rather inaugurates interpretability. Broadly construed, the psychoanalytic method of 
engaging therapeutically with the past is essentially based on this concept of the 
traumatic; therapy depends on a past that remains vulnerable to the present—whether in 
the deceptive coherence of the dream, or the compromise formations that address us as 
screen memories and symptoms.  While maintaining the “prophetic” power of our earliest 
experiences, Freud is equally insistent that the past is only obliquely and incompletely 
available to us. Insofar as both past and present are pervaded by unconscious desire and 
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the constructions of fantasy, psychoanalysis is a process aimed at taking up the prophetic 
voice; Oedipus, like all of us, does not inherit his fate (the universal Oedipal Complex)—
he inherits a foreign, resistant past: the unconscious.  
 The “foreignness” of the past, the lineage of transgression that Oedipus is 
unintentionally born into, is not contentious; however, the claim that Oedipus’ freedom is 
somehow realized in taking on this guilt, is. Implicit in this statement is the notion that 
who we are—and what we can be held to account for—is not limited to what we do or 
even to what we intend. Unconscious desire and fantasy, and no doubt Oedipus too is 
guilty of these, destabilize the past and our relation to it. In one of Freud’s earliest texts, 
“Screen Memories” (SE Vol. III, pp. 303-322), he argues that our most intimate 
connection to the past—memory—is not reliable in the way we imagine it to be; this isn’t 
just to say that our personal narrative is biased, but that insofar as memory is an 
imaginative production it betrays deeper issues concerning the reality of the past.109  For 
Freud, this “productive” memory only becomes apparent in the distortions he deals with 
in the therapeutic situation: the persistence of infantile modes of experience that are 
unacceptable to consciousness leads to the disfigured histories—the symptoms and 
confessions—of the analysand. But it is only in their duplicity that these memories, 
worked over by defenses and interwoven with fantasy, can expose the textured reality of 
the archaic past:  
It may indeed be questioned whether we have any memories at all from 
our childhood: memories relating to our childhood may be all that we 
possess. Our childhood memories show us our earliest years not as they 
were but as they appeared at the later periods when the memories were 
aroused. In these periods of arousal, the childhood memories did not, as 
people are accustomed to say, emerge; they were formed at that time. And 
a number of motives, with no concern for historical accuracy, had a part in 
                                                       
109 Gail S Reed and Howard B. Levine, Eds, On Freud’s “Screen Memories” (London: Karnac, 2015).  
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forming them, as well as in the selection of memories themselves (p. 
24/SE Vol. III, 322).  
 
The lack of “concern for historical accuracy” on the part of memory is, itself, an opening 
up of the historical and the objective in and through psychoanalysis. It is due to the nature 
of the past that its truth is not there to be recovered—to be deemed more or less accurate. 
Its truth is wrapped up in the same modes of infantile experience that are intolerable to 
the laws and logic of consciousness—non-contradiction, for example, or linear causality.  
The ambivalence and porosity that characterizes our earliest relationships, 
activity/passivity, love/hate, also defines our most fundamental sense of reality. We can 
begin to see why the oppositional structures of consciousness, including the distinction 
between memory and fantasy, are disturbed when confronted with the tragic dialectic of 
guilt and innocence.  To question our responsibility for the past we must enter into its 
radical alterity—we must return to the disorienting ambivalence from which the 
dichotomies of agency and desire are first constructed.    
 
3. Original Sin  
 
In his 1809 Freiheitsschrift Schelling begins to define freedom in relation to the problem 
of evil—to the concrete reality of living, deciding and historicizing as a creature that is 
born into and bears the unconscious. And as Schelling only intimated in his account of 
tragedy, he now explicitly contends that our relationship to the past, to the unconscious 
ground of our existence, is integral to human freedom. The possibility of radical evil, no 
less than the possibility of divine love, is also necessary to human freedom—to freedom 
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conceived as a potential for self-transformation manifested either in seclusion or 
embrace. As I hope to have shown, such a potential—for vulnerability and potency 
specifically in relation to the past—is fundamental to the psychical liberation of Freud’s 
therapeutic approach. Benefitting from Kant’s reformulation of freedom in Religion 
Within the Limits of Reason Alone, Schelling’s account of evil pries the unconscious from 
the merely natural, necessary or animal. As we shall see, it is only in this way that 
Schelling’s early interpretation of Oedipal guilt and freedom comes to fruition.  
Representative of Kant’s earlier, Critical period, where the unconscious has as yet 
no space of its own, he writes in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: 
Will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings so far as they are rational. 
Freedom would then be the property this causality has of being able to work 
independently of determination by alien causes; just as natural necessity is a 
property characterizing the causality of all non-rational beings—the property of 
being determined to activity by the influence of alien causes…What else then can 
freedom of the will be but autonomy—that is, the property which will has of 
being a law to itself?...Thus a free will and a will under moral laws are one and 
the same (p. 446).110  
 
Here Kant clearly maintains that, for rational beings, there are only two options: either we 
act in a manner that is above the natural order—freely, according to self-given, universal 
law—or we act naturally, which is to say determined by desire, instinct and inclination. 
Evil can only be ignorance of the moral law or the inability—a weakness of will—to act 
in accordance with it. The possibility of acting in such a way that we are beneath 
nature—that is, both freely and in conflict with the moral law—is foreclosed. Freedom is 
thus equivalent to obeying the moral law, and the reality of evil is reduced to animality 
that cannot be a free choice and, therefore, that we cannot be held accountable for. It is 
                                                       
110 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans., H.J. Patton (New York: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1964). 
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only with his work in Religion that Kant realizes that evil, no less than the good, must be 
attributable to freedom.  As he reflects on the connection between freedom and evil, Kant 
encounters the unconscious—he considers what it would require to take responsibility for 
that which we cannot know or experience: the very stuff of tragedy, or of psychoanalysis. 
In Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, Kant revisits the question of 
freedom with the developments of the Critique of Judgment in mind: What kind of cause 
is freedom? This questioning leads Kant to sort out the nature of evil and to an 
acknowledgment, more precisely, of its atemporal ground. In reformulating freedom as 
the real possibility of choosing good or evil, and in placing this choice outside of time, 
Kant leads the way for Schelling’s radical assertions about the essence of human 
freedom. If we are to understand freedom as the essence of the human, we cannot 
maintain that evil is merely the result of any causally determined series of events—
whether physical or psychical. That is to say, the disposition to adopt evil maxims must 
itself be a free choice—a choice, as we will see, that exceeds the phenomenal (spatio-
temporal) world. Kant writes, 
 
In order, then, to call a man evil, it would have to be possible a priori to infer 
from several evil acts done with consciousness of their evil, or from one such 
act, an underlying evil maxim; and further, from this maxim to infer the 
presence in the agent of an underlying common ground [allgemein liegenden 
Grund], itself a maxim, of all particular morally-evil maxims (p.16).111 
 
Kant runs up against the notion of a “common ground” in the agent, or a disposition; such 
a disposition, to adopt good or evil maxims, must itself be freely chosen. We are not born 
with a fixed destiny, Kant argues, but neither can our moral fate be determined by the 
                                                       
111 Immanuel Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßsen Vernunft (Berliner Ausgabe, 2013, 2. 
Auflage, p.16). Hereafter DR. 
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contingent facts of our experience. How, then, do we come to choose this disposition? 
What kind of choice—and what kind of chooser—can remain unexperienced while still 
causally effective?  
 The problem of nature—or rather of its duality—arises simultaneously with the 
problem of evil. This connection between nature and evil takes on another form, as we 
shall see, in Schelling’s text. It is in this vein that Kant deals with the Biblical account of 
hereditary sin at some length in this work, as he too is concerned here with freedom as 
opposition to nature and as integral to our nature. This is not merely a question of 
semantics, but rather speaks to the complications inherent in a being that is part of nature 
and able to stand against nature: 
 
Lest difficulty at once be encountered in the expression nature, which, if it 
meant (as it usually does) the opposite of freedom as a basis of action, 
would flatly contradict the predicates morally good or evil, let it be noted 
that by ‘nature of man’ we here intend only the subjective ground of the 
exercise (under objective moral laws) of man’s freedom in general; this 
ground—whatever is its character—is the necessary antecedent of every 
act apparent to the senses. But this subjective ground, again, must itself 
always be an expression of freedom [Dieser subjektive Grund muß aber 
immer wiederum selbst ein Actus der Freiheit sein] (for otherwise the use 
or abuse of man’s power of choice in respect of the moral law could not be 
imputed to him nor could the good or bad in him be called moral) (pp. 16-
17/DR, 16).112 
 
The “nature of man” is not, Kant argues, equivalent to the nature in man. That is, he does 
not mean to say that man is good or evil in the manner of natural cause, the way one is 
born a member of a particular race or sex. Despite Kant’s reticence in fleshing out this 
expanded understanding of nature, in reopening the concept of human nature he subtly 
alters the concept of nature as such. As we can already see in Schelling’s early works, for 
                                                       
112 ibid. p. 16 
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instance, it is precisely the  “subjective ground” of nature—the natura naturans that is 
never fully disclosed in its products—that bridges the human and non-human worlds.113 
Kant remains focused on the “subjective ground” of human nature that, in its deviation 
from the laws of nature, “must itself always be an expression of freedom.” Although this 
appears to be a rather familiar claim, that freedom is our noumenal essence, it is as if he 
is suddenly struck by the weight of this fact. If we are accustomed to the clarity Kant 
ascribes to the moral law, here he confronts us with the unfathomable depths of our guilt. 
Noumenal freedom must be the ground of law and not the law itself.  
If it is by way of duty and the moral law that Kant understood the phenomenality 
of freedom, it is revealing that only through radical evil can he approach the 
inexpressible, noumenal dimension of freedom:  
 
We shall say, therefore, of the character (good or evil) distinguishing man 
from other possible rational beings, that it is innate in him. Yet in doing so we 
shall ever take the position that nature is not to bear the blame (if it is evil) or 
take the credit (if it is good), but that man himself is its author. But since the 
ultimate ground of the adoption of our maxims, which must itself lie in free 
choice, cannot be revealed in experience, it follows that the good or evil in 
man (as the ultimate subjective ground of the adoption of this or that maxim 
with reference to the moral law) is termed innate only in this sense, that it is 
posited as the ground antecedent to every use of freedom in experience (in 
earliest youth as far back as birth) and is thus conceived of as present in man 
at birth—though birth need not be the cause of it (Religion, p.17/DR, 17). 
 
                                                       
113 “For although only transcendental philosophy raises itself to the Absolute Unconditioned [Unbedingt] in 
human knowledge, it must nevertheless demonstrate that every science that is science at all has its 
unconditioned. The above principle thus obtains for the philosophy of nature: ‘the unconditioned of Nature 
as such cannot be sought in any individual natural object;’ rather a principle of being, that itself ‘is’ not, 
manifests itself in each natural object…Now, what is this being itself for transcendental philosophy, of 
which every individual being is only a particular form? If, according to these very principles, everything 
that exists is a construction of the spirit, then being itself is nothing other than the constructing itself, or 
since construction is thinkable at all only as activity, being itself is nothing other than the highest 
constructing activity, which, although never itself an object, is the principle of everything objective” (First 
Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature, I, p. 13/SW III, pp. 11-12). 
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The peculiarity of what Kant is saying here is not obvious: it seems a mere recapitulation 
of his account of the negatively defined, noumenal spontaneity of freedom. Yet the 
paradox of our freedom is laid bare, as we are faced with a grounding that we have no 
direct access to and yet, somehow, remain ineluctably responsible for at every moment. It 
is this paradox that Kant’s successors try to overcome. His own efforts to move beyond 
the phenomenal expression of freedom are limited because of his equation of 
consciousness and subjectivity. Before and beyond the phenomenal expressions of 
actions, maxims and disposition, there must be the ungrounded, eternal decision:  
To have a good or an evil disposition as an inborn natural constitution does 
not here mean that it has not been acquired by the man who harbors it, that he 
is not author of it, but rather, that it has not been acquired in time…The 
disposition, i.e., the ultimate subjective ground of the adoption of maxims, can 
be one only and applies universally to the whole use of freedom. Yet this 
disposition itself must have been adopted by free choice, for otherwise it 
could not be imputed [Sie selbst aber muß auch durch freie Willkür 
angenommen worden sein, denn sonst könnte sie nicht zugerechnet werden]. 
But the subjective ground or cause of this adoption cannot further be known 
(though it is inevitable that we should inquire into it), since otherwise still 
another maxim would have to be adduced in which this disposition must have 
been incorporated, a maxim which in itself must have its ground (pp. 20-
21/DR, 20). 
 
Eventually, we come to a ground that can neither be known nor ignored; a ground that, 
marking the periphery of possible experience, suggests that the task of our lives is to 
acknowledge this ground as our own. Recognizing that this ground cannot show itself, 
that it cannot be known or experienced, is as essential to this demand as the effort to 
claim responsibility for it in and through our actions.  The relevance of the unconscious 
to this problematic should be apparent: freedom is not the domination of nor refusal to 
engage with our unknowable ground, but the possibility of allowing such a ground to be 
our own and to remain irreducibly other.    
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 By placing the ground of our disposition outside of time in this way, while still 
maintaining our ultimate freedom to determine ourselves, Kant suggests a relation 
between the noumenal and phenomenal realms that resonates with his work in The 
Critique of Judgment. Pointing to this dialectic of freedom and responsibility, where the 
unknowable ground is both the source and effect of our moral bearing, Kant articulates 
freedom as creative, organic cause: 
However evil a man has been up to the very moment of an impending free 
act (so that evil has actually become custom or second nature) it was not 
only his duty to have been better [in the past], it is now his duty to better 
himself. To do so must be within his power, and if he does not do so, he is 
susceptible of, and subjected to, imputability in the very moment of that 
action, just as much as though, endowed with a predisposition to good 
(which is inseparable from freedom) he had stepped out of a state of 
innocence into evil (p. 36/DR, 34).  
 
In this passage Kant highlights the ever-present possibility of redemption, and indeed of 
the difficulty involved in conceptualizing how we are always free to recreate the ground 
of our being even as this ground must be the source of our choice to do so. We are not the 
agents of one free act that determines our existence; we are, instead, free at every 
moment to acknowledge and recast who we are through the reappropriation of what we 
have done or will do—to be redeemed or damned. Without knowledge of our freedom, 
Kant suggests, we bear the responsibility for interpreting and creating the meaning of our 
actions. The decision that grounds our subjectivity is not atemporal in that it is before 
time, but by virtue of the fact that this decision is the eternal possibility to become who 
we are. Just at this moment Kant retreats into the Biblical story of original sin, turning 
away from the chiasmic ground that is both the necessary condition of my subjectivity 
(that which makes any choice mine) and itself my free choice and responsibility: 
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The foregoing agrees well with that manner of presentation which the 
Scriptures use, whereby the origin of evil in the human race is depicted as 
having a [temporal] beginning, this beginning being presented in a 
narrative, wherein what in its essence must be considered as primary 
(without regard to the element of time) appears as coming first in time. 
According to this account, evil does not start from a propensity thereto as 
its underlying basis, for otherwise the beginning of evil would not have its 
source in freedom; rather does it start from sin (by which is meant the 
transgressing of the moral law as a divine command). The state of man 
prior to all propensity to evil is called the state of innocence. The moral 
law became known to mankind, as it must to any being not pure but 
tempted by desires, in the form of a prohibition (pp. 36-37/DR, 34-35). 
 
The “radical evil” inherent in human nature is not an inborn propensity or perversion; 
human freedom, like knowledge in the critical philosophy, is only actualized in 
experience. Freedom cannot be abstracted from the conditions through which it is 
expressed, and so despite its metaphysical priority freedom depends upon the real 
possibility of choosing evil. As Kant points out, the priority of the possibility for evil is 
not a temporal priority, though it has to be expressed this way in the narrative constraints 
of the Scriptures. Rather, the free choice that defines us seems to occur never and always, 
both cause and effect of our mode of being in the world. Kant goes on to suggest an 
analogy between the Biblical story of Adam’s fall and his own reliance on the concept of 
obligation in developing his practical philosophy, serving “as it must” to communicate 
the moral law as a prohibition. Just as the Scriptures use the crutch of a temporal event to 
explain the origin of evil, Kant seems to admit that his own language of logic and duty 
similarly conceals the radical consequences of a freedom that we are but cannot know.   
The transition from innocence to guilt is not a matter of preferring evil to the 
good; it is not an arbitrarily chosen perversion of our nature. Rather, freedom and guilt 
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arrive together: in recognizing that our responsibility exceeds our knowledge, we assume 
our guilt. Kant, following the myth of original sin, suggests that innocence can only be 
experienced as having been; in taking up our subjectivity, in the self-consciousness that 
unifies our experience, the identity of thinking and being—of subject and object—is 
already lost. Self-knowledge, as the story of Adam and Eve allegorizes, necessarily 
precludes innocence. In our freedom and our finitude, we could always do otherwise and 
could not have done otherwise. Original sin, then, is as much the story of the “leap” into 
self-consciousness as it is into evil114:  
  
From all this it is clear that we daily act in the same way, and that therefore ‘in 
Adam all have sinned’ and still sin; except that in us there is presupposed an 
innate propensity to transgression, whereas in the first man, from the point of 
view of time, there is presupposed no such propensity but rather innocence; 
hence transgression on his part is called a fall into sin; but with us sin is 
represented as resulting from an already innate wickedness in our nature. This 
propensity, however, signifies no more than this, that if we wish to address 
ourselves to the explanation of evil in terms of its beginning in time, we must 
search for the causes of each deliberate transgression in a previous period of 
our lives, far back to that period wherein the use of reason had not yet 
developed, and thus back to a propensity to evil (as a natural ground) which is 
therefore called innate—the source of evil. But to trace the causes of evil in 
the instance of the first man, who is depicted as already in full command of 
the use of his reason, is neither necessary nor feasible, since otherwise this 
basis (the evil propensity) would have had to be created in him; therefore his 
sin is set forth as engendered directly from innocence. We must not, however, 
look for an origin in time of a moral character for which we are to be held 
responsible; though to do so is inevitable if we wish to explain the contingent 
existence of this character [Wir müssen aber von einer moralischen 
Beschaffenheit, die uns soll zugerechnet werden, keinen Zeitersprung suchen] 
(and perhaps it is for this reason that Scripture, in conformity with this 
weakness of ours, has thus pictured the temporal origin of evil) (pp. 37-
38/DR, 35-36). 
                                                       
114 See also: Soren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation 
on the Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin, trans. Reidar Thomte (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1980).  Kierkegaard writes, as if in communication with Kant,  “Thus sin comes into the world as the 
sudden, i.e., by a leap; but the leap also posits the quality, and since the quality is posited, the leap in the 
very moment is turned into the quality and is presupposed by the quality, and the quality by the leap” (p. 
32). 
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It is “neither necessary nor feasible” [nicht nötig, auch nicht tunlich ist] to assume that 
the propensity for evil was created by Adam; yet Adam, like all of us, is responsible for 
his sin. Strangely, it is the reality of sin that seems to create its possibility.115 We might 
read this in terms of Kant’s own concerns with the temporal confusion that freedom 
draws us into: How can it be that we freely, and eternally, choose our own ground—the 
same ground from which choice becomes possible?  Kant suggests that, as in the Biblical 
version, any temporal priority here is a simplification that obscures the truth. In giving 
precedence to sin, to the action that does not at first seem to belong to Adam essentially 
but only retrospectively, the story of the fall fails to think through self-consciousness that 
encompasses the alterity of the unconscious.  
 
4. The Logic of Longing 
 
In his Freiheitsschrift Schelling sketches out the rudiments of an ontological 
psychoanalysis in his attempt to think through the consequences of a grounding 
repression—of a traumatic union of fate and freedom.116 In contrast to his earlier works, 
                                                       
115 This peculiar temporality of original sin, of mutual production of innocence and guilt, is the focus of 
Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety, a work heavily influenced by Schelling: “Through the first sin, sin 
came into the world. Precisely in the same way it is true of every subsequent man’s first sin, that through it 
sin comes into the world…Just as Adam lost innocence by guilt, so every man loses it in the same way. If it 
was not by guilt that he lost it, then it was not innocence that he lost; and if he was not innocent before 
becoming guilty, he never became guilty” (p. 31/DR, 35). He continues, “Innocence, unlike immediacy, is 
not something that must be annulled, something whose quality is to be annulled, something that properly 
does not exist, but rather, when it is annulled, and as a result of being annulled, it for the first time comes 
into existence as that which it was before being annulled and which now is annulled…Innocence is not a 
perfection that one should wish to regain, for as soon as one wishes for it, it is lost…”(pp. 36-37). 
116 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968). 
In this text, Merleau-Ponty introduces the concept of a “psychoanalysis of Nature,” and this alongside a 
discussion of his “barbaric Principle”, in his notes from November, 1960, “’Nature is at the first day’: it is 
there today This does not mean: myth of the original indivision and coincidence as return. 
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in this text Schelling presents freedom as the possibility of choosing good or evil—
innocence or guilt. The language of seduction, procreation and longing is pervasive here: 
and evil, as Schelling tells us, is not a privation but a perversion. Freedom must be a 
certain tendency towards—a possibility for—this perversion. As we will see, this leads 
Schelling to develop a metaphysical account of the unconscious, as the ground of God 
and human beings, in terms of drive and desire. Just as Freud develops the temporality of 
Nachträglichkeit in order to make sense of our essentially neurotic subjectivity, so does 
Schelling articulate a new form of causation in his efforts to redefine human nature: an 
ontology grounded in will and desire, where objectivity and self-presence can no longer 
be equated with truth, inevitably disrupts the temporal order. I will suggest that Schelling 
takes an even more radical approach than Freud, developing a theory of an originary, 
erotic temporality that extends beyond the human to being as such.117 
                                                       
The Urtümlich, the Ursprünglich is not of long ago. 
It is a question of finding in the present, the flesh of the world (and not in the past) an “ever new” 
and “always the same”—A sort of time of sleep (which is Bergson’s nascent duration, ever new and always 
the same). The sensible, Nature, transcend the past present distinction, realize from within a passage from 
one into the other  Existential eternity. The indestructible, the barbaric Principle 
Do a psychoanalysis of Nature: it is the flesh, the mother. 
 
A philosophy of the flesh is the condition without which psychoanalysis remains anthropology 
 
In what sense the visible landscape under my eyes is not exterior to, and bound synthetically 
to…other moments of time and the past, but has them really behind itself in simultaneity, inside itself and 
not it they side by side ‘in’ time 
 
Time and chiasm” (p. 267).  
117 In Robert Vallier’s essay “Être sauvage and the Barbarian Principle,” in the collection The 
Barbarian Principle, where he discusses the relationship between Merleau-Ponty’s concept of a 
psychoanalysis of Nature in reference to Schelling’s work, he makes use of Freud’s Nachträglichkeit in 
order to account for God’s auto-production. However, Vallier does not consider the Freudian roots of this 
temporality which I will go on to consider here. Yet he does imply that, as with the coming-to-be of God, 
the relationship between ground and existence that characterizes human freedom must also take part in this 
disruption of linear time:  
 
Like light, God comes to His existence, He becomes Himself. Yet He also belongs to the 
ground, and so when God comes to His existence, the ground flees. Once again we see 
this structure of Nachträglichkeit…When God represses Nature, when He masters 
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Schelling’s essay, which can almost be read as a series of digressions on the 
limitations of reason, is a performance of the radically incomplete and disruptive freedom 
he encounters. That is, he initially attempts to develop a system of freedom in the weaker 
sense, a system that does not contradict freedom; through the course of the text, however, 
he constructs (and deconstructs) a system of freedom in the strongest sense, where 
freedom is the unifying and foundational principle. Rather than assuming the equivalence 
of “system” and “the principle of sufficient reason,” Schelling re-imagines the 
possibilities of systematicity in light of a grounding freedom. Partially in response to the 
“pantheism controversy,” Schelling points out that the equation of system with 
pantheism, and of pantheism with fatalism, stem from fundamental misunderstandings of 
the terms involved: if pantheism is understood as the culmination of reason, and 
furthermore as the identity of God and His creation, this need not inevitably lead to 
determinism or nihilism. Rather, such a claim calls for an investigation into the structure 
of this identity.118 Schelling is quite clear that Kant’s critical account of freedom—or 
“mere mastery of intelligence over senses and passions”—will not suffice. Indeed, 
Schelling sees that Kant can only approach freedom in its phenomenal expression—and 
thus as determined. The question of how we might reconcile system and freedom, then, is 
fundamentally the question of how to bring together what Kant emphatically tore apart 
                                                       
Himself, He properly exists; but Nature can be His ground only if He already exists. But 
He is never independent of this ground, which remains in Him as repressed (p. 140). 
 
118 See: Frederick C. Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1987). Beiser offers an illuminating and in-depth discussion of the pantheism 
controversy and its importance in the development of post-Kantian German philosophy (pp. 44-108). He 
writes, “It is difficult to imagine a controversy whose cause was so incidental—Jacobi’s disclosure of 
Lessing’s Spinozism—and whose effects were so great. The pantheism controversy completely changed the 
intellectual map of eighteenth-century Germany; and it continued to preoccupy thinkers well into the 
nineteenth century. The main problem raised by the controversy—the dilemma of a rational nihilism or an 
irrational fideism—became a central issue for Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche. It is 
indeed no exaggeration to say that the pantheism controversy had as great an impact upon nineteenth-
century philosophy as Kant’s first Kritik” (p. 44). 
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without devolving into dogmatism or mysticism. The essence of freedom is at issue, 
though not as an object or thing accessible to knowledge, and for Schelling this remains 
the singular task of philosophy: 
 
For the true conception of freedom was lacking in all modern 
systems…until the discovery of Idealism. And the sort of freedom which 
many among us have conceived, even those boasting of the liveliest sense 
thereof, a freedom, namely, consisting of the mere mastery of intelligence 
over senses and passions [in der bloßen Herrschaft des intelligenten 
Prinzips über das sinnliche und die Begierden besteht], could be deduced 
from Spinoza himself without difficulty, indeed quite easily with superior 
decisiveness (Philosophical Inquiries into the Essence of Human 
Freedom, p. 17/SW VII, p. 345). 
 
Schelling’s criticism of dogmatic and Kantian freedom, already prefigured in his 
emphasis on the priority of organism and generation over mechanism and production in 
the Naturphilosophie, is finally made explicit: “God is not a god of the dead but of the 
living. It is incomprehensible that an all-perfect being could rejoice in even the most 
perfect mechanism possible” (p. 346). It is in this sense that Idealism alone offers the 
tools to develop a positive account of freedom, as every coming-into-being presupposes 
and remains tied to a structure of inexhaustible, active subjectivity—here understood as a 
vital exchange between consciousness and the unconscious.  
In a system of freedom the principle of sufficient reason cannot be primary, and 
Schelling recognizes that he has to make room for causation that is neither reducible to 
nor entirely disconnected from determinism: the fact of creation (the existential 
consequent) is neither logically implied by, nor undifferentiated from, the act of creation 
(its antecedent)—both accounts of pantheism fail to grasp the space of the human, 
between finitude and eternity. The bond of identity that simultaneously individuates and 
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unites Creator and creation still needs to be articulated: “The principle does not express a 
unity which, revolving in the indifferent circle of sameness, would get us nowhere and 
remain meaningless and lifeless. The unity of the law is of an intrinsically creative kind 
[ist eine unmittelbar schöpferische]” (p. 345). If God and creation were identical in the 
sense of an inert sameness, there could be no relationship at all; there could be no terms 
connected as identical without these terms remaining in some sense discrete—without 
there being a way to distinguish antecedent from consequence.  Further, this 
undifferentiated confusion could not account for a being that is both created and free, so 
that freedom itself becomes a form of differentiation Schelling aligns with birth and the 
familial. Schelling argues that in order to reconcile finitude with freedom, we need to 
understand this (re-)productive identity as creaturely dependence—as a form of 
generation that must be ontologically prior to mechanistic production: 
  
Every organic individual, insofar as it has come into being, is dependent 
upon another organism with respect to its genesis but not at all with regard 
to its essential being...on the contrary, it would indeed be contradictory if 
that which is dependent or consequent were not autonomous. There would 
be dependence without something being dependent (p. 346). 
 
The investigation that Schelling takes up here is an attempt to flesh out the form of 
causation that a system of freedom requires. It is a question of what kind of identity-in-
difference, an inherently acitive identity, grounds the possibility of being both created 
and free—or the convergence of the temporal and eternal. As it turns out, this turns on an 
account of the relationship God and the human being bear to themselves as well as to 
each other—that is, that each bears to their own dark ground or the otherness at the root 
of selfhood. These free unions relate that which is irreducibly concealed/concealing to 
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that which is essentially revealed/revealing—a communicative structure that is both free 
and necessary. The active identity that holds together the individual human being is also 
the active identity of God and with God, precisely insofar as they are all expressions of 
the bond of personality—of the belonging-together of the unconscious and 
consciousness, ground and existence: the originary disruption that is life, the condition of 
possibility for love and hate, psychosis and neurosis.119 
While Schelling opens up his account of the unconscious already in his 
Naturphilosophie, the Freiheitsschrift builds upon the specifically human unconscious 
that is first sketched out in The System of Transcendental Idealism. If the System is 
concerned with the unconscious ground of consciousness, however, the Freiheitsschrift is 
a meditation on the unconscious as it pertains to the personal and divine: the unconscious 
is no longer merely the condition for consciousness, but a force of its own, structured by 
drives towards appropriating and excluding otherness. Paradoxically, in narrowing the 
unconscious to the personal Schelling simultaneously extends freedom beyond the 
human; the strange progression of the essay (a product of ceaseless regression and 
digression) suggests that an investigation of human freedom inevitably leads beyond 
itself, to freedom that exceeds even the Absolute: the Ungrund. Thus in making freedom 
and the unconscious personal, Schelling actually designates personality as the original 
and definitive system. Schelling defies Kant’s hypothetical approach to organic cause, 
asserting instead that organism is systematic in a more primordial sense than reason or 
                                                       
119 See: Sigmund Freud, “The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis” SE Vol. XIX, pp. 183-190. Freud 
contrasts neurosis and psychosis in the following manner: “Accordingly, the initial difference is expressed 
thus in the final outcome: in neurosis a piece of reality is avoided by a sort of flight, whereas in psychosis it 
is remodeled. Or we might say: in psychosis, the initial flight is succeeded by an active phase of 
remodeling; in neurosis, the initial obedience is succeeded by a deferred attempt at flight. Or again, 
expressed in yet another way: neurosis does not disavow reality, it only ignores it; psychosis disavows it 
and tries to replace it” (p. 185).  
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mechanism: God and human beings are personalities—self-conscious organisms—
insofar as they are always already engaged with otherness, with what they could be or 
could have been. A personality is insofar as it must be entangled in what it is not, capable 
of inhabiting its own possibilities—its self-development and self-concealment—as 
freedom.120 Schelling argues that it is only through the identity-activity of personality, 
which draws the human near to God, that the possibility of evil arises—and, therein, 
human freedom. Personality and freedom are inextricably linked for Schelling, 
descriptions of a systematicity that can encompass the self-potentiating interplay between 
ground and existence: that is, between the unconscious and consciousness in becoming an 
individual, between concealment and revelation in coming to expression. 
The arc of Schelling’s argument is itself an enactment of the strange temporality 
at work in personality—and it is, of course, the very emergence of time that is at stake in 
the system of freedom. Beginning with the dual aspects of God—his ground and 
existence—Schelling progresses to the human; but it is only towards the end of the essay 
that the ultimate ground, the Ungrund, makes its appearance as absolute freedom or 
indifference. It seems that Schelling performs a freedom that is the beginning and the end 
of philosophy, both in the content and the form of the Freiheitsschrift121: 
 
In the cycle whence all things come, it is no contradiction to say that that 
which gives birth to the one is, in its turn, produced by it. There is here no 
                                                       
120 “It goes without saying that this principle [for judging nature teleologically] holds only for reflective but 
not for determinative judgment, that it is regulative and not constitutive. It only serves us as a guide that 
allows us to consider natural things in terms of a new law-governed order by referring them to an already 
given basis [a purpose] as that which determines them. Thus we expand natural science in terms of a 
different principle, that of final causes, yet without detracting from the principle of mechanism in the 
causality of nature” (CJ/KU 379). 
121 “The alpha and omega of all philosophy is freedom” (Schelling’s Organic Form of Philosophy, p. 5). 
 
 129 
first and last, since everything mutually implies everything else, nothing 
being the ‘other’ and yet no being without the other (p. 358). 
 
If it is not quite clear why an investigation into human freedom opens immediately onto 
the relation between ground and existence, it is worth keeping in view the difficulty in 
approaching freedom by way of evil. Schelling’s tendency to circle back to the beginning 
might be more fruitfully understood as a method for drawing us into the reciprocal 
activity of personality; existence as the infinite capacity to return to, and to reinterpret, its 
inexhaustible ground. As we have already seen, the question of freedom concerns the 
unconscious as primordial causation. The relationship between ground and existence, 
then, is Schelling’s way of bringing into relief a manner of becoming an individual—of 
simultaneously being created and creating oneself—that is neither capricious nor 
determined. Freedom requires a certain kind of distance, a vital grounding that needs to 
be thought through to its most originary form.   
Although Schelling finds the rationalized, sanitized freedom of the Critiques 
insufficient, he takes up in earnest the Kantian equation of independence from time with 
freedom. While this connection is first presented in the critical philosophy, Schelling’s 
inquiry into the role of the unconscious here is more deeply engaged with Kant’s 
confrontation with radical evil in Religion Within the Bounds of Reason Alone. However, 
recognizing these resonances, Schelling maintains that Kant does not see his insights 
through to their natural—if disturbing—conclusion: 
 
But it will always remain strange that Kant, after first distinguishing the 
things-in-themselves from appearances only negatively, as being 
independent of time, and later, in the metaphysical explications of his 
Critique of Practical Reason, treated independence of time and freedom as 
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correlative concepts, did not proceed to the thought of transferring this 
only possible positive conception of per-se-ity to things (pp. 351-352). 
 
 
Freedom is not just one noumenal property among others, nor is it attributable only to the 
human being. Indeed, we might even say that Schelling’s main contention in the 
Freiheitsschrift is that freedom is the essence of the noumenal as such. That is, “[i]n the 
final and highest instance there is no other Being than Will. Will is primordial Being and 
all predicates apply to it alone—groundlessness, eternity, independence of time, self-
affirmation!” (p. 350). Pressing beyond Kant and expanding the unconscious to include 
the ground of God, Schelling claims that not only human beings but being as such belong 
to freedom. Only through approaching all existence as expressions of living personality, 
in attending to the structure of such expression, can his philosophy of freedom get 
underway. These concepts of personality and life, however, can be too easily dismissed 
as an anthropomorphizing of God, of the Absolute or of being; instead, such language 
ought to call attention to the distinction Schelling makes between freedom as the mere 
property of a creature or a being, and freedom as the very principle of creating or 
coming-to-be. Schelling’s quite human terms actually belie a de-anthropomorphizing and 
re-opening of freedom, as he seeks to reclaim its most primordial truth.122 
Having provisionally worked out why Schelling approaches human freedom 
through ground and existence, we can consider the ways in which this relationship 
functions in God, human being and finally in the Ungrund.  Following Schelling, we 
begin neither with that which is nearest (human experience) nor with the most distant 
(Ungrund), but with the grounding relationship shared by God and human beings: 
                                                       
122 This is Heidegger’s claim as well, as cited on the following page. 
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But since there can be nothing outside God, this contradiction can only be 
solved by things having their basis in that within God which is not God 
himself [daß die Dinge ihren Grund in dem haben, was in Gott selbst nicht 
Er Selbst ist] i.e. in that which is the basis of his existence. If we wish to 
bring this Being nearer to us from a human standpoint, we may say: it is 
the longing which the eternal One feels to give birth to itself [es sei die 
Sensucht, die das ewige Eine empfindent, sich selbst zu gebären]. This is 
not the One itself, but is co-eternal with it. This longing seeks to give birth 
to God, i.e. the unfathomable unity, but to this extent it has not yet the 
unity in its own self (p. 359). 
 
What we might be tempted to read as analogies—the longing of the divine ground to give 
birth to itself—are actually efforts to recover a more original sense for what we take to be 
fundamentally human experiences; the human is called to re-gather itself through the first 
stirrings of creation, appropriating itself anew as a reverberation of freedom, rather than 
deforming the Absolute in the effort to make it accessible, conceivable—knowable. Our 
melancholy, as Schelling puts it in his Stuttgart Seminars, is just such a call from and 
echo of this shared ground:  
 
The most obscure and thus the deepest aspect of human nature is that of 
nostalgia [Sensucht], which is the inner gravity of the temperament, so to 
speak; in its most profound manifestation it appears a melancholy 
[Schwermuth]. It is by means of the latter that man feels a sympathetic 
relation to nature. What is most profound in nature is also melancholy; for 
it, too, mourns a lost good, and likewise such an indestructible melancholy 
inheres in all forms of life because all life is founded upon something 
independent from itself…(p. 7/SW, 466). 
 
Schelling’s use of melancholy is not an allegory, but a way of making manifest the 
necessity and difficulty of a living Absolute. That is, the deepest structures of human 
experience are not cognitive, but emotional—it is life that we share with God and with 
each other, and for Schelling life can only show itself in and as feeling. More specifically, 
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as Schelling notes, our attunement to life is an attunement to loss—to finitude, limit and 
otherness (“mourns a lost good,” “founded upon something independent”). This is by no 
means an escape into irrational speculation or mysticism, but a nuanced articulation of 
Schelling’s central concern with the emergence of reason—of thought and language—
from its other: 
   
We are speaking of the essence of longing regarded in and for itself, which 
we must view clearly although it was long ago submerged by the higher 
principle which had risen from it, and although we cannot grasp it 
perceptively but only spiritually…Following the eternal act of self-
revelation, the world as we now behold it, is all rule, order and form; but 
the unruly lies ever in the depths as though it might again break through, 
and order and form nowhere appear to have been original, but it seems as 
though what had initially been unruly had been brought to order. This is 
the incomprehensible basis of reality in things [Dieses ist an den Dingen 
die unergreifliche Basis der Realität], the irreducible remainder [der nie 
aufgehende Rest] which cannot be resolved [auflösen] into reason by the 
greatest exertion but always remains in the depths (SW VII, pp. 359-360). 
 
Schelling understands that within a system of freedom, the characteristic distinctions or 
analyses of reason are not given but rather in need of explanation: any investigation into 
the structure of grounding depends upon an acknowledgment of “the irreducible 
remainder” that is “the incomprehensible basis of reality.”  Insofar as we are to 
understand freedom here in its most primordial sense, as the source of reason and the 
confines of its system, so too are we to consider longing as the ground of intelligibility.  
Although Schelling’s descriptions of God’s ground can be read as all-too-
human—“to bring this Being nearer to us from a human standpoint”—I think that the 
context demands a different interpretation. It is not that we should simply accept these as 
useful comparisons that aid our limited capacities in grasping a transcendent Creator, as 
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though we need to merely imagine our own feelings and then subtract ourselves from 
them. Part of what Schelling is doing here is emphasizing the darkness that human beings 
share with the act of creation—appealing to the ground that resists reason even as and 
because it allows it to come forth. We need to look at Schelling’s entire essay as a 
meditation on the nature of identity, as a sustained effort to show that existence is a 
manifestation of the deepest structures of personality—of the longing and anxiety from 
which a subject might emerge. The fundamental structure that Schelling will propose, an 
unconscious differentiation and gathering in personality, must be prior to any mere 
analogy between the divine and the human. Heidegger calls attention to Schelling’s 
privileging of the differentiating-gathering activity over any stabilized being, suggesting 
that in longing we touch upon that allows for and resists the paradigm of subject-object 
opposition:123  
The nature of the ground in God is longing? Here the objection can hardly 
be held back any longer that a human state is transferred to God in this 
statement. Yes! But it could also be otherwise. Who has ever shown that 
longing is something merely human? Who has ever completely dismissed 
the possibility with adequate reasons that what we call “longing” and live 
within might ultimately be something other than we ourselves? Is there not 
contained in longing something which we have no reason to limit to man, 
something which rather gives us occasion to understand it as that in which 
we humans are freed beyond ourselves? (Schelling’s Treatise on the 
Essence of Human Freedom, p. 124). 
 
Longing, like the freedom it “gives us occasion to understand,” is a mode of reaching out 
towards that within us that is not us—towards that within God which is not God: the 
Absolute ground, the Ungrund. It is a consequence of Schelling’s method of investigation 
                                                       
123 Martin Heidegger, Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, trans. Joan Stambaugh, 
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 1985).  
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that we are called upon to recognize otherness even, or especially, at the heart of self-
absorption and evil. 
Before we can even enter into the functioning of the ground in God, we already 
find ourselves caught up in the dialectic of identity and difference. In the very language 
through which Schelling binds God and human being, the strange forms of resonance and 
reflection that lead from the one to the other, it becomes clear that grounding must be 
intrinsically connected to expressing. Schelling explicitly unites ground and expression in 
his description of God’s self-constituting, imaginative act: 
This primal longing moves in anticipation like a surging, billowing sea, 
similar to the ‘matter’ of Plato, following some dark, uncertain law, 
incapable in itself of forming anything that can endure. But there is born in 
God himself an inward, imaginative response, corresponding to this 
longing, which is the first stirring of the divine Being in its still dark 
depths. Through this response, God sees himself in his own image, since 
his imagination can have no other object than himself. This image is the 
first in which God, viewed absolutely, is realized, though only in himself; 
it is in the beginning in God, and is the God-begotten God himself (pp. 
360-361).  
 
The “imaginative response” [eine inner relflexive Vorstellung] to this primal longing is 
the gathering of an “image”[Ebenbilde]—God’s own image, as there is as yet no other 
possible object.124 The dark order of longing is given shape through the work of the 
imagination—the subject/object distinction, the very possibility of reason, is a product of 
fantasy. As Christopher Yates writes in The Poetic Imagination in Schelling and 
Heidegger,  
To recognize understanding in anarchy and will in yearning, the divine 
imagination exercises its creative capacity through a willfulness not yet 
fully formed. Representation, as it were, marks the delivery of logos and 
not the other way around. God does not calculate the merits of a creative 
                                                       
124 See: John Sallis, Logic of Imagination: The Expanse of the Elemental (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2012). 
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project, but rather in his very self-imaging already enacts a word and will 
of loving formation; such self-imaging marks, at once, God’s coming into 
existence with the creation of the world. (pp. 85-86).125 
 
As Yates so pointedly argues in the course of this text, Schelling’s use of imagination in 
the Freiheitsschrift both resonates with and challenges his earlier preoccupations with 
intellectual intuition, human freedom and creation. In this context, Schelling equates 
divine fantasy with the temporal dislocation of an origin that is only in the revelatory 
process that would also depend upon it. God does not imagine creation and so it appears: 
rather, both more miraculously and more humanly, the movement of letting-be must be 
prior to God and his (self-)generation.   
We are left with the problem of how to articulate this primordial letting-be, this 
grounding that is the image of imagination itself. How is it that the essential darkness of 
inchoate longing is always already an imagining? And why should this imagining longing 
call forth its own reflection in and as reason? The image, Schelling continues, is the first 
emergence of reason as “the logic of that longing” [das Wort jener Sensucht]126 which, in 
itself, follows only “some dark, uncertain law” [nach dunkelm ungewissem Gesetz]:  
This image is at one and the same time, reason—the logic of that longing, 
and the eternal Spirit which feels within it the Logos and the everlasting 
longing…The first effect of reason in nature is the separation of forces, 
which is the only way in which reason can unfold and develop the unity 
which had necessarily but unconsciously existed within nature, as in a 
seed. Just as in man there comes to light, when in the dark longing to 
create something, thoughts separate out of the chaotic confusion of 
thinking in which all are connected but each prevents the other from 
coming forth—so the unity appears which contains all within it and which 
had lain hidden in the depths (p. 361). 
 
                                                       
125 Christopher Yates, The Poetic Imagination in Heidegger and Schelling (London: Bloomsbury, 2013). 
126 In a footnote to this phrase, Schelling adds “in dem Sinne, wie man sagt: Das Wort des Rätsels”, or “in 
the sense in which one finds Logos in Logogriphs”. In other words, Logos or the Word is here understood 
as something like a key to a puzzle—that which shows the order within the apparently unordered.  
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We will need to approach the “logic” [Wort] of the primordial longing, which Schelling 
calls reason, in its essential contradiction: indifference is drawn out of itself by self-need. 
Reason is the exposure and attempted resolution of difference—of a doubling—at the 
very root of identity. My suggestion is that the primordial imaging that is reason, as 
imaging, betrays a duplicity already, albeit unconsciously, at work in longing itself. As 
Kyriaki Goudeli points out in her text, Challenges to German Idealism,  
Logogrif, as the reflection of longing upon itself, is not only the word of 
longing but also its act. As such, logogrif contains not only the thoughtful 
reflection on experience but is a form of experience itself. The image 
which longing sees in its reflection is not its representation, but what is 
caught in the net of its bending movement, for grifos originally meant 
plait, and logogrif, the plaited image of longing which sees and utters itself 
(p.11). 
  
It is not as if reason somehow “adds” an order to longing that was not there before. 
Rather, as an image of an even more fundamental giving-forth, reason is a reflection in 
the most uncanny sense. Its arrival evokes what should have been, but cannot be, 
overcome: the disordering disclosure at the basis of all order and limitation. Or, as 
Goudeli goes on to say, “Logos, rather than being frustrated by its inability to conquer the 
absolute, rediscovers meaning in its activities, precisely by virtue of its finitude; not by a 
self-heroising resolution to perform the extraordinary, but by means of its ability to be 
perennially fascinated, intrigued, provoked by a puzzling cosmos” (p. 11).  
Heidegger’s reading of the longing that is the ground [die Sensucht] is useful here, 
as he suggests that reason emerges as both a (re-)shaping and (re-)presentation of primal 
imagination conceived of as an ontological self-addiction: 
“Addiction” (Die “Sucht”)—which has nothing to do with searching 
(Suchen) etymologically—primordially means sickness which strives to 
spread itself; sickly, disease. Addiction is a striving and desiring, indeed, 
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the addiction of longing, of being concerned with oneself. A double, 
contrary movement is contained in longing: the striving away from itself 
to spread itself, and yet precisely back to itself. As the essential 
determination of the ground (of being a ground) in God, longing 
characterizes this Being as urging away from itself into the most 
indeterminate breadth of absolute essential fullness, and at the same time 
as the overpowering of joining itself to itself. In that the general nature of 
the will lies in desiring, longing is a will in which what is striving wills 
itself in the indeterminate, that is, wills to find itself in itself and wills to 
present itself in the expanded breadth of itself…Eternal longing is a 
striving which itself, however, never admits of a stable formation because 
it always wants to remain longing…it does not know any name; it is 
unable to name what it is striving for. It is lacking the possibility of words 
(p. 125). 
 
   
Longing is thus a process of differentiation without which there could be no identity—
and no being—at all. Insofar as we are seeking a way to understand the co-primordiality 
of longing and imagining in Schelling, we would do well to consider the connection 
Heidegger makes here between repetition and difference. Existence is the repetition of 
self-concern, but the eruption of self-concern is always already infected by the intimation 
of difference. Thus longing is the imaginative act par excellence to the extent that 
creation, as the letting-be of existence as such, is an act of dissociation and reiteration. 
Through Heidegger we can begin to see the error in attributing a subject and object—or 
an anthropomorphic frame—to the longing Schelling names “ground.” It is the very 
structure of a subject that wills an object that is in need of grounding. Thus, it is not that 
the ground longs, but rather that longing grounds; it is only with the imaging of reason 
that the “possibility of words”—the opposition between being and doing that such a 
possibility announces—that the seeker and what is sought begin to take shape.  
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Although primordial reason here might look like an external ordering, a 
distinguishing capacity external to the chaotic ground it organizes, we ought to pay close 
attention to Schelling’s claim that  “the first effect of reason in nature is the separation of 
forces.” He does not say reason is the separation of forces. We can equally say that the 
first effect of the image, insofar as the image of the logic of longing is reason, is the 
separation of forces. By forces, Schelling means the fundamental oppositions of 
concealment and revelation, contraction and expansion; yet the separation of these forces, 
the unity of which already but “unconsciously” existed, is not somehow in the image, but 
emerges through imaginative productivity. Reason, then, is this response—dependent 
upon and distinct from the structural responsiveness already at work in longing itself.  
It is clear that for Schelling longing is not overcome or negated by reason; nor can 
it be that order follows necessarily from the unruly. Rather, the activity of grounding is 
both a withdrawing from existence and also that which is expressed in existence. And this 
duplicity, where self-differentiation sustains identity, is precisely the structure of freedom 
that Schelling wants us to open up to: the splitting within the ground that is only made 
manifest as existence, or the doubled identity of longing that can only be manifested in 
the image of reason, are both subject-less and free. That is, ground and existence are 
bound together unconsciously and, through a still unconscious longing, the subject and 
object of this longing take shape—that is, they separate out of their unconscious unity 
and are gathered together again.   
Insofar as the ground is longing, there is already within it the presentiment of the 
responsiveness or relating that prefigures separation. As longing, the ground 
unconsciously belongs to something other than itself and its implicit self-division is made 
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explicit through its expression into existence. It is only later in his essay that Schelling 
takes on the division within ground itself, when he posits that the being of the ground is 
itself grounded—in the Ungrund, the indifferent, unconscious unity. And this Ungrund is 
itself pure freedom. If the ground is itself already involved in a grounding relationship, its 
very mode of existence depends upon yet deeper roots. For now, I only want to keep in 
mind that it is not longing and its logic that, so to speak, comes first: rather, the ground as 
longing is itself only the first expression, the first “existence”, of the Ungrund—of the 
Absolute freedom to be or not to be. In looking closely at the duplicity concealed within 
the term “ground”, we are also retracing the active identity of longing and reason, of the 
unconscious and consciousness. Only in having begun to work out the ground in relation 
to existence—a relation that hinges on concealment or negation as that which appears and 
affirms—can Schelling reach back towards the unfathomable Ungrund, or that of which 
the ground itself is an expression.  
Longing is thus not the being of grounding as such, but the being of that which 
holds together the grounded and the grounding. In this way, bringing us quite close to its 
ordinary meaning, longing becomes a mode of existing between or remaining in 
transition. Schelling’s refusal to let identity collapse into sameness breaks down the 
viability of his language: it is not only the being of existence, but also the being of the 
ground, that must be divided between ground and existence. The expression of the 
Ungrund is longing, while that which is withdrawn from or grounding this expression can 
only be indifference.127 As the most primordial grounding, the non-existence of the 
                                                       
127 “Reality and Ideality, darkness and light, or however else we wish to designate the two principles, can 
never be predicated of the groundless as antitheses. But nothing prevents their being predicated as non-
antitheses, that is, in disjunction and each for itself; wherein, however, this duality (the real two-foldness of 
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Ungrund is disrupted by a longing to return to itself. Because the Ungrund itself cannot 
be the expression of some further ground, the fullness of its being can only be grasped as 
an abyssal loss, in the nostalgia for what must have been but never was.  
The Ungrund is a testament to the depth of unruliness that Schelling contends 
with in his investigations into the essence of human freedom. Because creation is, it is 
necessary that the Ungrund has in fact eternally fractured and re-gathered itself. 
However, the free decision to express its indifference imaginatively, insofar as it is 
always already decided, is necessarily effected through the reflection of the image: 
through the dialectic of concealment and revelation. At first, Schelling’s professed 
interest in human freedom—the real possibility of good or evil—seems far removed from 
such unthinkable metaphysical positions as absolute indifference or ontological desire. 
However, the way in which even the absolute freedom of the Ungrund is bound by 
necessity to a particular expression—as withdrawing/revealing, as longing/imagining—is 
essentially a reformulation of real and radical evil. The temporal disruption that Kant 
approaches through original sin, albeit obliquely, is taken up by Schelling in a more 
rigorous and philosophical manner. Freedom, whether we are referring to the indifference 
and infinite determinability of the Ungrund or to the concrete possibility of choosing 
between good and evil, is inevitably an engagement with being always already permeated 
by desire.    
 It is in this way that I understand the Freiheitsschrift as a presentation of uncanny 
freedom. Schelling realizes that freedom is not the capacity to separate ourselves from 
our actions and to judge them, as it were, objectively or sublimely; as in the Freudian 
                                                       
the principles) is established. There is in the groundless itself nothing to prevent this. For just because its 
relation towards both is a relation of total indifference, it is neutral towards both” (SW VII, 407). 
 141 
experience of the uncanny, freedom is a confrontation with the depth of our responsibility 
and the limitations of our knowledge—a disturbing recognition of our inability to either 
escape from or to fully inhabit our subjectivity. Because freedom and life are inextricably 
joined for Schelling, objective truth is a contradiction in terms: the culmination of 
freedom, as laid out in the Freiheitsschrift, is not the exhibition of some ultimate truth but 
the imaginative possibilities of personality and love. In other words, the truth of creation 
is not something revealed, it is not the sublimation of all darkness into light; it is the 
infinite capacity to orient ourselves to otherness—to the unknowable, to the unconscious, 
to the liminal as such—in a way that creates rather than closes off possibilities for 
meaningful engagement. We have seen that freedom is not the mastery of the intellect 
over the senses and passions; it is not a denial of the creaturely. In fact, to be free is to 
acknowledge our dependency—to claim responsibility for, to identify with, the deepest 
foundation of our being that is expressed and developed through our choices and yet 
exceeds all choice. If the good is not merely repression, evil cannot be merely uninhibited 
desire. For Schelling, good and evil are both human modes of relating ground and 
existence—orientations to otherness in all its forms.  
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III. The Absolute Past 
 
Verily at the first Chaos came to be –Hesiod, Theogony 
 
 
 
Nothing less than the origin of differentiation, the transition from the timeless to the 
temporal, is at stake in the development—and frustration—of Schelling’s and Freud’s 
drive theories. Continuing last chapter’s investigation of the obscure convergences of 
freedom and prophesy in tragedy, the focus in this chapter is on Schelling’s and Freud’s 
formulations of the chaotic unconscious drives “before” their organization into and 
generation of life—the destabilizing tendencies of the past. Schelling’s efforts to reclaim 
or narrate the Absolute Past in his Weltalter, and Freud’s attempts to uncover the drives 
at the origin of life in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, represent the simultaneous 
culmination and dissolution of their drive theories. In these similarly fragmentary texts, 
the logic of identity within and division among distinct drives is disturbed—undone by a 
thinking of unconscious temporalization and the transformations of pleasure. Taken 
together, the vanishing difference between the drives bring Freud and Schelling to the 
limit of their systems and, ultimately, towards unveiling liminality in all its uncanniness.   
Whereas Trieb is a fundamental concept for psychoanalysis from the start, the 
term is absent from Schelling’s early Naturphilosophie where he instead relies on the 
language of potency and force. By the time of the Freiheitsschrift (1809) and the 
Weltalter (1811-1815) Trieb has become the fundamental, dynamic unit for Schelling. 
This seems to occur simultaneously with his turn to the language of desire, suggesting 
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that this departure from the Naturphilosophie correlates with a rethinking of the 
psychical/physical divide. Notably, Schelling develops his first truly drive based theory 
in his System of Transcendental Idealism (1800). As argued in Chapter I, it is in the latter 
text that the unconscious becomes more nuanced than the blind productivity of natura 
naturans and is connected with the repressed. For their part, the potencies no longer act 
as a quantitative differentiation and integration of “forces” as they do in the 
Naturphilosophie and Identitätphilosophie, signaling in this context an apparent 
separation of the Real from the Ideal, but they do remain essential to Schelling’s later 
philosophy of freedom and the positive philosophy. As a non-deterministic, creative 
process of development, the potencies continue to serve an explanatory function for the 
activities and productions of drive activity in these later texts.128 Indeed, I argue that the 
connection between the retroactive temporality of organism in Schelling’s early texts, and 
of the unconscious (both the human and the Absolute) in the Weltalter, depends upon the 
potencies’ adaptability to a philosophy of drive. As Edward Beach writes, contrasting 
Schelling’s dialectic with Hegel’s, “Because the truth, for Schelling, emerges in this 
process of (re)production, subsequent phases in the dialectic can supplement and perhaps 
subordinate, but by no means cancel or reconstitute (as for Hegel), what the previous 
                                                       
128 Edward Allen Beach, The Potencies of God(s): Schelling’s Philosophy of Mythology (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1994). “Schellingian dialectic, by contrast [with Hegel’s Aufhebung], seeks 
to infuse the process of reasoning with a strong volitional component, so as to be capable of recovering the 
willing that allegedly precedes rational thought itself. Proceeding from this perspective in structured stages 
[the potencies], the thinker must then elucidate how this willing guides the development of determinate 
being. The emphasis on volition is directly coupled with a call for experience; for willing and experiencing 
alone can produce a truth that goes beyond the abstract demonstrations of logic” (p. 85). Beach goes on, 
“Schelling’s treatment of dialectic obtains its successive forms not as though implicitly contained in the 
foregoing ones, but rather as produced or reproduced (erzeugt) by a kind of procreative causality which is 
supposed to reenact the processes by which the outer universe itself has evolved. The proper aim of 
philosophy is to find a path of conative (re)production (Erzeugung) by which the universal forms of 
volition sequentially emerge in poses of mutual reinforcement or conflict. Furthermore, inasmuch as this 
‘reenactment’ depends upon causal influences as well as logical inferences, any conclusions that it yields 
must remain incomplete until they can be exemplified in direct historical experience” (p. 85). 
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phases have revealed.”129 In other words, setting the stage for his later philosophy of 
drive, Schelling’s potencies help create a space for a past that is neither completely 
overcome in, nor entirely resistant to, the present.   
With this in mind, I begin with a brief discussion of organism in Schelling’s 
Naturphilosophie, highlighting the connection between life as such and a certain temporal 
“backwardness;” I then suggest that it is a similar conception of retroactive existence that 
leads both Freud and Schelling to theorize a beginning that, eternally becoming and 
eternally dying, is never fully present. Through a reading of Schelling’s Weltalter, I focus 
more explicitly on the ways in which Schelling’s theory of drives evolves into a 
temporalization of eternity—the Absolute Past—inherent in desire itself; I go on to 
consider Schelling’s disruption of the dyad drive/satisfaction within the primal will, 
consequently presenting a slippage from pleasure-in-nothingness to pleasure-in-
difference. My hope is that detailing this progression in Schelling can help untangle 
Freud’s late drive theory, and in particular the collapsing distinctions between and within 
Eros/Thanatos that we find there; with the help of Jean Laplanche’s reading of Freud’s 
primary masochism, I then suggest a way forward in reconciling this failed dualism with 
the early, “polymorphous” pleasures of Three Essays on Sexuality. Just as Schelling’s 
efforts in the Weltalter lead him away from conceptual underpinnings of the negative 
philosophy, so Freud’s struggle to understand the development of life and consciousness 
leads to a rejection of the foundational pleasure principle. This apparent fissure in the 
Freudian project, where pleasure loses its former scientific and psyche-orienting status, 
                                                       
129 ibid. p. 85. 
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might in turn offer a way to better understand Schelling’s claim that to know the past is to 
take part in the genealogy of desire.130  
 
1. Backwards Progress 
Schelling’s approach to organism as the fundamental form of causation and existence 
extends from his Naturphilosophie all the way through to his positive philosophy. 
Focusing on the potentiation of opposed drives (towards development and inhibition, for 
example, or attraction and repulsion), Schelling reformulates Kant’s work on organism as 
a hypothetical instantiation of freedom in nature in the Critique of Judgment into a 
foundational, metaphysical truth. Specifically, the Naturphilosophie suggests the primacy 
of organic temporality.  
Schelling’s treatment of organism brings together several problematic lines of 
thought stemming from Kant’s aesthetic-teleological approach to cause and temporality 
in the Critique of Judgment. Through the dynamic structure of the organism, Schelling 
responds to the temporal disruption we have already noted in Kant’s account of the 
sublime in Chapter I. Schelling thus rejects a linear, mechanistic understanding of 
causation so as to highlight an ongoing, infinite conflict and attempted reconciliation 
                                                       
130 In Time Driven: Metapsychology and the Splitting of the Drive, Adrian Johnston’s arguments 
concerning the two versions of cause/temporality in Freud are indebted to Cutrofello’s work and, at times, 
converge with my own claims: “In identifying Trieb as the place of intersection for Freud’s two temporal 
models, these models no longer need to be thought of as mutually exclusive. In fact, the hypothesis of Trieb 
as split between two temporal organizations avoids favoring one portrayal of the drive at the expense of the 
others—for example, stressing the conservative, ‘deathly’ side of the drive to the detriment of the drive’s 
potential for constant modification. The problem is that Freud himself, in part due to his neglect of the role 
of time in psychoanalysis, doesn’t attempt any sort of reconciliation between his two unharmonized 
schemas” (p. 22). Using Lacan, Johnston connects the Kantian “transcendental” with the Freudian 
unconscious, and particularly with certain aspects of the drives themselves—suggesting that drives are split 
into mutable (aim/object) and eternal (source/pressure) components. His overarching concern in this text is 
with what it might mean for the unconscious to be “timeless”—why it is that Freud tends to shy away from 
a psychoanalytic account of temporality and how the drives are central to this project. I will be in 
conversation with Johnston’s work at various points throughout the chapter. 
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between forces of expansion and contraction, freedom and determination, the universal 
and the particular. Whereas Kant implies that organism and the sublime can only be 
signals or symbols of human freedom, Schelling insists that they are real manifestations 
of a freedom that extends beyond and grounds the human. As Bruce Matthews writes in 
Schelling’s Organic Form of Philosophy: Life as the Schema of Freedom, 
 
The common epistemological requirement of these elements—
apprehending a reciprocal causal system, organism, and the sublime—is 
their common need to effect what Kant calls “a comprehension of the 
manifold in unity” (KU, 107). Only if we can comprehend the reciprocal 
establishment of whole and part—simultaneously with the interaction 
among the parts themselves—only then can we understand the dynamic 
whole that is organic nature…What this requires however, is that Kant 
must shatter the static form of our pure a priori intuition of time…he must 
qualify intuition’s sequential processing of time and permit an experience 
in which the time-condition is removed (146, my italics). 
 
Matthews points to the analogous structure of our comprehension of the organic and of 
the sublime in terms of Schelling’s overarching claim that the philosopher/scientist’s 
task—no less than the artist’s—is to strive to unite the infinite and the finite, the eternal 
and the temporal.131 Contrary to Kant’s claims in the Critique of Pure Reason, 
experiences of the sublime and the organic require that the “static” (and thus measurable) 
form of time be “removed.” The subject must be implicated in this synthesis of finite and 
infinite rather than merely receptive to it.  Insofar as organic cause—irreducible to the 
mechanism of the phenomenal realm—is primary for Schelling, the “static form of our a 
priori intuition of time” must be derivative; whatever the altered temporality of organism 
                                                       
131 In Chapter I, I have already suggested the ways in which the Kantian sublime is transformed in 
Schelling; it should be clear that the latter’s insistence on the renegotiation of the boundaries between 
subject and object, self and other, in the sublime are also relevant in terms of the reciprocity belonging to 
organism. 
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(and of sublimity) entails, as the structure of life and freedom it must ground “static,” 
deathly, linear temporality and its necessity: 
Every organic product exists for itself; its being is dependent on no other 
being. But now the cause is never the same as the effect; only between 
quite different things is a relation of cause and effect possible. The 
organic, however, produces itself, arises out of itself; every single plant is 
the product only of an individual of its own kind, and so every single 
organism endlessly produces and reproduces only its own species. Hence 
no organization progresses forward, but is forever turning back always 
into itself (Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, p. 30).132 
 
   
The independence or self-sufficiency of organism already implies a kind of retroactive 
causation, a circular movement that is simultaneously self-transformative (change) and 
self-sustaining (continuity). Here Schelling introduces a notion of generative repetition 
that allows him to defend identity that is an activity rather than a state. The temporal 
repercussions of this organic union of unifying and differentiating forces, however, are 
only really cashed out through Schelling’s turn to drive theory; the transition from force 
to drive is also a transition from organism to personality.133 Thus organism is not only the 
great achievement of Nature’s non-conscious polarities. Sharing the temporal structure of 
Schellingian personality, organism is also the site where the distinction between force 
and drive becomes relevant. Schelling writes in the opening pages of the Weltalter, 
“Every physical and moral whole requires for its maintenance a reduction, from time to 
time, to its innermost beginning….Every thing runs through certain moments in order to 
attain completion: a set of processes coming one after the other where the later always 
                                                       
132 F.W.J. Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, trans., Errol E. Harris and Peter Heath. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988). SW Vol. II, pp. 1-344. 
133 Joseph L. Esposito, Schelling’s Idealism and Philosophy of Nature. (Lewisburg: Bucknell University 
Press, 1977). Esposito writes: “Our very concept of a thing cannot be separated from the notion of 
interaction and reciprocal determination…A thing is actually a locus of activity, resulting from the 
interaction of several or all parts of the community” (p. 61).  
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intrudes on the earlier, bringing it to fruition” (my italics, AW 1813, p. 117). In view of 
this later text, then, Schelling’s insistence that no organization can “progress forward” 
becomes a critique of a certain understanding of scientific knowledge and, even more so, 
a refusal to reduce self-knowledge to such a model: the incessant and mutual intrusion of 
past and future is a rejection of truth as presence, at least insofar as this sense of 
objectivity would lay claim to a totalizing neutrality. Progress forward is equated with the 
mechanistic trope of effects as implicit in, and pouring forth from, similarly 
circumscribed causes—science conceived as an inert accumulation of discrete and 
homogeneous events.   
Thus Schelling’s account of organic backwardness—characterized by the mutual 
activity of uniting identity (the whole/persistence) and difference (the unfolding of 
parts/development)—is not only a claim about how to know a particular type of being; it 
is a claim about the most fundamental and philosophical form of knowing. As Schelling 
writes in the Outline, “[n]o subsistence of a product [of Nature] is thinkable without a 
continual process of being reproduced. The product must be thought of as annihilated at 
every step, and at every step reproduced anew” (cited in Esposito, p. 86).134 And, when 
Schelling later locates organism at the root of creation in his Weltalter, he is quite explicit 
that this (re)generative activity is the essence and origin of temporality as such: “We have 
a presentiment that one organism lies hidden deep in time and encompasses even the 
smallest of things” (1813, p.123). Thus to temporalize—to begin—is to reach back; the 
eternal and unconscious past will always already have been intruded upon by the longing 
                                                       
134 F.W.J Schelling, First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature, Trans., Keith R. Peterson. 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004). “Evidently every (finite) product is only a seeming 
product, if again infinity lies in it, i.e., if it is itself again capable of an infinite development. If it engages in 
this development, then it would have no permanent existence at all; every product that now appears fixed in 
Nature would exist only for a moment, gripped in continuous evolution, always changeable, appearing only 
to fade away again” (p. 18). 
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for the origin that it was and cannot be, and philosophical knowing must structure itself 
accordingly: linearity is but a defense against the shifting temporality of desire. In this 
way, Schelling poses a serious challenge to the equation of knowledge with presence. To 
know is not to intuit the eternally present within the temporal, but to trace the desiring, 
temporalizing activity already at work in eternity.   
In Schelling’s Naturphilosophie, the seeming independence and priority of thing-
like stability (and, by extension, the deterministic paradigm that presents us with a thing-
like world) is unmasked as a product of inhibitive and creative forces: A deceptive 
stagnancy conceals the conflict between infinite productivity and infinite constraint.135 
Equally, our ordinary conception of time as a series of discrete, causally connected now-
points, would be the illusory result of an infinite becoming and that which resists it—an 
equally eternal returning. Indeed, Schelling’s struggle to articulate this conflict as the 
source of both the ontological and the temporal is evident in the various and unfinished 
drafts of the Weltalter: 
 
Whoever takes time only as it presents itself feels a conflict of two 
principles in it; one strives forward, driving towards development, and one 
holds back, inhibiting [hemmend] and striving against development. If this 
other principle were to provide no resistance, then there would be no time, 
because development would occur in an uninterrupted flash rather than 
successively; yet if the other principle were not constantly overcome by 
the first, there would be absolute rest, death, standstill and hence there 
would again be no time…Thus, the principles we perceive in time are the 
authentic inner principles of all life, and contradiction is not only possible 
but necessary (1813, p.123). 
                                                       
135 In his Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature (1797), which is considered Schelling’s first complete 
Naturphilosophie text, he is already making use of the language of conflict between forces to account for 
the apparent stability of products of nature and to illustrate the identity (and apparent distinction) between 
the Real and Ideal in terms of potencies. This language continues in the work that follows, First Outline of 
a System of the Philosophy of Nature. It is in fact not until his System of Transcendental Idealism (1800) 
that he first makes use of the term Trieb [drive] in reference to these generative forces of opposition (SW 
Vol. III, pp. 545-547).   
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The strangeness of this claim cannot be overstated: for Schelling, the eternal is not 
unmoving in contrast to the dynamism of the temporal, but rather the other way round. 
As I hope to show in what follows, the eternity or timelessness of Schelling’s Absolute 
Past, which he often equates with the unconscious, is not immobility—it is neither the 
absence of temporalization nor of differentiation. Time as we perceive it is a compromise 
formation, brought about through the same potentiation of contradictory drives towards 
inhibition and development presented in his Naturphilosophie. The timelessness 
belonging to the Absolute Past is a more fundamental form of relating these eternal 
tendencies of will. It is no mere illusion: if anything, it is our experience of mechanistic 
cause (time as a series of now-points) that is akin to the illusory, static appearance of 
natural objects (existence as a concatenation of things).  
This dialectical engagement between apparent stability and eternally united and 
opposed potencies is revisited in the Weltalter; here it is through contradictory drives 
towards expression and concealment, along with the bond [das Band] that unites them, 
that the Absolute reveals itself. By way of the identity-activity of organisms, the infinite 
forces that Schelling first posits in his Naturphilosophie are temporalized into drives; the 
implicit presence of these forces already begins to erode in the Ungrund of the 
Freiheitsschrift, as Schelling senses the need to historicize the emergence and 
development of temporality in terms of desire and repetition—as a function of an 
eternally withdrawing beginning. Beyond the ordered progression of potencies at work 
both in nature and human freedom, in the Weltalter Schelling returns to the essential 
backwardness of the organism, to the temporalizing attraction and withdrawal of the 
 151 
Absolute Past: he suggests that it is the being-as-craving of the drives that ultimately 
draws non-being into being, indifference into decision. Through the course of the 
Weltalter, Schelling suggests that it is the diffusion/integration of drive as such that unites 
the developmental logic of the potencies (necessity) and the eternal decision (freedom) of 
the beginning.136 
Schelling can only approach the cyclical, self-devouring drives, before their 
contraction into existence—the potencies of A1/the contracting drive, A2/the expansive 
drive, and A3/the bond that unites them—or, in relation to the Ungrund or A0, which 
constitutes the disintegrative possibility threatening and supporting the coherence of 
presence : 
With this there is nothing left over except an alternating positing, where 
alternately now one is that which has being and other is that which does 
not have being and then, in turn, it is the other of these which has being 
and the one which does not have being. Yet, so that it thereby also comes 
exclusively to this alternating positing in the primordial urge for Being, it 
is necessary that one of them be the beginning or that which first has being 
and after this, one of them is the second and one of them is the third. From 
this, the movement again goes back to the first and, as such, is an eternally 
expiring and eternally recommencing life (1815, p. 12-13).137  
 
His description here of a beginning before the beginning already includes what can only 
come after—difference and life—just as he goes on to depict the primal will as already 
                                                       
136 Part of the reason I focus on Schelling’s 1813 draft is due to his increasing minimization of spontaneity 
and his consequent return to the language of potencies in the 1815 draft. I find his movement away from 
the language of desire and drive to be indicative of his wanting to distance himself from the human that is 
so much at the heart of his Freiheitsschrift. That is, I find more compelling Schelling’s willingness to make 
the philosophical essentially human, while remaining able to avoid an anthropomorphism of being and 
time. Furthermore, in the 1815 version Schelling emphasizes the necessity of decision, of the cision of the 
Absolute Past, whereas the 1813 draft focuses almost entirely on its freedom. 
137 SW, p. 220. 
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divided between self-absorption (indifference) and self-seeking (tension).138 It is not that 
Schelling is limited to a narration of the past distorted by the biases of the present; rather, 
it is only through the retroactive structure that he can enact and come to know the 
contradiction of eternal beginning. The Absolute Past is not—until, of course, it was.  
In the language of the 1815 draft, that which will have become the Absolute Past, 
the pulsation of potencies that withdraw from and contract being, are already 
differentiated; but it is a differentiation that itself can only want existence, that must 
remain in the mode of, or under the sway of, craving and non-presence: A1. The transition 
to the Absolute Present, to expression, revelation and development, is thus both a re-
organization of the relation between the potencies (where A1 lets be A2 as that which 
ought to have being) and an actualization of the potency of expression or differentiation: 
A2. But the lingering mystery of the differentiation and unity of these potencies in and as 
creation, in and as the cision separating Absolute Past from Absolute Present, is 
ultimately ascribed to free decision (albeit through a necessary union of God’s nature and 
spirit): A3.  This eternal decision for self-revelation is itself a desire for the beginning—a 
desire that cannot have a beginning—and existence erupts as an orientation towards and 
delimitation of what no-longer-is:  
But precisely that one commences and one of them is first, must result 
from a decision that certainly has not been made consciously or through 
deliberation but can happen rather only when a violent power blindly 
breaks the unity in the jostling between the necessity and the impossibility 
to be. But the only place in which a ground of determination can be sought 
for the precedence of one of them and the succession of the other is the 
particular nature of each of the principles, which is different from their 
general nature which consists in being equally originary and equally 
independent and each having the same claim to be that which has 
                                                       
138 “Therefore, two principles are already in what is necessary of God: the outpouring, outstretching, self-
giving being, and an equivalently eternal force of self-hood, of retreat into itself, of Being in itself. That 
being and this force are both already God itself, without God’s assistance” (1815, p. 6) [SW, p. 211]. 
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being…It is now clear that what is posited at the beginning is precisely 
that which is subordinated in the successor. The beginning is only the 
beginning insofar as it is not that which should actually be, that which 
truthfully and in itself has being. If there is therefore a decision, then that 
which can only be posited at the beginning inclines, for the most part and 
in its particular way, to the nature of that which does not have being 
(1815, p. 13).139 
 
We should note that the necessity belonging to this eternal beginning, as Schelling tells 
us, only comes after. It is only characterizable as a decision retroactively—thus its 
Nachträglichkeit. The rupture of the beginning that occupies Schelling in the Weltalter, 
as he traces the absent moment of transition from the logic of potency to its 
(re)productive realization, is tied to an uncanny temporality. That is, it depends upon an 
originary, eternal act of repression—upon a “decision that inclines…to the nature of that 
which does not have being”—that conditions and always threatens to dissolve existence 
as such.    
We can see that Schelling views this other temporality that grounds creation, or 
the already-temporalized transition into creation, in terms of the dynamics of drive and 
repression. The unconscious, as the timeless past, is repressed as blind craving 
(vorweltliche), gives way to vital contradiction (weltliche), and intimates the possibility 
of renewed integration (nachweltliche).140 Schelling implies that consciousness and 
presence, no less than sublimation and futurity, depend upon the dual identity of drive—
                                                       
139 SW, p. 221. 
140 Schelling makes it clear in the 1813 draft that the Absolute Past, Present and Future refer to what comes 
before, during and after creation, respectively. Immediately after suggesting that one must put the past 
behind him in order to have a present, “only the man with the strength to rise above himself is able to create 
a true past; he alone can savor a true present, just as he alone looks forward to a genuine future,” Schelling 
posits that “the world has in itself no past and no future. [This would entail] that everything that has 
happened in it from the beginning and everything that will happen up to the end belongs to a single 
overarching time; that the authentic past, the past as such, is what came before the world [vorweltliche]; 
that the authentic future, the future as such, is what will come after the world [nachweltliche]. And so a 
system of times would unfold for us, of which the human system would be just a copy, a repetition within a 
narrower sphere” (1813, p. 121). 
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upon the structural confusion involved in separating what the drive is (which can only be 
what it wants) from its aim (which must also be its defining characteristic); the drive 
occupies a virtual space, split as it is between returning to and differentiating itself from 
non-existence. As we shall see, this ever-recurring collapse of the antagonism between 
the drives—and specifically in light of its connection to the transition into temporality—
is quite close to Freud’s work in Beyond the Pleasure Principle.141 This latter text, often 
understood as a narrative illustrating Freud’s insistence on conflicting drives towards 
integration and disintegration, actually makes manifest the extent to which even the most 
fundamental duality—life and death drives—conceals an oscillation between and 
resistance to oppositional frameworks of differentiation/disintegration and 
fusion/integration. Freud’s clinging to these opposing drives qua opposing actually elicits 
their bizarre and productive transformations. Indeed, Freud’s difficulty in maintaining a 
dualism of the drives in this work brings him quite close to the Schellingian drive that 
must bear both possibilities: to progression that always conceals repetition/regression, 
and to presence that is disrupted by the destabilized and destabilizing existence of the 
past:  
 
It would not be without a kind of horror that spirit would finally recognize 
that even in the primordial essence itself something had to be posited as 
past before the present time became possible, and that it is precisely this 
past that is borne by the present creation, and that still remains 
fundamentally concealed (1813, 122). 
 
Schelling’s language of “horror” and “concealment” is of course pervasive in Freud’s 
work. The ground is not as firm as we like to imagine, but volatile and frightening, in that 
                                                       
141 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Trans., Gregory C. Richter, (Toronto: Broadview Press, 
2011). SE XVIII, pp. 7-66.  
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existence depends upon a past that fundamentally resists (self-)presence. Moreover, 
Freud’s accounts of both the phylogenetic and individual inheritance of the unconscious 
echo Schelling’s claim that the Absolute Past—the true, and truly horrific, past—is 
producing and eroding itself in every moment and in us: 
Indeed, we will hazard the assertion that every act of generation occurring 
in nature marks a return to a moment of the past, a moment that is allowed 
for an instant to enter the present time as an alienated (re)appearance. For, 
since time commences absolutely in each living thing, and since at the 
beginning of each life time is connected to eternity anew, then an eternity 
must precede each life (AW 1813, p. 162).  
 
Not only is each moment tied to an unfathomable past, disrupting any linear sense of an 
unqualified individual agency; furthermore, the essentially repressed past must be a 
function of what comes after. Already, “before” the beginning, there is difference: there 
is drive divided within itself. The Absolute Past, like the Ungrund hovering at the 
periphery of the Freiheitsschrift, remains in the depths of the individual and of existence 
as such; we are as a frustrated striving, as an insatiable need to recuperate the past into 
presence—into a presence that, paradoxically, depends on a past that is-no-longer. This 
existential longing to return—to know the past—would be wrongly conceived as a desire 
for some thing.142 Rather, this self-defining and self-dissolving desire is the cision: a 
repetition grounding every act of existence.143 Disturbing the equation of reality and 
presence, bringing to awareness the precarious denial holding together all appearance, the 
                                                       
142 See Sean McGrath’s Dark Ground of Spirit for a discussion of Freud’s nihilism/relativism, most notably 
pp. 179-190. 
143 Unfortunately, Schelling’s own language can often lead to this kind of reading. His suggestion, for 
instance, that we must put the past behind us to truly have a present implies that such an exclusion of the 
past is both possible and desirable. I think, however, that the spirit of Schelling’s texts calls for another 
interpretation, one perhaps exemplified in the following: “The beginning that a being has outside of itself 
and the beginning that a being has within itself are different. A beginning from which it can be alienated 
and from which it can distance itself is different than a beginning in which it eternally remains because it 
itself is the beginning” (1815, p. 17/SW, p. 226). 
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Absolute Past is not there, once and for all, to give a name to and protect us from the 
meaningless transformations within non-existence. Indeed, if its withdrawal were 
complete, this would constitute Schellingian evil—an absolute self-absorption that 
excludes the otherness of expression; it is only as a continued claim on the present and 
future, as the primordially repressed ambivalence of the desire to become (other) and to 
return (to itself), that the Absolute Past provides the space for love and freedom.  
 
 
2. Two Beginnings 
 
What becomes evident in reading Schelling’s Weltalter alongside Freud’s Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle is that these texts are disrupted by two seemingly irreconcilable 
versions of the beginning. On the one hand, there is the undifferentiated, tranquil 
immobility of indifference or primal narcissism; on the other, there is the originary 
perversion and repetition of the drives. With this in mind, I have separated this section 
into two sub-sections, although I hope that the mutual dependency of these two 
accounts—the inability to engage with one without being intruded upon by the other—
becomes clear through the course of the chapter. The two sections that follow, “Primal 
Fantasy” and “Primary Masochism”, can be read as elaborations of “The Oceanic 
Feeling” and “Fort/Da”, respectively. While this leads to a certain lack of clarity in the 
presentation, it seems to me that this is the only way to do justice to the complications at 
work in Freud’s and Schelling’s own texts dealing with the problem of origins.  
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2.1 The Oceanic Feeling 
 
Already in the opening lines of Schelling’s Weltalter, we find the condensed, structural 
irony that motivates the therapeutic project of the text: intending to develop an account of 
the ages of the world, Schelling is—like all neurotics—engulfed by the past. In each of 
his drafts Schelling begins with the decisive assertion: “The past is known, the present is 
recognized, the future is divined” (p. 113). The simplicity of these claims obscures what 
it is that keeps demanding to be re-written: a sense of (self-)knowledge that could be 
adequate to the ongoing transition between the timeless and the temporal: 
 
Man must be granted an essence outside and above the world; for how 
could he alone, of all creatures, retrace the long path of developments 
from the present back into the deepest night of the past, how could he 
alone rise up to the beginning of things unless there were in him an 
essence from the beginning of times? Drawn from the source of things and 
akin to it, what is eternal of the soul has a co-science/con-sciousness of 
creation...Accordingly, the unfathomable, prehistoric age rests in this 
essence; although it faithfully protects the treasures of the holy past, this 
essence is in itself mute and cannot express what is enclosed within it 
(1813, p. 114). 
 
 
The past Schelling is concerned with is pre-historical in the sense that it resists 
conceptualization through the generality of language—“the authentic past, the past as 
such, is what came before the world [vorweltliche]”—and yet, it is the past that must be 
narrated (1813, p. 121). The past here imagined is importantly connected to the 
unconscious, or rather to that condition from which the division between consciousness 
and the unconscious comes to be: “This separation, this doubling of ourselves, this secret 
intercourse between two essences, one questioning and one answering, one ignorant 
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though seeking to know and one knowledgeable without knowing its knowledge…is the 
authentic secret of the philosopher” (1813, p. 115).144  The Absolute Past—and man’s 
knowing/unknowing essence that participates in it—is a mutual desiring: a vital 
difference within a primal drive(s) that always, already disturbs indifference—that has 
always, already duplicated itself. As Schelling goes on to say,  
Put most succinctly, the Highest can be what-is, and it can be being…A 
thing that is free, not either to be something or not to be it, but rather to 
exist or not to exist—such a thing, by itself and with respect to its essence, 
can only be will…It alone is allowed to stand in the middle as it were, 
between being and nonbeing” (1813, p. 132).  
 
If we ought to narrate the beginning, as Schelling suggests here, we shall name it will; but 
a peculiarly desireless will (“the will that wills nothing, that desires no object”) out of 
which opposing wills emerge.145  It is a will that remains, essentially and eternally, in 
transition.  
It remains to be seen whether or how such an originary, transitional space may 
already contain the present and future; time is redefined and transformed through 
Schelling’s various attempts at going back to the beginning. As David Krell points out in 
The Tragic Absolute, that Schelling does in fact offer more than the past in the Weltalter 
is already suggested in his notes for the first draft: from the very first line, “1. Ich 
beginne,” Krell reminds us that “the simple past…is not among the tenses into which we 
can translate Ich beginne (p. 109).”146 At the outset, the past shows itself as 
                                                       
144 See also “On the Nature of Philosophy as Science” in Bubner, Rüdiger, ed. German Idealist Philosophy. 
(London: Penguin Books, 1997): “There is a contradiction in the idea of knowing eternal freedom. It is 
absolute subject=primordial state. How, then, can it become object? It is impossible for it to become object 
as absolute subject, for, as such, it has no object-like relation to anything…Instead of absolute subject, it 
can also be called pure knowledge, and as such it cannot be that which is known” (p. 224). 
145 AW, p. 133. 
146 David Farrell Krell, The Tragic Absolute: German Idealism and the Languishing God (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2005). 
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heterogeneous, ambiguous and already entangled in present and future tenses. The eternal 
beginning, an act that is both paradigmatically past and the condition for there being a 
past at all, is only insofar as it makes itself past—it is insofar as it is not.  
 The tranquil immobility of the past already carries within it the seeds of 
contradiction—and most essentially, the self-contradiction constitutive of desire.  The 
will to remain as it was silently, freely unfolds, giving rise to the founding question of 
philosophy: “Now the great riddle of all times originates precisely here, the riddle of how 
anything could have come from what is neither externally active nor is anything in itself. 
And yet life did not remain in the state of immobility, and time is just as certain as 
eternity” (135). Schelling goes on to offer the following solution, grasping for language 
that can express the very possibility of expression, the potentiating movement from the 
First to the Second, from the eternal One to the temporalizing Two:147 
   
Everything that is something without actually being it must by nature seek 
itself; but this is not to say that it will find itself, and still less that a 
movement or a going out from itself takes place. This is a seeking that 
remains silent and completely unconscious, in which the essence remains 
alone with itself, and is all the more profound, deep, and unconscious, the 
greater the fullness it contains in itself. If we could say that the resting will 
                                                       
147 Krell writes in The Tragic Absolute, quite beautifully and with great and original insight, of the 
movement from One to Two in Schelling—its relevance to his project as a whole: “The tragic absolute is in 
multiple senses the stroke of one—the stroke of one by one. That stroke instigates critique, judgment, crisis, 
separation, severance and divorce; it also initiates the more languid moments of love and desire that we call 
languor and languishment. The stroke severs one not into two, that is not into two clearly definable units, 
but into a manifold that resists synthesis. The stroke of one severs ‘that loved clasp’ of Una and Dua, severs 
all singular identities and all binary oppositions…The stroke of one marks the end of all philosophies of 
eternity and the instauration of a new understanding of time and temporality. It sounds a knell, initiating a 
period of progressive paralysis and ultimate decrepitude for all absolutes; yet it also rings the bell, at least 
to Schelling’s ear, at the birth of a finite human freedom” (p. 70). This sense of the stroke both of and by 
one, a unity in self-division, is in part what leads me to consider Freud (and Laplanche) on primary 
masochism in connection with Schelling’s Die Weltalter in this chapter. Indeed, I was inspired by Krell’s 
work and, in a sense, consider my efforts in this dissertation (and specifically in this chapter) to be one way 
of heeding his call to “problematize (or at least leave open) the very meaning of ‘inheritance’ and historical 
succession. One would thereby show greater respect for both psychoanalysis and Schelling, precisely by 
setting out in quest of the undiscovered source of primal repression. That source lies hidden in a time so 
remote that it appears—to both Schelling and Freud—as timeless” (117). 
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is the First, then we can also say that an unconscious, tranquil, self-
seeking will is the Second…This will produces itself and is therefore 
unconditioned and in itself omnipotent; it produces itself absolutely—that 
is, out of itself and from itself. Unconscious longing is its mother, but she 
only conceived it and it has produced itself (p. 137). 
 
In and as unconscious seeking, the will simultaneously negates itself (as what-is) and 
posits itself as lack (as what is not); it can only produce itself—only be itself—through a 
desire for itself indistinguishable from a desire for the Other. The longing Schelling 
wants to account for appears—or rather, is neither present nor absent—already in the 
resting first will (“everything that is something without actually being it must by nature 
seek itself”); the self-sufficiency of the First is simultaneously affirmed and refused. At 
the same time, the Second will, which would disturb the First, is characterized as tranquil. 
What Schelling glimpses here is a beginning that is always, eternally, too late; the will 
that wills nothing is already congealed into self-seeking desire, into the will that wills 
nothing—and such a beginning can only appear as “having been,” as a grounding that 
resists presence, and thus as an ungrounding. 
There is a tendency in readings of Schelling and Freud to conflate the 
unconscious that fundamentally resists consciousness (the Absolute Past) with the 
unconscious that is only potentially or problematically conscious (the past). However, 
such a reading obscures the reality of an unconscious that is not merely the shadow of 
consciousness, and protects us from an Absolute Past that is more than just faded 
presence. Indeed, it seems to me that Schelling’s own vacillation on this point is one of 
the main reasons he can never be finished with the Weltalter; and why, in the 
Freiheitsschrift, the loving sublimation of ground into existence—the filtering or molding 
of the darkness of desire into the light of reason—is complicated by an eternal 
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“remainder”.148 Finishing the Weltalter would require a final victory of linear time—a 
beginning and an ending which could be ultimately fixed. As we shall see, there is a 
similar hesitancy pervading Freud’s reflections on time, as the above competing senses of 
the unconscious rise to the surface. It is worth noting that when Freud most self-
consciously indulges in this sort of temporal “speculation,” he compares his work with 
Kant’s: in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the timelessness of the unconscious is notably 
presented alongside and supported by the philosopher’s equation of the noumenal and the 
atemporal.149 And so we need to ask: Why is the Kantian tradition evoked here? Why 
does pleasure (pleasure understood in terms of a primal unity with otherness) lead Freud 
to develop the rudiments of a psychoanalytic theory of temporality?150 
Today, due to certain psychoanalytic discoveries, Kant’s pronouncement 
that time and space are necessary categories of the mind can be brought to 
discussion. We have discovered that the unconscious mental processes are 
in themselves ‘timeless.’ That is to say, first of all, that they are not 
ordered chronologically, that time changes nothing in them, and that one 
cannot really apply to them the concept of time. These are negative 
                                                       
148 See Sean McGrath’s The Dark Ground of Spirit for a reading that emphasizes this conception of the 
teleological interpretation, where darkness is made light, where the unconscious is translated into 
consciousness. See also: FS, pp. 399-407. 
149 In Imagining Otherwise: Metapsychology and the Analytic A Posteriori Andrew Cutrofello brings 
together Kant, Freud and Lacan, making the case that metapsychology brings out the possibility of the 
analytic a posteriori concealed within transcendental philosophy; in particular, he argues that Lacan’s objet 
a, and the Freudian conception of the subject’s relation to his unconscious more generally, are 
instantiations of this elusive form of judgment. Making use of Kripke’s claim that an analytic judgment is 
one that the subject will not give up under any circumstances, Cutrrtofello claims that the repressed desires 
of the hysteric, and the manifest beliefs of the psychotic, offer cases of judgments that are both analytic 
(necessary) and a priori (deriving from experience). I will return to these claims later in the chapter. 
150 Freud’s relevance to the trajectory of transcendental philosophy is noted and expounded upon by a great 
variety of philosophers, from all areas of the field. As Stanley Cavell writes in “Freud and Philosophy: A 
Fragment”: “In these paths of inheritance, Freud’s distinction is to have broken through to a practice in 
which the Idealist philosophy, the reigning philosophy of German culture, becomes concrete (which is 
roughly what Marx said socialism was to accomplish). In Freud’s practice, one human being represents to 
another all that that other has conceived of humanity in his or her life, and moves with that other toward an 
expression of the conditions which condition that utterly specific life. It is a vision and an achievement 
quite worthy of the most heroic attributes Freud assigned himself. But psychoanalysis has not surmounted 
the obscurities of the philosophical problematic of representation and reality it inherits. Until it stops 
shrinking from philosophy (from its own past), it will continue to shrink before the derivative question, for 
example, whether the stories of its patients are fantasy merely or (also?) reality; it will continue to waver 
between regarding the question as irrelevant to its work and as the essence of it” (Critical Inquiry, Winter 
1987, 393). 
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characteristics that can only be clarified through comparison with the 
conscious mental processes. Our abstract concept of time, by contrast, 
seems to be completely derived from the modus operandi of the system P-
C [Perception-Consciousness] and to correspond to a self-perception by 
that modus operandi. This mode of function in the system might possibly 
be another way of providing a shield against stimuli. These comments will 
surely sound very obscure, but I must restrict myself to such hints (p. 68). 
  
Freud’s suggestion that conscious time is a defense can be seen as a gesture towards the 
silent, traumatic transitionality that haunts the text—the emergence of consciousness 
from the unconscious, life from death, pleasure from pain; indeed, Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle is a text defined by repeated and failed beginnings—a text that is itself always 
in transition, unable to truly and decisively begin. Before considering that work in some 
detail, I would briefly point to the opening pages of its later, companion text, where 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle finally begins. In Civilization and its Discontents, citing a 
letter from a friend, Freud implies that although timelessness threatens consciousness, it 
is not excluded from reality or inherently traumatic: 
 
I had sent him my small book that treats religion as an illusion, and he 
answered that he entirely agreed with my judgment upon religion, but that 
he was sorry I had not properly appreciated the true source of religious 
sentiments. This, he says, consists in a peculiar feeling, which he himself 
is never without, which he finds confirmed by many others…It is a feeling 
which he would like to call a sensation of ‘eternity’, a feeling as of 
something limitless, unbounded—as it were, ‘oceanic’(p. 11). 
 
Continuing, or rather retroactively initiating the exploration of pleasure in excess of its 
principle, Freud first posits the oceanic feeling; by presenting this feeling through a 
personal letter, Freud draws our attention to the particular quality or specificity of 
pleasure. To include this private account so prominently is to demand from 
psychoanalysis a reevaluation of the tension between the individual and the universal that 
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so disrupted Beyond the Pleasure Principle—hovering, as that text does, between biology 
and myth, between organic immortality and individual death.151 In other words, the 
opening pages of Civilization and Its Discontents make it clear that Freud’s move beyond 
the pleasure principle could only lead him more deeply into pleasure which can in no way 
be equated with “diminution of tension.” He goes on, as we saw in his accounts of the 
uncanny and telepathy, to remind us that while he personally lacks these feelings he can 
nonetheless use them to illustrate psychoanalytic discoveries: 
 
From my own experiences I could not convince myself of the primary 
nature of such a feeling…Further reflection tells us that the adult’s ego-
feeling cannot have been the same from the beginning. It must have gone 
through a process of development, which cannot, of course, be 
demonstrated but which admits of being constructed with a fair degree of 
probability. An infant at the breast does not as yet distinguish his ego from 
the external world as the source of the sensations flowing in upon him. He 
gradually learns to do so, in response to various promptings…A tendency 
arises to separate from the ego everything that can become a source of 
unpleasure…One comes to learn a procedure by which…one can 
differentiate between what is internal—what belongs to the ego—and 
what is external—what emanates from the outer world. In this way one 
makes the first step towards the introduction of the reality principle which 
is to dominate future development…In this way, then, the ego detaches 
itself from the external world. Or, to put it more correctly, originally the 
ego is everything, later it separates off an external world from itself. Our 
present ego-feeling is, therefore, only a shrunken residue of a much more 
inclusive—indeed an all-embracing—feeling which corresponded to a 
more intimate bond between the ego and the world about it (pp. 13-15, my 
italics). 
                                                       
151 It is strange, to say the least, that in a text that claims to introduce the death drive, Freud should also 
concern himself with the possibility of immortality: “But maybe this belief in the internal necessity of 
dying is only one of the illusions we have created for ourselves um die Schwere des Daseins zu ertragen [to 
bear the weight of existence] (Schiller, Die Braut von Messina [The Bride of Messina], I, 8)…The greatest 
interest for us is connected with the treatment of the duration of life and the death of organisms in the 
works of August Weismann (Weismann 1882, 1884, 1892). It was he who proposed a distinction in living 
substance between mortal and immortal halves. The mortal half is the body in the narrower sense, the 
soma, which alone is subject to natural death. The gametes, by contrast, are potentially immortal: under 
certain favorable conditions they can develop into a new individual, or, in other words, surround 
themselves with a new soma (Weismann 1884)” (BPP, pp. 82-83). Freud’s quick transitions from war 
neuroses to play, from biology to myth, are particularly astounding here: the convergence of immortality 
and finitude is also a point of contact between the delusions of religion and the axioms of science. 
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Freud re-appropriates his friend’s religious language in order to explain that the 
boundaries between ego and world remain permeable and are not given from the 
beginning but produced through, and ever vulnerable to, our modes of experiencing 
pleasure and pain. The dichotomies of internal and external, active and passive, seem to 
derive from an undifferentiated, “oceanic” engulfment that remains the ambivalent source 
of pleasure (repetition) and anxiety (dissolution).  
 
2.2 Fort/Da 
It is no coincidence that Freud and Schelling both repeatedly compare their work (like 
Rousseau before them) to archaeology and its ruins—to the unearthing of an 
inconceivably distant past preserved in the unconscious.152 But there is a deeper 
similarity in their revitalization of the past, as they problematize the continuity and 
homogeneity that hold together the very being of past, present and future. As Schelling 
writes in his Weltalter (1815),  
 
For different times (a concept that, like many others, has gotten lost in 
modern philosophy) can certainly be, as different, at the same time, nay, to 
speak more accurately, they are necessarily at the same time. Past time is 
not sublimated time. What has past certainly cannot be as something 
present, but it must be as something past at the same time with the present. 
What is future is certainly not something that has being now, but it is a 
future being at the same time with the present. And it is equally 
inconsistent to think of past being, as well as future being, as utterly 
without being (p. 76/SW, p. 302). 
 
                                                       
152 Schelling writes in the Weltalter: “Everything that surrounds us points back to a past of incredible 
grandeur. The oldest formations of the earth bear such a foreign aspect that we are hardly in a position to 
form a concept of their time of origin or the forces that were then at work…In a series of time immemorial, 
each era has always obscured its predecessor, so that it hardly betrays any sign of its origin; an abundance 
of strata—the work of thousands of years—must be stripped away to come at last to the foundation, to the 
ground” (1813, p. 121). And Freud in Interpretation of Dreams:  
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This passage recalls the opening lines, retained from both the 1811 and 1813 drafts, in 
which Schelling tells us with a deceptive simplicity that “The known is narrated, the 
discerned is presented, the intimated is prophesied” (xxxv). I say “deceptive” because we 
must take care not to confuse times with things—with objects that can be put at a distance 
and dissected. Since Schelling himself never explicitly reaches beyond the past, what are 
we to make of his claim that the “past is known…the known is narrated”? This cannot 
imply that the past contains nothing left unknown or unexpressed. We, at least, have no 
such privileged relationship with the past. Perhaps it is better to think of this knowing not 
as a structure that is external or applied to the past, but one that is instead constitutive of 
it.  
In disclosing the great (de-)cision [(Ent-)scheidung] of the Weltalter, the crisis 
through which God takes up His nature (the drives) by separating the Absolute Past from 
the Absolute Present of creation, Schelling again focuses on an abyssal site of 
transition—from  succession to simultaneity and back again.153 The chaotic, annular 
pulsation of negating and affirming drives, though not yet actualized or brought to 
presence, is described as a succession; before the beginning, each drive and that which 
unites them—which is to say the expressible (being and what-is) and the expressing—
                                                       
153 “Hence, the contradiction only breaks with eternity when it is in its highest intensity and, instead of a 
single eternity, posits a succession of eternities (eons) or times. But this succession of eternities is precisely 
what we, by and large, call time. Hence, eternity opens up into time in this decision” (1815, p. 76). 
Schelling continues, comparing the free necessity of human decisiveness—a return to Kant’s work in 
Religion Within the Bounds of Reason Alone and his own Freiheitsschrift—to this eternal beginning: “We 
say that the person who doubts whether they should be utterly one thing or the other is without character. 
We say that a decisive person, in whom something definitely expressive of the entire being is revealed, has 
character. And yet it is recognized that no one has chosen the character following reasoning or reflection. 
One did not consult oneself. Likewise, everyone assesses this character as a work of freedom, as, so to 
speak, an eternal (incessant, constant) deed. Consequently, the universal ethical judgment discerns a 
freedom in each person that is in itself ground, in itself destiny and necessity. But most people are 
frightened precisely by this abyssal freedom in the same way that they are frightened by the necessity to be 
utterly one thing or another. And where they see a flash of freedom, they turn away from it as if from an 
utterly injurious flash of lightening and they feel prostrated by freedom as an appearance that comes from 
the ineffable, from eternal freedom, from where there is no ground whatsoever” (78).  
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excludes the others in its singular craving for being.154 It is only in the contraction of 
being that this unruly succession is realized in the simultaneity of the beginning. Thus 
simultaneity returns to succession (past, present, future) in the Absolute Present, and the 
drives regain their lost unity through historical revelation: 
 
[T]he talk here is of the highest self of the Godhead, which can never 
become Being with respect to something else. This self can only have 
being and be active in each of its forms (if one is to permit this 
expression), as the Yes and as the No and as the unity of both. Given the 
decisive contradiction between the Yes and the No, this self is thinkable 
only because of the concept of different times. Hence, here it depends 
much more on the simultaneity among the different forms being 
sublimated and transformed into a succession (1815, p. 77). 
 
In other words, Schelling’s insistence on distinct times does not imply a disorder 
that precedes the beginning. Times, as we experience them, are rather the return of the 
primordially repressed transition, an actualization of what already actively belongs 
together in the Absolute Past. Schelling also refers to this “transition” as a “perversion,” 
much in the way we will see in Freud. Schelling too understands the primordiality of 
perversion; he will claim that existence itself depends upon it. The interplay of negating, 
affirming and unifying potencies contracts being—both in the sense of withdrawal and 
disease, active and passive—through a perverse act: A1, the negating potency, rather than 
remaining the indeterminate subject that wants being, becomes B—the impermeable 
object that will no longer submit to A2.155 As Edward Beach writes,  
Not just randomly unordered, the actualized first Potency transforms into a 
positive force for disorder, disruptive and tumultuous in the extreme. This 
                                                       
154 AW 1813, p.145 
155 “This progressive generation can be represented as an increase. If one posits the affirming principle as 
such = A and the negating principle as such = B, then the first active will is indeed in itself what-is, but it 
also negates itself as such. It is thus an A that acts as such = B; that is = (A=B). This is the beginning, and 
hence the first potency” (AW 1813, p. 144). 
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new substrate, Schelling continues, would in effect be an “inversion” 
[Umkehrung]—or, more forcefully still, a “perversion” [Verkehrung]—of 
the first Potency as it was in its original state of rest. In its capacity as the 
material ground of a concrete, but disordered and in this sense “blind” 
existence, this principle would ceaselessly work against all that is 
systematically ordered and rational in the world (p. 133). 
   
In this manner, the harmonious unity of the potencies is inverted, marking the “second 
beginning” in Schelling as an actualization of the purely logical first potency into a 
“positive force for disorder.” For now, I would just note that perversion is in some sense 
at the origin—that while the radical move from A1 to B remains logically inexplicable, its 
truth is ensured by the fact of creation. If this seems like a deus ex machina, we need to 
remember that the movement of perversion coincides with freedom for Schelling—that, 
as we have already seen in the Freiheitsschrift, freedom requires the originary possibility 
of evil, of the ground erupting out of its proper place.156 The thatness [Daß] of being 
cannot be derived from the merely logical order of the potencies, but requires a force that 
is in fact positively opposed to such order and, because of this, repressed by the 
increasingly rational reality it works against and makes possible.   
What strikes me most in bringing Schelling together with Freud is the extent to 
which their projects rely on a past that does not—that cannot—come to presence; a past 
that, despite this existential uncertainty, remains at the center of their work. For 
Schelling, this insight penetrates the deepest logic of existence: so that beings can be, the 
                                                       
156 Beach also obliquely points out the connection between the perversion of the first Potency and 
Schelling’s radical account of evil in his Freiheitsschrift: “Assuming that there is a God, therefore, B would 
be a principle fundamentally opposed to the divine Providence. It would assume the aspect of ‘that-which-
ought-not-to-be’ (das nicht-sein-Sollende). In this capacity, then, B would take on the role of the cosmic 
Antagonist, the dark Other which needs to be subdued…Yet although B would in this way become the 
counterweight poised against the good, it would not for that reason be an absolute evil, but only a relative 
one. For without it, without a firm foundation for self-assertiveness that would be capable of resisting, at 
least for a time, the grand designs of the Deity, neither independent selfhood nor real freedom would be 
possible (pp. 133-134).” 
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positively irrational and chaotic past must actively ground rational, ordered existence. In 
Freud, this is much less an ontological claim than it is a therapeutic discovery: whether 
verbal or bodily, narration is inherently symptomatic—it is not a re-presentation of the 
past but a trace of its resistance. Such a past is never finished but remains eternally in 
transition, its traumatizing opacity a challenge to the familiar order of presence. Freud’s 
unconscious, in its absorption in the past, suggests a great deal more than psychic 
determinism. It is evocative of Schelling’s eternal beginning and the originary decision 
that represses the Absolute Past: if this self-limitation were to be made present, it could 
no longer act as the beginning, and presence itself would collapse. Similarly, the 
Absolute Past that is reconstructed in psychoanalysis is not some content or event. What 
is revealed, or glimpsed through repeated dissimulation, is a mode of being that remains 
utterly foreign to and yet harbored within presence. To posit a way of existing that is 
neither potential nor actual coming-to-expression—an existing that defines who we are 
and what we will become—such is the strangeness of the true unconscious and the 
Absolute Past.  
And so it is that before the beginning, before the oceanic feeling, Freud opens 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle with a discussion of constancy (i.e. the steady operation of 
the pleasure principle’s urge for stasis) that is almost immediately overcome by trauma 
and anxiety. 157 Acting out the process he describes, tranquility is already disturbed from 
within. Freud goes on to interrupt his account of war neuroses and its nightmares, the first 
disruption in the text, with a discussion of the repetition in a child’s (his own grandson, 
                                                       
157 Schelling makes an almost identical claim in his introduction to Die Weltalter, writing “But movement 
never occurs for its own sake; all movement is only for the sake of rest…all movement seeks only rest, and 
rest is its nourishment or that from which alone it takes its power and sustains itself” (1813, p. 133). 
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his own repetition) play.158 The seamless functioning of the pleasure principle that 
ultimately aims at the tensionless state of primary narcissism, is doubly disturbed—first 
by the repetition (signaling the inability to escape the past and the consequent attempt to 
have no past) and then by the repetition (signaling the ability to attribute meaning to the 
past and thus to make past). It is within this strange (unheimlich) scene that the 
authenticity of the personal converges with the detachment of the theoretical: the 
convergence that forces psychoanalysis towards a Weltanschauung all its own.159  
The psychoanalytic challenge to science depends on a singular method for 
translating the individual into the universal. Freud’s interpretation of his grandson’s game 
is particularly useful as an illustration insofar as it brings into relief the therapeutic 
position of intimacy/objectivity. It is perhaps due to the difficulty of navigating this 
peculiar neutrality that Freud cannot see the fundamental structure of the game—an 
exploration, creation and dissolution of boundaries: “[H]e very skillfully threw the spool, 
attached to the string, over the edge of his little curtained bed…then, using the string, he 
pulled the spool out of the bed again” (BPP, p. 57). More than an attempt at mastery, 
                                                       
158 Though I will not pursue this here, Freud’s interpretation of his grandson’s game of Fort-Da is by no 
means irrelevant to this discussion. Indeed, Freud does not finally explain how it is that the frustrations the 
child experiences can be relieved by repeating them; Freud variously attributes this to a natural pleasure in 
imitation, to the compulsion to repeat and to the narcissistic pleasure of mastery/omnipotence. The 
relationship between interpretation and Eros, indeed of interpretation as Eros, will also be relevant to 
understanding the possibility of pleasure in tension that periodically disturbs the text of Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle. 
159 Cavell, Stanley. “Freud and Philosophy: A Fragment”. Critical Inquiry, Vol. 13, No. 2, The Trial(s) of 
Psychoanalysis (Winter, 1987), pp. 386-393. This is the question enacted by the scenes of Freud the father 
and grandfather circling the Fort/Da game of repetition and domination, looking so much like the 
inheritance of language itself, of selfhood itself. What is at stake is whether psychoanalysis is inheritable—
you may say repeatable—as science is inheritable, our modern paradigm for the teachable. If 
psychoanalysis is not thus inheritable, it follows that it is not exactly (what we mean by) a science, then its 
intellectual achievement may be lost to humankind. But now if this expresses Freud’s preoccupation in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle and elsewhere, then this preoccupation links his work with philosophy, for it 
is in philosophy that the question of the loss of itself is internal to its faithfulness to itself (389). 
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Ernst is engaged in a playful recognition of the intersection of vulnerability and control, 
of self and other.  
As Freud understands him, Ernst repeats the disappearance of his parents in order 
to cope with the traumatic experience of passive loss and separation; but it is also the case 
that in doing so Ernst opens himself to the equally traumatic possibilities of responsibility 
and guilt. After all, his violent and sexual desires—now that they are becoming his—
cannot be without consequence. It is from this latter perspective that we might interpret 
Ernst’s preference for the first half of the game—“Fort”—which Freud the grandfather 
refuses to take seriously. That is, despite the fact that Ernst for the most part only plays 
“Fort” [“gone”], Freud still proclaims that he derives the greatest pleasure from its proper 
completion, “Da” [“here”].160 This merely begs the question: Why would Ernst generally 
play “Fort” if he prefers the complete game—if the pleasure is only in return? One way to 
approach an answer would be through the transformation of pleasure at work within the 
game itself: Ernst’s absorption in the world (his union with his mother) is no longer 
merely pleasurable but also a source of anxiety (loss of self/fear of castration). At the 
same time, the pain of separation offers Ernst a new model of desire and satisfaction 
altogether.    
While Freud seems to explain away his grandson’s game in terms of a putative 
instinct for mastery, he too remains unsure about its finality. Freud shows a sensitivity to 
the problem of “inheritance”—to the viability of analytic metapsychology—in 
immediately going on to question the most fundamental axiom of psychoanalysis-as-
science:  
                                                       
160 See section II of BPP for the description of the Fort/Da game. 
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But if a compulsion to repeat does operate in the mind, we should be glad 
to know something about it, to learn what function it corresponds to, under 
what conditions it can emerge and what its relation is to the pleasure 
principle—to which, after all, we have hitherto ascribed dominance over 
the course of the processes of excitation in mental life” (BPP, p. 25).  
 
A beginning that operates beyond and independently of the physiology of pleasure 
suggests that psychoanalysis is no longer beholden to determinism; the repetition of the 
drives, whether paralyzing or productive, is now primary.  
Freud develops his final theory of drives, the inseparability and opposition of Eros 
and Thanatos, in response to the threat this original repetition poses to the scientific 
Weltanschauung. Like Ernst, Freud is caught up in the dual anxiety—the two 
beginnings—of union and differentiation. While generally assumed that it is the death 
drive that first makes its appearance here, it is really Eros that marks a more decisive shift 
in Freud’s thought.161 Or rather, the essential insight of the text concerns the relation that 
holds Eros and Thanatos—conflict and tranquility, union and dissolution—together. 
Freud opens up the realm beyond opposition and, first and foremost, beyond the 
opposition of pleasure and pain. The primacy of the transitional, evidenced in the 
Nachträglichkeit origin of subject and pleasure alike, disrupts the deathly mechanism of 
                                                       
161 In Peter Gay’s seminal Freud: A Life For Our Time, it is clear from Freud’s own correspondence and 
the mixed responses of the psychoanalytic circle that the death drive was considered the major innovation 
of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, with Eros rather just an expansion and reformulation of the sexual drives 
of his earlier works: “This slim volume [Beyond the Pleasure Principle], and its two successors, 
demonstrated why he could not publish that much-announced, much-postponed book on metapsychology. 
He had complicated and modified his ideas too much. Not least of all, they had not had enough about death 
in them—or, more precisely, he had not integrated what they had to say about death into his theory” (394). 
Gay also points out how the death drive—unlike Eros—divided psychoanalysts: “As they debated Freud’s 
new theory of instinctual dualism, psychoanalysts were assisted by the distinction Freud drew between the 
silent death drive, working to reduce living matter to an inorganic condition, and showy aggressiveness, 
which one encountered, and could daily substantiate, in clinical experience…But for most analysts Freud’s 
idea of a hidden primitive urge toward death, of a primary masochism, was something else again…In 
distinguishing the death drive from sheer aggression, Freud enabled his followers to uncouple the two, 
reject his epic vision of Thanatos confronting Eros, and yet retain the concept of the two warring drives” (p. 
402). 
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constancy and establishes the temporality of psychoanalysis. Repetition, Freud suggests, 
is what makes drives drives—“all instincts [Trieb] tend towards the restoration of an 
earlier state of things” (p. 44). What precisely this is to mean, given the ambiguous sense 
of “repetition” which emerges in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, is to the point: As we 
have suggested above, this repetitive structure of the drive is neither an escape from the 
past nor an unqualified immersion in it. It marks, rather, the transitional space between 
the objective and the intimate, between a vanquished past and a static present. Freud’s 
earlier “pleasure principle” failed to do justice to precisely this understanding of the 
drive. 
In Chapter VI of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud ponders at length the 
emergence of life from the inanimate, depicting the death drive as arising from a demand 
to return to the tension-less state of non-existence. Life entails increased tension and 
complication and the aim of the drive is to be rid of tension. We settle into a restatement 
of the nirvana principle and a re-justification of Freud’s understanding of the instinctual 
need to decrease or eliminate tension. It is less obvious how Eros or the life drive aims at 
an “earlier state of things,” or how it might be reconciled with the general aim of pleasure 
as a decrease in tension.162 From his earliest texts, Freud argues that we have a tendency 
to retain attachments to our earliest sexual aims and satisfactions. In expanding Eros 
beyond the sexual to a class of drives towards greater and more complex unities— and in 
further breaking down and distributing the sexual drives between Eros and the death 
                                                       
162 Freud himself initially seems confused about whether Eros is a radical addition to psychoanalytic theory 
or a long familiar concept—indeed, this may be the motivating question of the whole text: “As for the sex 
drives…it is obvious that they reproduce primitive states of the organism, but the goal for which they strive 
with all their means is a merging of two gametes differentiated in a specific manner” (BPP, pp. 81-82). 
However, Freud begins Beyond the Pleasure Principle with the opposition between “ego” and “sex” drives, 
only to complicate this paradigm by suggesting that the sex drives themselves can be further broken down 
between Eros and death drives.  As we will see, however, this opposition cannot fare much better—the 
relationship between differentiation and dissolution can not be simply oppositional or dualistic.  
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drive—the connection between pleasure and repetition-qua-lifeless-stasis is weakened. 
Indeed, if Eros is not merely a mutation of the death drive, and thus truly opposed to it, 
pleasure in tension must be equi-primordial with pleasure in the reduction or absence of 
tension. The same conclusion is implicit in Freud’s questioning as to whether and how 
the reality principle is distinct from the pleasure principle. The difficulty in determining 
the origin of limits becomes an exploration of the liminality of origins: 
 
The attributes of life were at some time evoked in inanimate matter by the 
action of a force of whose nature we can form no conception. It may 
perhaps have been a process similar in type to that which later caused the 
development of consciousness in a particular stratum of living matter. The 
tension which then arose in what had hitherto been an inanimate substance 
endeavored to cancel itself out. In this way the first instinct [Trieb] came 
into being: the instinct to return to the inanimate state (p. 48) 
  
The drive, we might say, is not inherently responsive but—as a longing (differentiation) 
to be what it is not (undifferentiated)— self-productive. Without yet delving into the 
complications of Eros, Freud suggests that drives are by nature split: the drive is tension 
and the drive is the desire to be rid of tension.  
The death drive, which Freud here refers to as the “first,” is more obviously self-
negating; while its existence is a disruption, it is only through the drive that release 
becomes an aim—a satisfaction lost and a source to return to. In more human terms, as 
Schelling argues in “On the Nature of Philosophy as Science,” the longing to restore the 
past is precisely what separates us from it: “Here, then, emerges the contradiction of man 
destroying what he wants by wanting it. From this contradiction arises that drifting 
movement, because that which the searcher searches for escapes him, so to speak, in 
constant flight” (German Idealist Philosophy, p. 233). This self-defeating longing—this 
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“drifting movement” between the searcher and what is sought—defines Eros and 
Thanatos insofar as they are drives. And it is this beginning-in-transition that Freud’s 
final theory of the drives hits upon but cannot resolve: the essential mutability and mutual 
formation of the drives (as emphasized in Three Essays on Sexuality), seemingly 
forgotten in the theoretical dyads and triads of the metapsychological papers, returns in 
repetition.163  
The central contradiction of Freud’s metapsychology is thus made explicit in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Ultimately, Freud will equate Thanatos and Eros with 
unbinding and binding, respectively.164 The work of Eros is to prepare the way for 
restoration, return and thus satisfaction. It is only because psychic energy is bound—
brought to unity—that an organism is able to unbind or release it. Freud makes the case 
that erotic repetition is essentially conservation; although Eros seems to be a force of 
differentiation and development, at its most fundamental level it is the retroactive 
                                                       
163 Freud’s paper “Drives and their Fates,” however, is a remarkable instance within the metapsychological 
papers of paying heed to a possible primacy of ambivalence—a reflective, or transitional, beginning. 
Though Freud does not quite see this through, his attention to the intermediate phase is essential to 
understanding the problems he faces in Beyond the Pleasure Principle and his eventual acceptance of a 
primary masochism. Dealing with the fates of the drives that are prior to and less sophisticated than 
repression or sublimation, reversal into its opposite and turning round upon the subject, Freud approaches 
their peculiar union in sadism/masochism: “With the pair of opposites sadism-masochism, the process may 
be represented as follows:  
 
(a) Sadism consists in the exercise of violence or power upon some other person as its object. 
(b) This object is abandoned and replaced by the subject’s self. Together with the turning round 
upon the self the change from active to a passive aim in the instinct is also brought about. 
(c) Again another person is sought as object; this person, in consequence of the alteration which 
has taken place in the aim of the instinct, has to take over the original role of the subject.” (SE 
1915, p. 81). 
 
Freud goes on to define (b) in the following terms: “The active voice is changed, not into the passive, but 
into the reflexive middle voice” (p. 81). As we will see in what follows, this stage (b) not only begins to 
take on a more primary place in Freud’s thinking, but already did so in his Three Essays on the Theory of 
Sexuality, where auto-erotism is the initial phase of drive activity. 
164 See: section IV of BPP. 
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gathering that grounds identity.165 Freud’s juxtaposition of the useless nightmares of war 
neuroses and the all-too-serious play of Fort/Da implies that to repeat is to prepare, 
however inconceivably, for our past.   
 The subtle shift here between conservation and pathological repetition echoes the 
move from the First will to the Second in Schelling: what begins as a restful, proto-
satisfaction turns into an active desire to be what it already is—to preserve, though not 
yet to desirously repeat. It is as if the longing to maintain its current state necessitates a 
doubling—an unconscious splitting that is the opening up of desire. What Freud senses in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle is that the beginning cannot be reduced to either 
opposition or to singularity: through Eros Freud is forced to move not only beyond the 
pleasure principle, but also beyond his own fantasies of dualistic/monistic paradigms. He 
is better able to express the insufficiency of such views by the time of writing Civilization 
and Its Discontents and, once again, it is the connection between pleasure and time that is 
at issue:  
It is in sadism, where the death instinct twists the erotic aim in its own 
sense and yet at the same time fully satisfies the erotic urge, that we 
succeed in gaining the clearest insight into its nature and its relation to 
Eros. But even where it emerges without any sexual purpose, in the 
blindest fury of destructiveness, we cannot fail to recognize that the 
satisfaction of the instinct is accompanied by an extraordinarily high 
degree of narcissistic enjoyment, owing to its presenting the ego with a 
fulfillment of the latter’s old wishes for omnipotence (pp. 80-81). 166   
                                                       
165 This sense of Eros as repetition and development resonates with Schelling’s claim in the Outline 
(already cited) that “[n]o subsistence of a product [of Nature] is thinkable without a continual process of 
being reproduced”. 
166 Freud’s fear of falling into a monistic account is in no small part a reaction against Jung’s theory: “Our 
views have from the very first been dualistic, and to-day they are even more definitely dualistic than 
before—now that we describe the opposition as being, not between ego-instincts and sexual instincts but 
between life instincts and death instincts. Jung’s libido theory is on the contrary monistic” (64). Of course, 
Freud’s insistence belies his discomfort, writing in Beyond the Pleasure Principle: “Wherever the original 
sadism has undergone no mitigation or intermixture, we find the familiar ambivalence of love and hate in 
erotic life. If such an assumption as this is permissible, then we have met the demand that we should 
produce an example of a death instinct—though, it is true, a displaced one. But this way of looking at 
things is very far from being easy to grasp and creates a positively mystical impression” (65, my emphasis). 
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The bond that holds Eros and Thanatos together as drives—neither identical nor 
opposed—hinges on Freud’s eventual acceptance of primary masochism: on a primal 
transitionality where pain coincides with pleasure, object with subject, repetition with 
temporalization.  
 
3. Primal Fantasy 
 
In “On Narcissism,” Freud traces the development of a more stable boundary between 
ego and world. He proposes that this relatively undifferentiated state is repeated or 
returned to in what he terms secondary narcissism. My hope here is to unpack his account 
of just what narcissism is; how it relates to auto-erotism as a mode of subject/object 
unity; and whether or how the fantasy characteristic of the narcissistic level of psychic 
integration parallels the freedom and auto-production of Schelling’s imagining, self-
reflective Absolute considered in the previous chapter.  
Starting out with a discussion of the schizophrenic turning away from the world, 
Freud continues with an explanation of narcissism and its derivative status: 
 
The libido that has been withdrawn from the external world has been 
directed to the ego and thus gives rise to an attitude which may be called 
narcissism. But the megalomania itself is no new creation; on the contrary, 
it is, as we know, a magnification and plainer manifestation of a condition 
which had already existed previously. This leads us to look upon the 
narcissism which arises through the drawing in of object-cathexes as a 
secondary one, superimposed upon a primary narcissism that is obscured 
by a number of different influences…This extension of the libido theory—
in my opinion a legitimate one—receives reinforcement from a third 
quarter, namely, from our observations of the mental life of children and 
primitive peoples. In the latter we find characteristics which, if they 
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occurred singly, might be put down to megalomania: an overestimation of 
the power of their wishes and mental acts, the ‘omnipotence of thoughts,’ 
a belief in the thaumaturgic force of words, and a technique for dealing 
with the external world—‘magic’—which appears to be a logical 
application of these grandiose premises (SE XIV, p. 75, my emphasis). 
 
Freud posits primary narcissism and connects it to the “primitive” belief in the 
“omnipotence of thought,” a term familiar to us from “The Uncanny.” The pathological 
narcissism occurring in adults is a repetition of a more primal experience in which the 
limit between ego and world is first being worked out, a repetition that nonetheless 
complicates the undifferentiated “oceanic feeling”.  
Freud’s claim that the boundary between ego and reality is an accomplishment, a 
development generated from the permutations of pleasure and satisfaction, is first made 
explicit in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. In this text Freud claims sexual 
drives and fantasy are the distinguishing characteristics of human subjectivity. Freud 
shows that adult sexuality (both normal and neurotic) has its roots in the polymorphous 
perversion of infantile life rather than in any physiological instinct developing during 
puberty; he further claims that it is infantile sexuality, and its inevitable repression, that 
determines the variations of adult sexuality and pathologies. These observations lead 
Freud to ask the questions that will define his life’s work: Why do unconscious drives 
become structured into the conscious experience of a subject confronting a world of 
objects in the particular ways that they do? How is it that the limit between ego and world 
develops out of infantile sexual life? Part of my claim here is that such development 
depends, paradoxically, on a repeated return to and reclaiming/reintegrating of earlier 
states of creating just such a limit.  
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Whether limitation shows itself as our own activity in the anxiety-provoking 
uncanny, or in the therapeutic scene of transference, the regression that propels psychic 
development can be traced to auto-erotism—to the site where subject and object converge 
in fantasy: 
 
…[W]e are bound to suppose that unity comparable to the ego cannot exist 
in the individual from the start; the ego has to be developed. The auto-
erotic instincts [Trieb], however, are there from the very first; so there 
must be something added to auto-erotism—a new psychical action—in 
order to bring about narcissism (“On Narcissism”, SE Vol. XIV p. 77) 
 
A more nuanced account of narcissism can help explain Schelling’s self-desiring, self-
generating Absolute in the Weltalter, but we first need to consider what it means that 
these auto-erotic drives are there “from the very first.”167 Laplanche’s approach to this 
question in Life and Death in Psychoanalysis hinges on a close reading of Three Essays 
and, more specifically, on a more narrowly defined understanding of drive. Laplanche 
contends that the drives are perversions of the instincts—“propping” themselves on vital 
needs; this reading in turn grounds Laplanche’s claim that the translation of Trieb into 
instinct rather than drive in the Standard Edition is faulty. Indeed, Laplanche argues that 
much of the confusion surrounding the drive centers on Freud’s failure to flesh out the 
consequences of his theory of “propping”: 
 
Our study of thumb-sucking or sensual sucking [taken as a model of oral 
sexuality] has already given us three essential characteristics of an 
infantile sexual manifestation. At its origin it attaches itself to [or props 
itself upon; ensteht en Anlehnung an] one of the vital somatic functions; it 
has as yet no sexual object, and is thus auto-erotic; and its sexual aim is 
dominated by an erotogenic zone (cited in Laplanche, his emphasis, p. 15). 
                                                       
167 Jean Laplanche, Life and Death in Psychoanalysis. Trans. Jeffery Mehlman (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1970).  
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The essence of the drive is its dependence upon and subsequent separation from the vital 
instinct. We might also say, though this will take some working out, that the perversion 
of the drives is “beyond” the pleasure principle: insofar as desire is no longer connected 
to need, fantasy is already a perversion of the mechanics of pleasure.  
What remains unclear is the kind of proto-object (and proto-subject) that belongs 
to autoerotic drives. Laplanche gives us the following explanation, in response to Freud’s 
proposal in the just cited work that “the finding of an object is in fact the re-finding of it”: 
 
The text cited has an entirely different ring to it from that vast fable of 
autoerotism as a state of the primary and total absence of an object: a state 
which one leaves in order to find an object; autoerotism is, on the contrary, 
the stage of the loss of the object…But above all, if such a text is to be 
taken seriously, it means that on the one hand there is from the beginning 
an object, but that on the other hand sexuality does not, from the 
beginning, have a real object. It should be understood that the real object, 
milk, was the object of the function, which is virtually preordained to the 
world of satisfaction. Such is the real object which has been lost, but the 
object linked to the autoerotic turn, the breast—become a fantasmatic 
breast—is, for its part, the object of the sexual drive…From this, of 
course, arises the impossibility of ultimately ever rediscovering the object, 
since the object which has been lost is not the same as that which is to be 
rediscovered. Therein lies the key to the essential “duplicity” situated at 
the very beginning of the sexual quest (Life and Death, pp. 19-20). 
 
We are again faced with the beginning that is not the beginning—the first sexual object is 
a result, not a given. The first object of the instinct, which the fantasized object of the 
drive models itself on, is not an object in the proper sense. As Laplanche says, the initial 
“real” object is “the object of the function,” which is precisely to say that it is not the 
object for any subjectivity. The appearance of subject/object opposition is not a creation 
at all but a re-creation: in the displacement that occurs between the needed “milk” and 
the fantasied “breast,” Laplanche reminds us that a certain kind of linguistic magic—
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productive symbolism, through which desire and satisfaction are delimited—must already 
be in play before a unified subject can arise. He maintains that the beginning is loss (of 
undifferentiated unity) and also the fantasy of its restoration (wish-fulfillment): for 
Laplanche, auto-erotism is the Freudian term for this grounding duplicity—a proton 
pseudos—from which the subject and objects for it emerge.   
The psychoanalytic obsession with the past reflects and distorts this more 
fundamental relationship to the Absolute Past and to the beginning that destabilizes all 
opposition:  
 
Because this essence holds time enveloped, it serves as a link that enables 
man to make an immediate connection with the most ancient past as well 
as with the most distant future. Man often sees himself transported into 
such wonderful relations and inner connections through precisely this 
innermost essence, such as when he encounters a moment in the present as 
one long past, or a distant event as if he himself were witness to it (AW 
1813, p. 114). 
 
The very assumption of a compulsion to repeat, where an origin to be repeated is taken 
for granted, belies the alterity of such a past. It is this relationship that Schelling struggles 
to speak in his Weltalter, the creative gesture that is no longer tranquility and not yet 
opposition. Schelling marks the beginning as an unconscious longing between the First 
and the Second, between the resting will and the tranquil, self-seeking will: 
 
The eternal will alone provides the initial point that starts up the great 
process of the whole. It posits itself as the mere willing of eternity, and to 
that extent as negated. But in positing itself as negated, it is at the same 
time the self-negated will. Yet it cannot negate itself by positing itself as 
not being at all; rather, it can only posit itself as not being the essence, or 
what affirms, or what- (genuinely and by nature) is. Moreover, the will 
cannot negate itself as being the essence without positing itself as lack 
and—to the extent that it is also active—as hunger, as yearning, as desire 
for essence. Returning into itself, it necessarily finds itself to be empty and 
 181 
in need but is for that reason all the more eager to fill itself, to satiate itself 
with essence. But it finds essence neither inside itself nor outside itself; for 
it does not recognize eternity, and by returning into itself it is turned much 
more away from eternity than toward it. Thus, nothing is left but for the 
will to posit essence or affirmation absolutely outside of itself through an 
unconditioned and totally generative force (1813, pp. 138-139). 
 
From this dense passage I would like for the moment merely to pull out two ideas: the 
will posits itself as “desire for essence” and the will posits essence as “absolutely outside 
of itself through an unconditioned and totally generative force.” In other words, the 
seeking subject and the object it seeks are aspects of the same will—as if viewed 
internally and externally, respectively. Through what Schelling elsewhere calls a “dark 
presentiment and longing,” the will is driven out of its complacency by way of searching 
for and creating its own limits—producing selfhood from otherness and otherness from 
selfhood. The “dark presentiment” that urges the will out of itself is of course no event 
within time or consciousness—but then how are we to approach this simultaneously 
world-constructing and self-revealing longing?  
 The problem of beginning is not merely pushed back to the inexplicable 
awakening of unconscious discomfort. Although we cannot yet speak of a “before,” in 
order for there to be a beginning there must be an unconscious inscription of desire. The 
satisfied will longs—but what could it long for if not for satisfaction? And what could 
provide satisfaction when there is as yet no Other? This would be a self-defeating desire 
indeed. But what if satisfaction were not the inchoate aim of this dark presentiment, what 
if longing erupted as an end (and as a beginning) in itself? What if the opposition 
between being and what-is did not come from frustrated desire but from the primordial 
play of fantasy? In “On the Nature of Philosophy as Science” Schelling makes an 
important distinction between desire for and desire as such:  
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The concepts of ability and will are united in the word ‘to desire…’ 
Eternal freedom is eternal desire, not the desire for something but desire in 
itself or, as it can also be expressed, eternal magic. I am using this 
expression because it expresses my concept; true, it is a strange word, but 
when we use it for ourselves it is in our possession again. Saying eternal 
ability or eternal magic is one and the same. This expression, however, 
suggests itself because it expresses the capacity both to adopt any form 
and not remain in any given one…The original magic contains more than 
mere knowledge, that is, objective production (p. 222).168 
 
One cannot help but see the resemblance between The Absolute, which Schelling calls 
eternal magic, and the source for the Freudian conception of wish. Initially, Freud’s 
primal fantasy—and its reappearance in the formation of the dream/symptom—is nothing 
other than the (hallucinatory) production of its object: a wish that provides its own 
satisfaction. 169  Desire extends beyond its common usage in connection with an object to 
its original form as a ceaseless productivity of its own object—of itself as well as its 
Other. Schelling goes on to claim: “That which is the absolute beginning cannot know 
itself. In its transition to knowledge it ceases to be the beginning and it therefore has to 
proceed until it rediscovers itself as the beginning. The beginning, restored as a beginning 
that knows itself, is the end of all knowledge” (p. 222).170 The task, for Schelling and for 
Freud, is to explain the movement from primal fantasy—a fantasy that “cannot know 
itself” because there is as yet no subject distinct from its object—to self-creation and 
interpretation. In Schelling’s words, the task is to discover how to “break through to the 
bliss of ignorance again (which at this point is a knowing ignorance)”.171   
 
                                                       
168 German Idealist Philosophy. 
169 Sigmund Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. SE VII, pp. 136-243. See Part II, Infantile 
Sexuality, for Freud’s first elaboration of auto-erotism and the object-less sexual drives of infantile life.  
170 German Idealist Philosophy. 
171 ibid. p. 222. 
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4.  Primary Masochism 
We have seen that beginnings in general, and the drives in particular, are essentially 
duplicitous; the repetition of the life and death drives is a perversion and dislocation of 
instinctual or mechanical repetition. And while Freud sees that there is something 
disturbing in the kind of repetition that Eros demands, he fails to recognize that 
Thanatos—as drive—must disturb us in the same manner. Perhaps here one might note 
that both primary masochism and the aggression which is understood as the fruit of the 
death drive in Civilization and its Discontents is worlds away from the Nirvana principle: 
Destruction is no mere return home. In “The Economic Problem of Masochism” Freud 
suggests that primary masochism is the site where Eros and Thanatos “coalesce”: 
 
If one is prepared to overlook a little inexactitude, it may be said that the 
death instinct which is operative in the organism—primal sadism—is 
identical with masochism. After the main portion of it has been transposed 
outwards on to objects, there remains inside, as a residuum of it, the 
erotogenic masochism proper, which on the one hand has become a 
component of the libido and, on the other, still has the self as its object. 
This masochism would thus be evidence of, and a remainder from, the 
phase of development in which the coalescence, which is so important for 
life, between the death instinct and Eros took place (SE XIX, p. 164). 
 
Life, as Freud suggests, requires difference—but this difference is not mere antagonism. 
The interpenetration of Eros and Thanatos depends upon their grounding in something 
that is common to, but distinct from, both. In order to show that primary masochism can 
serve such a function for psychoanalysis, we would do well to return briefly to where 
Freud initially deals with sadism and masochism in Part I of Three Essays: “Sexual 
Aberrations.” It is part of Freud’s larger aim in this work to show that heterosexual 
intercourse aimed at procreation is an achievement, not the result of an instinct [Instinkt]: 
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what we take to be perversions of the sexual instinct are in fact evidence that human 
sexuality is itself perverse—which is to say, driven rather than instinctual. By beginning 
with the aberrations, Freud forces us to see that perversion is somehow originary: any 
stable opposition between ego and world derives from the disruptive, the chaotic and the 
perverse.  
Freud writes that sadism/masochism is “the most common and the most 
significant of all the perversions—the desire to inflict pain upon the sexual object, and its 
reverse.” His reasons for giving such weight to sadism and masochism are two-fold: 
First, “sadism and masochism occupy a special position among the perversions, since the 
contrast between activity and passivity which lies behind them is among the universal 
characteristics of sexual life” (p. 25); second, “the most remarkable feature of this 
perversion is that its active and passive forms are habitually found to occur in the same 
individual” (p. 25). It is not just that sadism and masochism embody activity and 
passivity, two primitive drive fates, but also that activity and passivity are so often 
entangled there.172 The union of pleasure and pain in masochism reflects Freud’s 
emphasis on the sexual as the site of ambivalence and the source of subjectivity.    
According to Laplanche, Freud’s fascination with sadism-masochism is a 
consequence of its connection with the fantasy that distinguishes drive from instinct:  
 
Finally, we have situated, in the position of what we called reflexive 
masochism, or the middle voice, a fantasy which, however, has a properly 
masochistic content in the “passive” sense: I am being beaten by my 
father. But that is because, as we have emphasized, the process of turning 
                                                       
172 As Freud also writes ten years later in “Instincts and their Vicissitudes,” (sometimes and better 
translated as: “Drives and their Fates”) it is not only the object of the drive that gets reversed in sadism-
masochism, but also its aim. In other words, a transitional, auto-erotic space opens up between subject and 
object (I am both the one that inflicts pain and the one that receives it) and between pain and pleasure (I 
derive pleasure from the pain of the other and I am the other that experiences pain) (SE XIV, p. 81).  
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round is not to be thought of only at the level of the content of the fantasy, 
but in the very movement of fantasmatization. To shift to the reflexive is 
not only or even necessarily to give a reflexive content to the “sentence” 
of the fantasy; it is also and above all to reflect the action, internalize it, 
make it enter into oneself as fantasy. To fantasize aggression is to turn it 
round upon oneself, to aggress oneself: such is the moment of autoerotism, 
in which the indissoluble bond between fantasy as such, sexuality, and the 
unconscious is confirmed (Life and Death, p. 102).173 
 
In effect, Laplanche rejects the originality of primary narcissism and the viability of a 
completely undifferentiated state, and offers trauma and perversion instead: there is no 
“before” the intrusion of adult sexuality, nothing that precedes relating to the Other, 
because primary masochism is the traumatic beginning of time and memory. The primal 
fantasy, the movement from instinct to drive, is a turning round upon oneself the 
inscrutability of sexuality. Because adult fantasy—the unconscious of the Other—is 
already there, already addressing, the subject emerges in frustrated, fantasied attempts to 
receive and make sense of this address.  The priority of masochism is a function of its 
disturbing location between the structured drives of a more coherent subjectivity that 
addresses/aggresses on the one hand, and the instinctual incoherence or disorganization 
of infantile life on the other. Put differently, the simultaneous emergence of fantasy and 
drive is a response to the intrusion and inscription of something other than instinct. 
 Auto-erotism, and its traumatic origin in and as primary masochism, takes the 
place of Freud’s underdeveloped, theoretical construct of primary narcissism. Freud is 
never comfortable with an undifferentiated, primary narcissism that is anything more than 
a retroactive construct or fantasy; in Laplanche, this undifferentiated state is complicated 
                                                       
173 Laplanche continues, “If we press the idea to its necessary conclusion, we are led to emphasize the 
privileged character of masochism in human sexuality. The analysis, in its very content, of an essential 
fantasy—the “primal scene”—would illustrate it as well: the child, impotent in his crib, is Ulysses tied to 
the mast or Tantalus, on whom is imposed the spectacle of parental intercourse…the passive position of the 
child in relation to the adult is not simply a passivity in relation to adult activity, but passivity in relation to 
the adult fantasy intruding within him” (ibid.). 
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by the “vital differences” of the Other that is always already there.  The “propping” of the 
drive on vital instincts, the gap that appears between them, is the coming into being of a 
pleasure that resonates with the desires and fantasies of the Other but cannot yet be 
perceived as such.  Perversion is a movement away from that negative, or pleasure-less 
pleasure conceived of as the satisfaction of an instinct—as the release or absence of 
tension. Instead, perverse pleasure is detached from such a mechanistic paradigm, to the 
extent that it can even account for pleasure in pain, in the excessive tension of suffering 
and desire, and in the differentiation of Eros. Primary masochism is not only a way for 
Freud to illustrate the death drive, and to distinguish drive from instinct, but also for 
temporality and subjectivity to become fundamental issues for psychoanalysis. The 
imagined tranquility of primal narcissism is not upset by something other than itself, but 
rather by the propping or slippage from the pleasure of non-existence (instinctual life) to 
the pleasure of longing (the life of the drives). It would seem that there is something 
about this self-enclosed pleasure—pleasure that is initially satisfaction belonging to no 
subject—that already seeks subjectivity: in fantasy, pleasure attracts subjectivity and 
otherness to itself.   
 Pleasure as preservation becomes pleasure as repetition, as we have already seen 
in “Fort/Da”, where little Ernst’s sense of the unity of self and world is threatened by the 
perversion of desire. In order to preserve this felt unity (in fact always already lost), Ernst 
puts himself in the place of another who, as he is in the process of discovering, is not 
merely an extension of himself; he repeats the process of separation and integration, of 
boundary-making, that initially traumatized him from without.174 For Laplanche, of 
                                                       
174 “The child had a wooden spool with a piece of string tied around it. It never occurred to him to drag it 
along on the floor behind him and pretend it was a carriage, for example. Instead, he very skillfully threw 
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course, such play is possible only through the intrusion of adult sexuality—through the 
suggestion of another form of pleasure. But even for Laplanche, this is not an intrusion 
that occurs in time, but one that is already a condition for temporal existence. Human 
beings do not simply arrive: we are born. The otherness of sexual pleasure—of pleasure 
that is a perversion of instinctual satisfaction—quite concretely makes our existence 
possible.  It seems at least viable, then, to approach Schelling’s account of the movement 
from the resting will to the self-seeking will—with unconscious longing as the Mother of 
the latter and born from the former—in terms of such transformations of pleasure. 
Although Laplanche suggests that the other pleasure of drive and sexuality is proper only 
to human being, dependent upon the adult unconscious that impinges upon us, we might 
instead consider existence itself to be generated by—birthed by—the internal dynamics 
of pleasure. When Freud pushes against the limits of psychoanalysis, as he does in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle, he moves towards biology, myth and philosophy. With 
great reticence, Freud suggests that the beginnings of human being inherently lead us 
towards the origins of being as such.  
Freud recognizes that the primacy of repetition/preservation that he argues for 
would threaten conscious temporality. He quite explicitly ties together 
pleasure/unpleasure and temporality, albeit without claiming any final solution. 
Conscious time is put forward as a form of defense against traumatic, unconscious time—
                                                       
the spool, attached to the string, over the edge of his little curtained bed so that it disappeared therein, all 
the while uttering his meaningful ‘o-o-o-o.’ Then, using the string, he pulled the spool out of the bed again 
and greeted its appearance with a joyful da [there]. So this was the whole game—disappearance and 
return—of which it was usually possible to see only the first act, tirelessly repeated as a game in its own 
right, though the greater pleasure was no doubt associated with the second act. The interpretation of the 
game was then clear. It was connected with the child’s great cultural achievement: by renouncing his drives 
(renunciation of drive gratification) he allowed his mother to leave without protest. He compensated for 
this, so to speak, by enacting the same sort of disappearance and return of the objects in his reach” (pp. 57-
58). 
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“this mode of functioning [the self-perception of the system Pcpt.-Cs.] may perhaps 
constitute another way of providing a shield against stimuli…but I must limit myself to 
these hints” (31). Freud is quite clear that external traumas are “any excitations from 
outside which are powerful enough to break through the protective shield” (p. 33). But if 
conscious time is a defense against the unconscious—and thus the drives—how do we 
understand this trauma, regarding which Freud expressed such concern?  
The connection to Schelling’s Weltalter should be apparent: in this text, the 
perversion that precipitates the differentiation of times is also the origin of the internal 
and the external, subject and object—internal trauma, the trauma of the drives, 
simultaneously creates and is created by a more primordial, unbearable excess. Such an 
originary trauma, where there are as yet no boundaries to be overwhelmed, forces Freud 
closer to Schelling’s ontological account of pleasure/pain: 
We have decided to relate pleasure and unpleasure to the quantity of 
excitation that is present in the mind but is not in any way ‘bound’; and to 
relate them in such a manner that unpleasure corresponds to an increase in 
the quantity of excitation and pleasure to a dimunition…the factor that 
determines the feeling is probably the amount of increase or dimunition in 
the quantity of excitation in a given period of time…it is not advisable for 
us analysts to go into the problem further so long as our way is not pointed 
by quite definite observations (BPP, p. 4). 
 
In both passages where Freud brings up the problem of time in relation to pleasure, he 
pointedly refuses to go beyond: Freud’s unwillingness to engage with the kind of 
temporality that psychoanalysis opens up, however, belies his contributions in the form of 
his theory of Nachträglichkeit. Although in the “speculative” Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle Freud circles around the tangled relationship between trauma, repetition and 
time, the practice of psychoanalysis quite clearly depends upon a temporality that defies 
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consciousness.  After all, the founding discovery of psychoanalysis may well be 
compressed into the joint claims that “hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences” and 
that, in the unconscious, reality and fantasy are indistinguishable: the ways in which the 
past disrupts our present, and that the present redefines and recreates the past, already 
invokes a troubling and profound attack on any notion of linear time or the stasis of 
history.176  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       
176 See: Studies on Hysteria, SE Vol. 2 pp. 1-306 and “Screen Memories,” SE Vol. 3 pp. 303-322. 
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IV. The Mythical Symptom 
 
 
More memories, mine, than from a thousand years—Baudelaire, Spleen 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I argue that the approach to the Absolute Past we have considered in 
Schelling and Freud is a therapeutic one: in order to know such a past we must allow 
ourselves to be altered by it, to become intimate with the methods and depths of our own 
concealment. The therapeutic is here conceived as an active engagement with our own 
repressed beginnings that, remaining vulnerable to the reconstructions of the present, 
challenge our assumptions about the past as such.  Therapeutic engagement would thus 
be a self-desiring, self-transforming act—a holding together of the past both as 
irretrievable origin and as a continuous possibility for (re-)creation. The Absolute Past is 
thus not only the object of philosophical and psychoanalytic desire but also, in its eternal 
becoming, the very form of therapeutic desire—a desire that can sustain and stabilize 
itself in its own provisional nature.  
Beginning with a discussion of the role of primal repression in both Freud and 
Schelling, I hope to show that such an account is necessary in order to understand the 
privileged place of mythology in their respective systems. Having offered an argument 
for the centrality of primal repression to their methods of interpretation, I focus on 
Historical-Critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology, arguing that Schelling’s 
main contribution to the philosophy of mythology comes in his attempt to locate the 
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origins of differentiation—and of meaning—within a primary and recurrent 
transitionality: to radicalize the notion of origin and, in turn, the therapeutic connection 
between its explanatory and transformative possibilities. Schelling’s account of 
unconscious desire giving way to creation and history, which in turn shapes unconscious 
desire, gives narration a metaphysical weight; Schelling’s insistence on our paradoxical 
intimacy with, and alienation from, the Absolute Past suggests that our approach to its 
truth must be both familiar and disorienting. In other words, we come to know the 
Absolute Past in and as the uncanny.  
Unpacking Schelling’s lectures will entail dealing with some fundamental 
questions about the relationship between trauma, language and the emergence of a 
people. These questions fall out of Schelling’s initial inquiry into the meaning of 
mythology—and, in particular, its relation to philosophy on the one hand and poetry on 
the other.177 As an introduction to his positive philosophy, Schelling’s lectures on 
mythology bring the conclusions and insights of the freedom essay and his Weltalter into 
contact with actual historical development and revelation; in line with the earlier texts’ 
account of freedom, and particularly its relationship to the unconscious, Schelling argues 
that mythology is neither a capricious invention nor a mechanical necessity. Indeed, he 
writes,  
Mythology would not in general be only a natural product, but rather an 
organic one; this is certainly a meaningful step in comparison to the 
merely mechanistic type of explanation. But it would also be an organic 
product in the following respect. Poetry and philosophy each for itself, is 
for us a principle of free, intentional invention, but because they are bound 
                                                       
177 “Now, however, one could still ask in particular if in mythology’s era of emergence poetry and 
philosophy as such—that is, in their formal opposition—could really have been present at all; because we 
have seen, on the contrary, how as soon as a mythology is present and has completely filled consciousness, 
both initially depart from each other in different directions, from out of mythology as from a mutually held 
middle-point, albeit even then they separate themselves very slowly” (Lecutre 3, p. 38). 
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to one another neither, properly speaking, can freely be active; mythology 
would thus be a product of in themselves free activities, but here, 
however, of unfreely causally effective activities, just as the organic is a 
birth of freely necessary emergence; and to the extent that the word 
invention is still applicable, mythology is here a product of an 
unintentional-intentional, instinctive invention, which on the one hand 
would hold at a distance from itself everything merely fabricated and 
artificial, but on the other hand would at the same time allow that the 
deepest meaning and the soundest relations inherent in mythology be seen 
as not merely contingent (Lecture 3, p. 41). 
 
At first glance, this appears to be a recapitulation of Schelling’s description of the 
conscious-unconscious production in his much earlier lectures on the philosophy of art; 
here, however, the model of artistic creation is brought to bear on the real emergence and 
differentiation of languages, world-views and peoples. Schelling writes of Genesis, 
“Also, it is not at all a mere fabrication; on the contrary, this story is created from actual 
memory, which is in part also preserved by other peoples, a reminiscence—out of 
mythical time to be sure, but from a real event of the same” (Lecture 5, p. 74). As we 
shall see, this will lead Schelling to view mythology as a response to and retroactive 
framing of a traumatic, originary cision or, “as we have called it, a crisis” (Lecture 5, p. 
74). 
Despite his professed distaste for metaphysics, Freud’s account of the traumatic 
development of ego and reality out of a state of non-differentiation offers a parallel vision 
of this “beginning before the beginning;” for Freud, of course, the therapeutic bond 
between trauma, mythology and language is the founding discovery of psychoanalysis. 
Narration neither corresponds to nor falsifies some historical event but, through its 
emphases and caesurae, gestures towards both personal and universal mythologies, as 
well as the bond that holds these together. Through the process of free association—the 
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breaks of memory, slips of the tongue and transferences that analyst and analysand take 
as their starting point—psychoanalysis focuses on the fractures that signal a forced 
coherence and an opening to (re)interpretation and, ultimately, towards psychic health 
and integration.178 This does not suggest a failure to accurately remember past events, but 
rather redirects us to the way narrative can expose the unrepresentable, unspeakable 
Absolute Past. 
While the place of mythology in psychoanalysis is not always entirely clear, it is 
certainly a quite prominent one. Not merely a tool to aid in interpretation, or a text to be 
psychoanalyzed, mythology unites the unique experience of the individual with the 
broader realities of the culture and species he is born into. That is to say, part of what 
Freud discovers in therapeutic practice is that each of us creates a mythology—a 
language—that constitutes the specific pathology that we ourselves are. It is our capacity 
as unique myth-makers that undergirds Freud’s refusal, in Interpretation of Dreams for 
example, to rely on any universal symbolism.179 Of course, Freud is equally insistent on 
the inheritance of common desires and frustrations—most notably, the Oedipal 
                                                       
178 I have in mind here Freud’s description of secondary revision in his Interpretation of Dreams: “What 
marks this part of the dream-work out and exposes it to view is its purpose. This function proceeds rather as 
the poet* [Heine] maliciously declares philosophers do: with its snippets and scraps it patches the gaps in 
the dream’s structure. The result of its labours is that the dream loses its appearance of absurdity and 
incoherence, and approaches the pattern of an intelligible experience” (pp. 319-320).   
179 ibid. One of Freud’s major claims to a novel approach to dream interpretation depends on the difference 
between his method and what I have termed “universal symbolism”. He writes, “The other popular method 
of dream-interpretation [besides the “symbolic” method in which a diviner “takes the dream-content as a 
whole and seeks to replace it with a different, intelligible, and in certain respects analogous content.”] 
popular method of dream-interpretation…might be called the ‘decoding method’, as it treats the dream as a 
kind of secret writing in which every sign is translated by means of a fixed key into another sign whose 
significance is known. I have had a dream of a letter, for example, but also of a funeral or the like; I now 
consult a ‘dream-book’ and discover that ‘letter’ is to be translated as ‘ill humour’, ‘funeral’ as ‘betrothal’” 
(p. 79). Freud goes on to explain that his own method, though scientific in nature, is closer to the 
‘symbolic’ than to the ‘decoding’ method: “Patients who had undertaken to inform me of all the thoughts 
and ideas that beset them on a certain subject told me their dreams, and in this way taught me that a dream 
can be interpolated into the psychical chain which, starting from a pathological idea, can be traced 
backwards in the memory. This suggested that the dream itself might be treated as a symptom, and that the 
method of interpretations for symptoms might be applied to dreams” (pp. 80-81). 
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Complex—that are in some sense universal. Thus, psychoanalysis might be described as 
the process by which an analyst becomes “fluent” in the mythological expressions of the 
analysand; at the same time, by bringing the analysand’s symptom-language into a 
broader, communicable mythology, therapy can effectively provide relief. It is the task of 
this chapter to show that Schelling’s insistence on (mythological) narrative as the 
philosophical approach to the Absolute Past can be re-framed on this Freudian 
therapeutic model, with a focus on the development of the latter as it is presented in 
Interpretation of Dreams and other texts that deal with the process of cure.  
 
1. Primal Repression 
 
How do I separate from myself a world? This is both Freud’s question about individual 
human beings and their pathologies, and Schelling’s concerning the origin of peoples and 
the emergence of consciousness; I believe that in order to address either dimension of the 
issue we need to look at just what repression represses. Primal repression, like the 
primary masochism we encountered in the last chapter, seems to lead back to the 
inherently fantasized site of an identity that can never be settled and yet must be decided: 
to an abyssal freedom, an eternal beginning, that we need only engage with in order to 
feel for ourselves the traumatic effect on the conceptual order.  
Freud first uses the term primal repression as a way of differentiating between an 
idea that is repressed on its own account and the derivatives or associated ideas that are 
repressed as a consequence of their connection to it. At the economic level Freud argues 
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that primal repression, as opposed to “actual repression”, is maintained by the 
counterinvestment of the preconscious (pcs) system: 
 
What is required here, then, is another process, which in the first case 
maintains the repression and in the second is responsible both for 
establishing and continuing it. For this we need to postulate a 
counterinvestment, by means of which the pcs system protects itself 
against the pressure of the unconscious idea…It is the counterinvestment 
that represents the ongoing expenditure in primal repression and which 
also guarantees the durability of the repression. In primal repression it is 
the sole mechanism, whereas in actual (follow-up) repression it is 
accompanied by the withdrawal of pcs investment. It may very well be 
that it is precisely this energy withdrawn from the idea that is used to 
create the counterinvestment (“The Unconscious,” p. 64/SE XIV, p. 
181).180 
 
Freud seems merely to say that initially—before there is a force of attraction coming 
from the unconscious—there must be an active warding off, energetically, on the part of 
the pcs. But this merely begs the question: Why is this increase of tension on the part of 
the pcs called for in the first place? Why, indeed, does Freud want to distinguish between 
primal and actual repression at all? Further along in the same essay, there is another 
account of the nature of and need for primal repression: 
 
If human beings do inherit psychic formations, something analogous to 
animal instincts, then these are what form the core of the ucs. Everything 
that is discarded over the course of infantile development—material not 
necessarily different in nature from that which is inherited—is then 
subsequently added to this core (p. 77).181 
  
The “core of the ucs” is inherited in the form of something like animal instincts. Once the 
psychic structure is sufficiently organized and capable of repression, one would assume 
that ideas bearing some resemblance to this “core” would be the best candidates. 
                                                       
180 Sigmund Freud, The Unconscious, trans., Graham Frankland (London: Penguin Books, 2005). 
181 SE Vol. XIV, p. 195 
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Strangely, Freud says only that the subsequently “discarded” (not “repressed”) material is 
“not necessarily different in nature from that which is inherited.” Wouldn’t Freud want to 
say something much stronger—that this discarded material is likely similar in nature to 
what is inherited? Instead, he seems to go in the opposite direction—but why does Freud 
do this?  
Here, it is not so much an economic account of primal repression as it is a 
developmental one. Freud sees repression as a defense against the overwhelming force of 
the drives, but by no means as the first or most basic of such mechanisms. In 
“Repression,” Freud argues that  
[R]epression is not one of the original defense mechanisms, that it cannot 
occur until a sharp division has been established between conscious and 
unconscious psychic activity…prior to this stage of psychic organization, 
the task of defense against drive impulses was dealt with by the other 
drive fates, such as reversal into the opposite and turning back on the 
self.182  
 
It is at this point that Freud introduces primal repression, having just explained that 
repression itself is precisely not primal. Repression, Freud argues, develops from more 
primitive mechanisms of “reversal into the opposite” and “turning back on the self.” 
Indeed, Freud suggests that in one and the same moment—sadism-masochism—both of 
these mechanisms appear simultaneously: “These two drive fates—turning back on the 
self and reversal of activity into passivity—are dependent on the narcissistic organization 
of the ego and bear the imprint of this phase”.183 These earlier methods of coping with the 
demands of the drives “bear the imprint” of a time before any stable boundary between 
ucs/pcs or ego/world has been developed; they are the primary modes of working out and 
                                                       
182 “Drives and their Fates” in The Unconscious, p. 36/SE Vol. XIV, p. 147. 
183 ibid. p. 25/p. 132 
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constructing such a limit to defend against, or indeed recognize, the intolerable force of 
the drives.  
The real need for an account of primal repression, it seems, should come here: 
Freud has to differentiate between the boundary-making and dissolving process through 
which the unconscious develops, and the defense mechanism that depends upon there 
already being such a boundary. Primal repression would be the making unconscious of 
those originary moments where the boundary between ego/world, ucs/pcs—has not yet 
stabilized. In support of this claim, I return briefly to Kristeva’s discussion of the abject 
as an objectification (an abjectification) of the transitional as such which she, too, relates 
to primal repression and the sublime:  
If, on account of that Other, a space becomes demarcated, separating the 
abject from what will be a subject and its objects, it is because a repression 
that one might call “primal” has been effected prior to the springing forth 
of the ego, of its objects and representations. The latter, in turn, as they 
depend on another repression, the “secondary” one, arrive only a posteriori 
on an enigmatic foundation that has already been marked off; its return, in 
a phobic, obsessional, psychotic guise, or more generally and in more 
imaginary fashion in the shape of abjection, notifies us of the limits of the 
human universe (Portable Kristeva, p. 237). 
 
Taken together with the passage cited in the Introduction, where Kristeva claims that in 
the abject “[t]he border has become an object”, we might understand the uncanny as the 
potentially creative, rather than merely paralyzing, dimension of this experience. In other 
words, while I agree with Kristeva that the border is the material of primal repression, I 
would suggest that our access to this primal repression comes in the uncanny: in the 
experience of the liminal not as object but precisely in its liminality. 
I am borrowing and remaking Freud’s term, “primal repression,” as a way to 
approach the processes that must—originally—form the core of the unconscious. This is 
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to say that the inheritance Freud refers to hinges on the fundamental movement of auto-
erotism—on the self-differentiation of desire. Primal repression conceals the perversion 
of instinct into drive, or the trauma that grounds our subjectivity. Unconscious 
processes—the core of the unconscious—do not exist in themselves because, without or 
prior to difference, there is nothing. They can only exist once there is a distance, a space 
for desire: the transitional is only afterwards. Primal repression is inseparable from—if 
not equivalent to—Nachträglichkeit. Only after limitation, after actual repression begins 
to function and to fail, can primal repression manifest itself as having been. When Freud 
warns us “we should not think of the process of repression as a single event with 
permanent results, as when, say, a living thing is killed and from then on remains dead,” 
we might take this further: beyond defining primal repression negatively, it must be 
approached as a challenge to and foundation for the deterministic structure of 
event/result, cause/effect, desire/satisfaction.184 Freud only sketches out what the 
temporality of unconscious processes are not—“processes in the ucs system are timeless, 
i.e., are not chronologically ordered, are not altered by the passage of time, indeed bear 
no relation to time whatsoever”— and thus fails to follow through with several strands of 
thought within his work that edges towards a conception of what such timelessness might 
entail.  
If the unconscious is the timeless origin where fantasy and reality cannot be 
differentiated, the nature of and mode of apprehending truth must be radically 
reconceived. Insofar as the unconscious is the ground of consciousness, to begin is to find 
ourselves already divided.  And yet it is only because we are divided that the beginning 
can speak to us—can belong to us—at all:  “The man who cannot separate himself from 
                                                       
184 ibid. p. 39/p. 151 
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himself, who cannot break loose from everything that happens to him and actively oppose 
it—such a man has no past, or more likely he never emerges from it, but lives in it 
continually” (AW 1813, p. 120).  Paradoxically, it is the very act of repression—of 
foreclosing the past and claiming ourselves in so doing—that allows us to be historical, to 
have a past at all.  
Schelling’s claim that “philosophy is thus a history of self-consciousness” 
suggests that this kind of re-appropriation is in fact the demand of philosophy—that this 
creative remembrance of the past is freedom itself (STI, p. 50).  Interestingly, Schelling 
claims that repression is an unavoidable and repeated condition of this freedom. In order 
for there to be an objective world outside of us, or a world within, the productions of the 
self—the originary subject/object, the self-itself, the thing-in-itself—must successively 
“disappear” from consciousness:  
The thing–in-itself arises for it (the self) through an action; the outcome 
remains behind, but not the action that gave rise to it. Thus the self is 
originally ignorant of the fact that this opposite is its own production, and 
must remain in the same ignorance so long as it remains enclosed in the 
magic circle which self-consciousness describes about the self; only the 
philosopher, in breaking out of this circle, can penetrate behind the 
illusion (p. 69). 
 
It begins to seem that Schelling’s philosopher comes close to the Freudian analyst: at an 
engaged remove, the philosopher and the therapist interpret the return of the repressed—
whether in bearing witness to the deeper ground of the transcendental conditions of 
knowledge or the symptoms of a neurotic. Taking this comparison seriously, I believe 
that we can find support for Schelling’s historical metaphysics in Freud’s therapeutic 
method. If it is indeed the case that the transitional space of the beginning is primordially 
repressed, that it cannot be fully translated into or overcome by consciousness, how can it 
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be understood? The question of how one interprets or recognizes the traces of the past in 
the present—of how our history is profoundly lost and inescapably alive—is one that 
both Schelling and Freud force us to consider.185 Moreover, we have to ask: What kind of 
truth necessitates such a method? What kind of truth does such a method makes visible?  
 
2.  Archaic Truth 
 
What Schelling sees as a misconceived search for the real meaning of mythology, 
achieved by removing the distortions of fantasy, sounds quite like one way of 
understanding Freud’s therapeutic technique. Allying psychoanalysis with the scientific 
worldview, Freud often claims to seek bare reality salvaged from the fantasies we project 
upon it, as he does quite explicitly in “The Question of a Weltanschauung”: 
In summary, therefore, the judgment of science on the religious 
Weltanschauung is this. While the different religions wrangle with one 
another as to which of them is in possession of the truth, our view is that 
the question of the truth of religious beliefs may be left altogether on one 
side. Religion is an attempt to master the sensory world in which we are 
situated by means of the wishful world which we have developed within 
us as a result of biological and psychological necessities. But religion 
cannot achieve this. Its doctrines bear the imprint of the times in which 
they arose, the ignorant times of the childhood of humanity (New 
Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, p. 209).186 
 
However, it is also the case that in denying the truth of the religious Weltanschauung, 
Freud unwittingly exposes a similar wish—for an undistorted, recoverable reality—as the 
                                                       
185 Schelling writes in the Weltalter that the goal of his science is to engage with the “boundary”: “For the 
essential thing in scientific progression is to recognize the boundary of each moment and to focus on it 
sharply” (1813, p. 131). 
186 SE Vol. XXII, p. 168. 
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source of scientific constructions.187  That is, if psychoanalysis does have a 
Weltanschauung of its own, it would center on a capacity for self-analysis—for 
recognizing its own fundamental and motivating fantasies. In this sense, we should keep 
in mind that while Schelling dismisses a poetic reading of mythology, he admits that it is 
integral to his own work and, in fact, the only place to begin:  
The poetic view is also one such first interpretation. It undoubtedly 
contains what is correct, to the extent that it excludes no meaning and 
indeed permits mythology to be taken properly. And so we will be careful 
not to say that it is false; on the contrary, it shows what is to be reached” 
(Lecture 1, p. 15).  
 
The question of whether and how the “truth” of mythology might be presented is also an 
invitation to rethink the correspondence between objective science and the reality it 
knows. 
As the experience of the uncanny illustrates, the subjective processes through 
which we (re)negotiate the boundaries of reality are never really overcome: the 
unconscious, indelibly marked by the trauma of separating “off an external world from 
itself,” is timeless and indestructible.188 Moreover, it is through these varied modes of 
relating to the world and to ourselves that mythology, as a dynamic process of 
identification with and differentiation from reality, remains meaningful.189  In his 
                                                       
187 It is worth noting that it is in Freud’s polemic against religion, Future of an Illusion, that he implicitly 
draws science and philosophy closer to religion—precisely insofar as each kind of illusion conceals a wish 
for the world to make sense: “And thus a store of ideas is created, born from man’s need to make his 
helplessness tolerable and built up from the material of memories of the helplessness of his own childhood 
and the childhood of the human race” (SE Vol. XXI, p. 18).  
188 “…originally the ego includes everything, later it separates off an external world from itself. Our present 
ego-feeling is, therefore, only a shrunken residue of a much more inclusive—indeed, an all-embracing—
feeling which corresponded to a more intimate bond between the ego and the world about it” (Civilization 
and its Discontents, SE Vol. XXI, p. 68). See Chapter I: Beginnings; and Chapter IV: The Primal/Freud for 
more detailed examination of primary narcissism. 
189 “At this point, however, a curious psychic transformation occurred in the mind of Kronos’s devotees. 
For precisely in the act of his destroying his antagonist [Uranus], Kronos became intimately identified with 
him” (Beach, p. 200). 
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insistence that a true philosophy of mythology must seek out the source of its religious 
power—what he calls the “dark and uncanny power of the belief in gods”—Schelling 
comes quite close to the psychoanalytic unconscious and to Freudian interpretation 
(Lecture 3, p. 45). As Freud points out, the uncanny is a return to the original horror—
and to the horror of origins: consciousness, including scientific consciousness, is born 
from unconscious desire. It is born like we ourselves are, like the gods are, generated not 
from bloodless logic but from dark, familiar longing. 
For Freud and Schelling, it is clear that unconscious fantasies and dynamics do 
not disappear with the advent of the higher levels of organization that they gives rise to. 
That is, the unconscious can never be entirely reducible to consciousness—there is 
always the “irreducible remainder”—insofar as only the former can hold together the 
contradictory attitudes and relationships that constitute our earliest and most fundamental 
grasp on reality.190 In psychoanalysis, this means that the goal of therapy could never be 
the complete destruction or sublimation of the unconscious, but only the practice and 
development of a language that can begin to integrate the inchoate communications of 
our deepest selves.191 In the process of psychoanalytic therapy, then, it is not a matter of 
translation but of transformation: becoming who we are requires a return to more 
primitive forms of relating to ourselves and to the world—which is to say, to the various 
methods of “making sense” that continue to operate unconsciously. The goal of 
psychoanalytic therapy is not the destruction of the unconscious, but the increased 
capacity to remain open to the unconscious as the impetus of such transformative power.  
                                                       
190 FS, p. 360.  
191 See: Introduction, pp. 38-39 for a discussion of Freud’s “navel of the dream” in The Interpretation of 
Dreams that suggests a particularly affecting admission of this impossibility. 
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As I have suggested, this “return” to modes of experience that we thought were 
overcome is integral both to therapeutic success and to the anxiety of the uncanny. In the 
psychoanalytic uncanny, we experience a haunting realization of our primitive modes of 
relating to the world in reality: our sense that we have overcome infantile fears, wishes, 
theories of knowledge and desire, is radically disturbed by their “coming true.” Part of 
what I take from Freud’s investigation of the uncanny is that we are disturbed precisely 
because the distinctions that define our subjective experience and the scientific 
Weltanschauung do not extend to the unconscious. Although Freud can sometimes claim 
that psychoanalysis is a science in that it rids reality of all traces of wish-fulfillment, his 
insistence on the indestructibility of the unconscious threatens any such model. The 
unconscious is the site where the contradiction between fantasy and reality is undone, or 
rather has not yet arisen, and yet remains the ineradicable and dynamic grounding of 
consciousness and the reality it confronts. This is not to say merely that fantasy is one 
kind of experience among others that make up human being, but rather that the non-
contradiction of truth and fantasy remains the vital source of conscious, rational life and 
all the distinctions that entails. Reality cannot finally and completely be disentangled 
from fantasy because, in the beginning that continues to act as beginning, they are bound 
together.  
By insisting upon the connection between the uncanny and the force of religion, I 
hope to show that Schelling, too, senses the therapeutic possibilities of mythology. That 
is to say, because reality includes the unconscious, truth cannot merely be correlated with 
a heightened level of objectivity and scientific distance. Like Freud, Schelling instead 
struggles toward the recovery of a founding trauma—an ever-receding primal scene—
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suggesting that a metaphysics grounded in the unconscious demands a different model of 
truth and knowledge altogether. Such a scene, or a crisis as Schelling calls it, requires a 
rethinking of processes of differentiation that prepare the way for opposition—
particularly the oppositions between fantasy and reality, subjectivity and objectivity, 
fable and truth.  
In Schelling’s claim that mythology is the highest reality in his early lectures on 
art, that fantasy is to imagination what intellectual intuition is to reason, we gain more 
insight into Freud’s insistence on the world-creating (whether religious, philosophical or 
scientific) power of the wish:   
I define creative imagination in relation to fantasy as that in which the 
productions of art are received and formed, fantasy as that which intuits 
them externally, casts them out from within itself, as it were, and to that 
extent also portrays them. The relationship is the same as that between 
reason and intellectual intuition. Ideas are formed within reason and, in a 
sense, from the material of reason; intellectual intuition is that which 
presents them internally. Fantasy is thus the intellectual intuition within art 
(Philosophy of Art, 38). 
 
In the same way that intellectual intuition defines the deed of self-consciousness—where 
the self is simultaneously creator and created in a moment eternally repressed from 
consciousness —fantasy must hold together artistic self-creation and its abyssal 
beginnings. This conception of fantasy in his Philosophy of Art lectures comes to carry a 
metaphysical weight only in Schelling’s much later lectures on mythology; in this latter 
text, the most fundamental fantasy—mythology—is real: there is thus no deeper meaning 
to be recovered from mythology because within it, as within infantile subjectivity 
dominated by unconscious processes, fantasy and reality are not yet distinguished.  
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As Schelling goes on to argue that the emergence of mythology is simultaneous 
with the separation of peoples, with the dispersion of languages and world-views, the 
analogy between intellectual intuition and fantasy can be more fully fleshed out. Like the 
self-positing “I” of intellectual intuition, the primal scene that gives rise to mythological 
expression and to differentiation more generally must remain outside of time.192 That 
which precedes mythology, that which mythology pathologically “remembers”, can only 
be an undifferentiated, timeless unity:  
Whatever duration we give to this period of homogeneous humanity is 
entirely indifferent to the extent that this period in which nothing happens 
has in any event only the significance of a point of departure, of a pure 
terminus ad quo, starting with which time is counted, but in which itself 
there not actual time (Lecture 5, p. 75) 
 
Like the Absolute Past, it is only after the rupture that mythology responds to—the 
Entscheidung—that this trauma takes shape as a transition, as a beginning. In some way 
that we still must determine, this Absolute Past of self and god(s) alike must relate to 
Schelling’s claim that “the night and fate, the latter itself standing over the gods just as 
the former is the mother of the gods, are the dark background, the hidden and mysterious 
identity from which all gods have emerged” (Lecture 3 p. 41). As with all true 
beginnings—and isn’t mythology always about beginnings?—the gods were not brought 
forth at some point in time; instead, received through fantasy and produced in 
imagination, they make “dimly visible” the bringing forth of time itself—the very process 
of reality-as-(historical) revelation.    
                                                       
192 As Schelling writes in System of Transcendental Idealism: “For if it is through self-consciousness that 
all limitation originates, and thus all time as well, this original act cannot itself occur in time; hence, of the 
rational being as such, one can no more say that it has begun to exist than that it has existed for all time; the 
self as self is absolutely eternal, that is, outside time altogether” (p. 48).  
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Schelling’s initial insight into the failures of competing approaches to 
mythology—primarily the poetic and the philosophical/scientific—concerns their 
inadequacy in addressing the “dark” power of religion.193 He argues that while it might 
be possible for a poetic or philosophical genius to invent a system of the gods, no such 
arbitrary creation could result in the intensity of a religion for a people, and that 
addressing the source of this power is essential to understanding mythology. It is in this 
context that Schelling introduces the concept of unheimlichkeit in his Historical-Critical 
Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology, suggesting that only the most profound and 
continuous spiritual “crisis” could explain such a hold on a people: “[A] well-known and 
popular way of thinking [is] to presuppose for the later, serious times of our human 
species an epoch of a clear and serene poesy, a condition that was still free from religious 
terror and all those uncanny feelings by which later humanity was harried, the time of a 
happy and guiltless atheism.” Schelling then presents his own view on the matter, as he 
doubts whether it is even conceivable “that the dark and uncanny power of the belief in 
gods [developed] from a weak and artificial beginning”(Lecture 1, p. 14/Lecture 3, p. 45). 
It should already be clear from these passages that the uncanny is integral to the dark 
potency of religious belief for Schelling—the strength of which is such that it could not 
have contingently come-to-be. When Schelling goes on to define the uncanny in his 
lectures on mythology and revelation, it is still attached to a “principle” that remains 
obscure—an obscurity that, it seems, may be ineradicable: 
                                                       
193 I call the “philosophical/scientific” views those which “say that no gods are meant in mythology at al; 
neither proper and real nor improper and unreal, no personalities, but rather impersonal objects that are 
only represented poetically as persons. Personification is the principle of this method of interpretation; 
either ethically customary or natural properties and phenomena are personified” (Lecture 2, p. 24). This 
covers the possibility of geniuses, whether scientific, political or philosophical, that cover their (perhaps 
rudimentary) knowledge of the world in poesy in order to communicate it to society at large. 
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The Homeric pantheon tacitly contains a Mystery within it, and is as it 
were built up over an abyss, which it bedecks as with flowers… The pure 
sky that hovers above the Homeric poetry was first able to extend over 
Greece after the dark and darkening power of that uncanny (unheimliches) 
principle (for one calls “uncanny” all that which should have remained in 
secret [im Geheimnis], in concealment and latency, but which has 
nonetheless stepped forward)—that aether which forms a dome principle, 
which dominated in earlier religions, was precipitated down in the 
Mystery. The Homeric age was first able to conceive of that purely poetic 
narrative of the gods after the actually religious principle had been hidden 
in the interior and thus allowed the spirit to turn freely toward the outside 
(cited in Beach, p. 228). 
 
The suggestion here is that even “poetic” narrative, and perhaps narrative more generally, 
is built upon the withdrawal of the “dark and darkening”. While Schelling seems to 
suggest that the uncanny is this darkness, this cannot be quite right: after all, what is 
uncanny must—though it ought not—come to light. That is, the uncanny is only insofar 
as it returns; even—or, perhaps, especially—the most harmonious coherence points to its 
violent history.  
The spiritual crisis that Schelling invokes as the real basis of religious power, the 
trauma that imbues the beautiful Homeric pantheon with meaning, is crucially linked to 
the Freudian uncanny: it marks the site-less site of the transition from immersive union to 
differentiation, from Schelling’s relative monotheism to successive polytheism.194 This 
                                                       
194 Although I will deal with successive polytheism in greater detail through the course of this chapter, 
Schelling initially uses the term as a way to distinguish a historical system of the gods from a merely 
hierarchical one. In other words, Schelling’s interest lies in the genealogy of the gods given in mythology, 
and in successive polytheism as a recollection and trace of an actual genealogy: “Indeed, it can escape to 
whom it is pointed out that there is a great difference between the polytheism that emerges when indeed a 
greater or lesser number of gods is conceived, which are however subordinated to one and the same god as 
their highest and master, and that polytheism that emerges when several gods are assumed, but each of 
them is the highest and dominating in a certain time and for this reason can only follow one another. If we 
think to ourselves, say, that the Greek history of the gods had, instead of the three races of gods—which it 
has follow one upon the other—only one, say that of Zeus, then it would also only know of gods (all of 
which would be resolved into Zeus, as their common unity) coexisting and simultaneous with each other, it 
would know only of simultaneous polytheism. Now, however, it has three systems of gods, and in each one 
One god is the highest…Thus these three gods cannot be simultaneous ones but rather only mutually 
excluding, and for this reason ones following one another in time. So long as Uranus dominates, Kronos 
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crisis provokes a process of individuation, of working out the boundaries that connect us 
to and separate us from each other and the world: 
Thus this fear, this horror before the loss of all consciousness of unity, 
held together those who remained united and drove them to maintain at 
least a partial unity, in order to persist, if not as humanity, then at least as a 
people. This fear before the total disappearance of unity, and therewith of 
all truly human consciousness, provided them not only with the first 
institutions of a religious type but even the first civil institutions, whose 
goal was no other than to preserve what they had saved of the unity and to 
secure against future disintegration (Lecture 5 p. 82). 
 
Schelling goes on to more explicitly connect this spiritual crisis to language, pointing out 
that “it is the name that differentiates and separates a people, just as an individual, from 
the others, but for just this reason at the same time holds them together” (Lecture 5 p. 83). 
Elsewhere, he refers to this transitional space in biblical terms as a “confusion” of 
language, a confusion that extends to the temporal priority of differentiation and crisis: 
“let us build a city and a tower, whose summit reaches to the heavens, that we may make 
a name for ourselves, for we might perhaps be scattered across the whole earth. They say 
this before language is confused; they intimate that which stands before them, the crisis 
which is announced to them” (Lecture 5 p. 83). Schelling continues, 
Thus, the fear of being dispersed, of no longer being a whole at all, of 
rather being fully disbanded, motivates it to the undertaking. Stable 
residence is first considered when humanity is in danger of losing itself 
entirely and of disintegrating, but with the first stable abodes the 
separation begins, thus also the repulsion and exclusion, like the tower of 
Babel, which is supposed to prevent the entire dispersion, becomes the 
beginning and the occasion of the separation of the peoples (Lecture 5 p. 
83). 
 
                                                       
cannot; and should Zeus attain dominance, Kronos must recede into the past. Thus we will name this 
polytheism the successive polytheism [successiven Polytheismus]” (Lecture 6 p. 86).  
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The emergence of a people—which is also the emergence of distinct languages and 
mythologies—is, in an important sense, linked to the time of trauma: Nachträglichkeit. 
Differentiation, Schelling tells us, cannot be easily located as cause or effect of the 
confusion of language. Only retroactively, through the histories of the gods in successive 
polytheism, can relative monotheism show itself as what came before. And thus 
mythology is in no way an overcoming of the trauma that provoked it—mythology is 
instead both a historical record and a retroactive creation of this transition. Similarly, the 
uncanny is not merely the return of the repressed: it is a return to the temporality 
activated in and through trauma—to a realization of non-existence converging with 
existence, indifference with difference, by way of the dissolution of the ordinary limits of 
our experience.  
Mythology is an enactment of the development of multiplicity from 
undifferentiated unity, though these concepts of history and development must be 
carefully rethought: “When one compares the mythologies of various peoples, it becomes 
fully incontestable that it is the actual history of its emergence that mythology has 
preserved in the sequentiality of its gods” (Lecture 6, p. 88). Mythology here is self-
reflective—if we can only bear to listen, it tells of its own arrival: the dispersion and 
historicization of men and gods that mythology works against (as a unifying process) is, 
at the same time, effected by mythology (as a differentiating process). This does not 
mean, however, that the myths are narrations of actual events. Rather, Schelling questions 
just what it means for something to be an actual event—what it might mean for the truth 
to show itself mythologically, or at all.  
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One way to approach such a truth is to take up Markus Gabriel’s claim that 
mythology is the necessary and meaningless foundation of meaning: “Mythology is an 
unprethinkable event in the sense that there is no reason (no thought) anterior to 
mythology which could transform it into a reasonable product. In its brute 
meaninglessness, it is the foundation of meaning, even of the meaning of 
meaninglessness” (p. 64).195 Schelling himself uses the term “unprethinkable” in 
reference to the tower of Babel, pointing out that “such an indelible symbolic meaning, 
like the one attached to the name Babel, only emerges in that it is derived from an 
unprethinkable [unvordenklich] impression” (Lecture 5 p. 76).  Like Gabriel, Schelling 
suggests that the common ground of religion and language, which is to say the ground of 
difference, reason and meaning more generally, must exceed meaning: brute reality 
cannot be logically derived or further interpreted, and it is precisely this impenetrability 
that makes meaning—whether mythological or scientific—possible.  
My worry with Gabriel’s account, however, concerns the distinction made 
between what he calls constitutive mythology and regulative mythology; the former, in 
some sense, is the unprethinkable event, and the latter the histories of the gods that 
constitute the content of Schelling’s successive polytheism. He writes, “whereas 
regulative mythology makes use of specific metaphors, symbols, personae, and the like, 
constitutive mythology bases itself on ‘absolute metaphors’ in Blumenberg’s 
sense…‘fundamental stocks of philosophical language’” (p. 66). Gabriel’s essay seems to 
depend upon an abstract mythology, or set of mythemes, that allows for—and thus cannot 
be contained by—the existence of any particular world-view; at the same time, Gabriel 
                                                       
195 Markus Gabriel and Slavoj Zizek, Mythology, Madness and Laughter: Subjectivity in German Idealism 
(New York: Continuum, 2009). 
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wants this constitutive mythology to provide the unprethinkable thatness of reality. But, 
drained of its specificity, constitutive mythology can only become the generic, groundless 
ground of Reason. Although I find his argument that meaning needs mythology 
persuasive and important, it seems to me that the constitutive/regulative distinction in no 
way helps explain Schelling’s account of how meaning depends upon theogony, or the 
connection between the unprethinkable real and its particular mythological expressions, 
but only serves to further obscure it. Ultimately, Gabriel seems to assume the opposition 
between particular and universal in the guise of the regulative and the constitutive, rather 
than to trace its development. Like the philosophical and poetic approaches Schelling 
condemns, Gabriel uses mythology instead of letting it speak for itself.  As we will see in 
both Schelling and Freud, the emergence of mythology—a bringing forth that is the 
stories of the births and deaths of gods—is an essential moment in the dialectic between 
the particular and the universal. The myths of creation and destruction are expressions of 
the traumatic eruption of (self-)consciousness, of the crisis through which the very 
possibility of the particular (the differentiated) and the universal (the undifferentiated) 
first appears.  
Instead of dwelling on Gabriel’s distinction between constitutive and regulative 
mythology, which merely begs the question of whether and how universal and particular 
mythemes come together, we should consider instead the identity Schelling posits 
between language and myth: “One is almost tempted to say: language itself is only a 
faded mythology; what mythology still preserves in living and concrete differences is 
preserved in language only in abstract and formal differences” (Lecture 3, 40). In other 
words, Schelling suggests that language is mythology, no less than mythology is a 
 212 
language: communication, as we saw with the construction of Babel, is always an act of 
connection and separation. The “faded” or immobile quality of ordinary language, 
perhaps even more so than the bright sky of the Homeric pantheon, keeps the ongoing 
crisis of coming-to-consciousness at bay. Even the most comfortable abstractions 
promise an uncanny return of the repressed—a resurrection that, as Freud so carefully 
attends to, is evident in the ambivalence of the very terms Heimlich/Unheimlich. Where 
Freud points to the same deconstruction of opposition in the experience of the uncanny, 
like truth/fantasy and inner/outer, Schelling focuses on the incipient anxiety of 
renegotiating surface and depth, the periphery and the center.196  
Indeed, Schelling’s overall claim that mythology means what it is, would suggest 
that it is not something psychoanalysis can effectively interpret—or at least not in the 
way Freud is accustomed to. Schelling’s account of mythology may instead lead us to 
how Freud can relate to mythology, how his method of interpretation uniquely depends 
upon it. At a superficial level, we can see this dependence in the centrality of Oedipus in 
Freud’s theory more generally—itself a repetition of the motifs already operative in the 
prophecy, murder and castration of Uranus/Kronos/Zeus as well as Freud’s own myth of 
the primal horde; there is nothing for Freud to “interpret” in these events except for their 
literal, universal truth.  However, this is not to say that the themes shared by the Oedipal 
tragedy and Greek mythology are instances of constitutive mythology and its 
                                                       
196 Schelling deals with the relationship between periphery and center at some length in his Freedom essay: 
“The most appropriate comparison is here offered by disease, which is the true counterpart of evil and sin, 
as it constitutes that disorder which entered nature through a misuse of freedom. Disease of the whole 
organism can never exist without the hidden forces of the depths being unloosed; it occurs when the 
irritable principle which ought to rule as the innermost tie of forces in the quiet deep, activates itself, or 
when Archaos is provoked to desert his quiet residence at the center of things and steps forth into the 
surroundings. So, on the other hand, all radical cure consists in the reestablishment of the relation of the 
periphery to the center, and the transition from disease to health can really only take place through its 
opposite, that is through the restoration of separate and individual life to the inner light of being, whence 
there recurs the division” (my italics, p. 41).  
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“fundamental stocks of philosophical language” that Gabriel introduces.  Rather, the 
psychoanalytic approach to mythology, where interpretation does not quite apply to 
mythology but emerges from it, suggests a way to trace the mutual development of 
language and reality in Schellingian terms.  
  
3. Uncanny Meaning 
 
On Schelling’s view, the uncanny is the site where self-identity (Heimlich) shows itself as 
irreducibly not-itself, divided (Unheimlich). The Homeric pantheon, Schelling writes, can 
only appear to us as basking under a “pure sky” because there is hidden within it the 
“religious” and “darkening power” of the uncanny. If there were no place to hide—no 
interiority and no limit—there could be no meaning at all. Thus the uncanny, as the return 
of the repressed, also allows for meaning construed as retrieval from the depths. It is for 
this reason that Schelling refuses to engage with mythology as allegory: the very 
possibility of the latter has to be grounded in the former.  
Without the intimation of the hidden, without interiority or limit, there can be no 
meaning at all; but it is only with mythology that depth and surface, center and periphery, 
past and future come to be distinguished. Schelling discovers that interpretation is 
unthinkable without the histories of the gods: from Uranus, through Kronos to 
Zeus/Dionysus, Schelling draws together the formation of consciousness with the 
development of meaning. Initially, with Uranus, there is a certain flat naïvete, an 
unreflective and undifferentiated immersion (the unconscious unity, pre-historical and 
self-enclosed); with the birth of Kronos, which is also the transitional stage between 
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unconscious unity and self-conscious differentiation, anxiety sets in. Dislocated by the 
memory of overcoming that defines him, and the desire to forget that he is vulnerable to 
the same fate, Kronos is uncanny: individuality is grounded in the split between the need 
for the past in legitimating himself and denying such a past to the gods that would come 
(the all-consuming, child-devouring present forecloses the past to refuse the future).197 It 
is only with the arrival of this second god—and the anxiety succession entails—that the 
first becomes meaningful as a god:  
[T]he one God, reigning over the placid, pre-historical time, was indeed 
the only one existing up to that point, but not in the sense that no second 
one was able to follow him; rather, only that another had not yet actually 
followed him. To this extent he was essentially already a mythological 
god, although he only first became such actually when the second actually 
arrived and made himself into the master of human consciousness (Lecture 
6, p. 97). 
 
Only in Kronos’ subjecting Uranus to the past—in his conflicted creation of and 
separation from a past that was never experienced as such, that never belonged to a 
people—does mythology, as historical and symptomatic, properly begin. The anxiety that 
Kronos experiences is real—it is an anxiety surrounding the emergence of times, a 
consequence of making past that defines us and divides us in trauma.  
In Totem and Taboo, his first text dealing with the emergence of religion and the 
taboos of civilization from totemism, Freud makes a similar claim about the anxiety that 
comes with the succession of the gods:  
 
The contrast between ‘sacred’ and ‘unclean’ coincides with a succession 
of two stages of mythology. The earlier of these stages did not completely 
disappear when the second one was reached but persisted in what was 
                                                       
197 See Schiller’s account of a similar development in “On Naïve and Sentimental Poetry” in Essays (pp. 
179-260). 
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regarded as an inferior and eventually contemptible form. It is, he [Wundt] 
says, a general law of mythology that a stage which has been passed, for 
the very reason that it has been overcome and driven under by a superior 
stage, persists in an inferior form alongside the latter one, so that the 
objects of its veneration turn into objects of horror (SE Vol. XIII, p. 25). 
 
Here Freud explicitly connects history with anxiety: the first god inspires horror because 
the past is not over—in its very disappearance, the first god is erected and threatens 
return. Such an understanding of the collective consciousness of a people converges with 
Freud’s theory of Nachträglichkeit for the individual—the radical therapeutic premise 
that trauma is not a stable event locatable in time, but a disruption and redefinition of the 
temporal order. As with Schelling, in making memory and history active Freud 
destabilizes the past, its reality beholden to what can only come later. In the same work 
Freud goes on to discuss Dionysus-Zagreus, Kronos’ successor, who Schelling presents 
as the meaningful gathering of past and present that could resolve the anxiety of 
differentiation in the eternal coming-to-be of the future.  However, Freud’s version seems 
to emphasize instead the endless cycle of familial brutality: “Mankind, it was said, were 
descended from the Titans, who had killed the young Dionysus-Zagreus and torn him to 
pieces” (p. 153). The future (Dionysus), like the present (Kronos), is a repetition of the 
past—and particularly of its dislocation and violent sundering. This repetition threatens to 
undo any real differentiation between times, as each god suffers the fate of and becomes 
identified with his father. But it can also be envisioned in its productive, or rather 
reproductive, aspect: we might recognize such a creative repetition in the way that the 
past is both repeated and engendered in the continued development of an individual or a 
people. In its oscillation between revelation and concealment, the conflicted pulse of the 
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symptom suggests how we might understand mythology as both literally true and still 
interpretable. 
The crisis of consciousness speaks to us mythologically: mythology is the 
memory of a founding loss, the trace of the mutual emergence of times and 
consciousness—of difference as such. But it is also the repetition of this primordial 
separation, concealing as it does the lost unity through the very act of historicizing, of 
narrating. In this way, the trauma of transition unites the history of consciousness with 
the history of the gods. Mythology expresses the constitutional anxiety of the subject, and 
consciousness as a negotiation between the dual threats of immersive unity and isolating 
difference. The individual, no less than language and meaning, disappears in the collapse 
into undifferentiated union as well as in the fetishization of distinction. Schelling’s 
emphasis on birth, and furthermore his attentiveness to birth that is marked by the 
castration of the father and the devouring of the son, cannot be overlooked in this 
respect. Birth recalls us to Schelling’s overarching concern with an organic holding 
together, with a living temporality that neither destroys what comes before nor vanishes 
into what comes later; but it also gestures towards the undeniably horrific (murderous, 
incestuous, bloody) aspects of such an (un)natural begetting.  The bond that unites 
Uranus, Kronos and Dionysis is the dialectic of individuation and communion—the 
intractable identity of illness and cure, of repetition and creation. 
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4.  Therapeutic Meaning 
 
Schelling’s work on mythology requires a rethinking of the meshwork of temporality, 
meaning and anxiety. In tracing the development of human consciousness from the 
unconscious, Schelling does not want us to simply find the historical development of 
subjectivity comparable to, or allegorized in, mythology. Rather, he challenges us to 
develop forms of meaning and relating that are necessary for approaching mythology and 
origins more generally: 
Certainly, mythology has no reality outside of consciousness; but if it only 
takes its course in the determinations of consciousness, that is, in its 
representations, then nonetheless this course of events, this succession of 
representations themselves cannot again be such a one that is merely 
imagined; it must have actually taken place, must have actually occurred 
in consciousness. This succession is not fashioned by mythology, but 
rather—contrariwise—mythology is fashioned by it. For mythology is just 
precisely the whole of those doctrines of the gods that have actually 
succeeded each other, and thus it has come into being through this 
succession (Lecture 6, 89). 
  
As we can see more explicitly in Schelling’s explanation of mythological meaning, the 
connection here is precisely not allegorical. But how then do we begin to understand that 
the births or history of the gods do relate to us? How are we to understand what Schelling 
is doing when he interprets mythology as both fantasy and actual history?  
These questions gesture towards the great hope and the great danger of 
Schelling’s efforts. I suggest that this relation is an uncanny belonging together—a 
connection founded in and expressed by the anxious, transitional space between what is 
and what is not. In other words, it is precisely through the activity of working out the 
boundaries between the actual and the imagined, within the border realm of the uncanny, 
 218 
that the gods and consciousness arrive (and continue to arrive) together. On the surface it 
seems that the manner in which Freud derives mythology from psychic structures, as the 
projection of infantile desires and fears onto the world, offers a stark contrast with 
Schelling’s views. This kind of interpretive gesture on Freud’s part is apparent in texts 
like Future of an Illusion, where he presents mythology both as a mode of religious 
experience and as a protection against paralyzing vulnerability and senselessness:  
Impersonal forces and destinies cannot be approached; they must remain 
eternally remote. But if the elements have passions that rage as they do in 
our own souls, if death itself is not something spontaneous but the violent 
act of an evil Will, if everywhere in nature there are Beings around us of a 
kind that we know in our own society, then we can breathe freely, can feel 
at home in the uncanny and can deal by psychical means with our 
senseless anxiety. We are still defenseless, perhaps, but we are no longer 
helplessly paralyzed; we can at least react. We can apply the same 
methods against these violent supermen outside that we employ in our 
own society; we can try to adjure them, to appease them, to bribe them, 
and, by so influencing them, we may rob them of part of their power (SE 
Vol. XXI, pp. 16-17). 
 
It appears that what Schelling finds actual in mythology, Freud deems utter delusion, and 
vice versa.198 But as I have tried to suggest, the uncanny is precisely the moment at which 
we are called to address—to return to—just what separates truth from desire, the actual 
from the imagined.  Freud’s own fascination with mythology is not limited to finding 
examples that illustrate the projection and distortion of unconscious fears and wishes; at 
pivotal moments in the development of his thought, Freud is unable to clearly demarcate 
the foundational elements of his science from the structures and status of myth. Further, 
these “mythological moments” that Freud can never entirely embrace nor do without—
                                                       
198 It is worth noting that before Freud classed totemism and mythology together with monotheistic world 
religions, Schelling’s claims for the continuum of religious phenomena—stretching from paganism to 
Christianity—were relatively new and controversial. See: Beach’s pp. 4-23 for a discussion of these 
debates. 
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for instance, in his Platonic defense of Eros in Beyond the Pleasure Principle—tend to 
concern the relationship between desire and history, between the individual and the 
species, between repetition and recreation.199 Perhaps most memorably, Freud’s primal 
horde, as presented in Civilization and its Discontents, Totem and Taboo and, to a certain 
extent, in Moses and Monotheism, is itself a myth of origins and the origin of myth: it 
serves to explain, in various and contradictory ways, the inheritance of guilt, the Oedipal 
Complex and religion by way of repression and primary ambivalence. As Freud writes in 
Civilization and its Discontents, concerning the remorse that follows the murder of the 
father in the primal horde: “This remorse was the result of the primordial ambivalence of 
feeling towards the father. His sons hated him, but they loved him, too” (p. 95). It is only 
out of this “primordial ambivalence” that in devouring the father, they also become the 
father—the very stuff of generation, connection and separation: which is to say, of 
mythology.200 And yet, this is what actually happened. Paradoxically, inescapably and 
uncomfortably, Freud—and perhaps this can be seen as one way to answer Schelling’s 
call in the Weltalter—discovers mythology in truth and truth in mythology.   
This convergence of truth and myth is perhaps most fully explored in Freud’s 
final reworking of the primal horde in Civilization and its Discontents. In an effort to 
explain the development of civilization, Freud again turns to the sexual, murderous and 
familial at the root of psychic life. Hoping to discover in the process the emergence of the 
                                                       
199 BPP, pp. 94-95/SE Vol. XVIII, pp. 57-58. 
200 In Freud’s A Phylogenetic Fantasy, he posits not only the killing of the primal father by his sons, but 
also the castration of the sons by the father: “experiences admonish us, however, to substitute another, more 
gruesome solution—namely, that he robs them of their manhood—after which they are able to stay in the 
horde as harmless laborers” (p. 17). This text, a so-called twelfth metapsychological paper, written in 1915, 
was found among Freud’s unpublished drafts in 1983. In large part, this text is important due to Freud’s 
inclusion of a pre-Ice Age period of general happiness and satisfaction; his claim is that, due to the 
shortages and exigency of the Ice Age, the conflicts within the primal horde appear and—more 
importantly—become etched into human psychic life.  
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super-ego and the origin of guilt and repression, Freud reworks the hypothetical primal 
horde from Totem and Taboo insofar as it fails to adequately explain why the murder of 
the father results in the guilt of the sons. Here, Freud marks the importance of 
omnipotence of thought—a term familiar to us from its uncanny effects—in terms of 
whether the primal horde be understood as fiction or reality:  
A great change takes place only when the authority is internalized through 
the establishment of a super-ego. The phenomena of conscience then reach 
a higher stage. Actually, it is not until now that we should speak of 
conscience or sense of guilt. At this point, too, the fear of being found out 
comes to an end; the distinction, moreover, between doing something bad 
and wishing to do it disappears entirely, since nothing can be hidden from 
the super-ego, not even thoughts (Civilization and its Discontents, SE Vol. 
XXI, p. 125). 
 
Interestingly, Freud suggests, the developmental achievement that is the super-ego is in 
fact a re-enforcement of the mechanism of omnipotent thought; that is, the ambivalence 
between desire and reality is not surpassed at this stage but preserved and even increased. 
And yet, it is in this text that Freud is most insistent on the reality of this primal scene: 
“We cannot get away from the assumption that man’s sense of guilt springs from the 
Oedipal complex and was acquired at the killing of the father by the brothers banded 
together. On that occasion an act of aggression was not suppressed but carried out” (p. 
131). He argues that while following generations may feel guilt due to the renunciation of 
their murderous, sexual impulses (in the form of punishments from the super-ego), the 
erection of the super-ego as an agency, and with it the remorseful idealization of the 
father, can only be the effects of real action.  
The contradiction here should be apparent: why must it be real if there is as yet no 
distinction between the wish and its fulfillment? The omnipotent thought that holds sway 
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in primitive psychic life, while not perhaps as totalizing as it becomes with the super-ego, 
makes any question of the reality of the murder irrelevant. However, it is not first and 
foremost to explain the guilt of the brothers that Freud needs the act to be a real one; it is 
in order to explain the deification of the father that follows. It is thus the inheritability of 
the Oedipal complex—the very possibility of succession, to use Schelling’s term—that 
leads Freud to assert the reality of the primal scene. Simply put: the father needs to 
actually die in order to become a god. 
Freud’s late text Moses and Monotheism reiterates the real need for the death of 
the father to explain the potency of religious feeling. He treats biblical events in the same 
way he treats Greek mythology, pointing to their identity as religious phenomena and 
their shared rootedness in real and enduring crises very much in the style of Schelling. 
Here it is a question of the emergence of a particular people (his own people, the 
Israelites) and the mythology that both exposes and propagates an originary trauma: the 
story of Moses bears within its fault-lines the violence of differentiation and 
individuation, the trauma that marks all true beginnings.201 Indeed, Freud emphasizes the 
transition from polytheism to monotheism as fundamental to the meaning and power of 
Moses’ story. The continued reverence for these narratives, Freud suggests, is a testament 
to a constitutively hidden force—to the most profound and ambivalent feelings of love 
and hate that spur our development and awaken our nostalgia. It is worth noting, as 
Derrida does in Archive Fever, that Freud’s interpretation of Moses is marked by the 
language of the uncanny: “Freud characterizes the impression which circumcision leaves 
on those who are uncircumcised: ‘a disagreeable, uncanny [unheimlich] impression’ [SE 
                                                       
201 See Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, Freud’s Moses: Judaism Terminable and Interminable, (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1991). Yerushalmi offers a radical reading of Freud’s Moses along with an 
interpretation of the connection between Judaism and psychoanalysis more generally. 
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Vol. XXIII p. 92).202 For Freud, the symptom-formation that is Moses is a version of the 
Oedipal myth—and, even more archaically, the theogony of Uranus-Kronos-Zeus—at the 
level of a people: the murder of their leader, their father figure, is repressed, transformed, 
inherited. And, like the tragedy of Oedipus or even his grandson’s game of Fort/Da, the 
story of Moses is a story of inheritance—of our unconscious and ungrounding ground, of 
the past that we never experienced (before we were born, before we were self-conscious) 
and inevitably take up in our own way. It is not so much that Freud insists upon a 
physiological structure of inheritance, but rather that he opens up the possibility of a 
distinctively psychoanalytic process of history.203 We do not inherit, genetically as it 
were, some set of archetypes or mythemes; rather, we are born into a reality, as well as a 
people, that is shaped by and remains vulnerable to the earliest psychic formations.    
Hesitantly, Freud marks out an understanding of reality that must take into 
account relationships to the world that we no longer have access to but cannot be rid of.  
Just as Schelling refuses to relegate religion and mythology to the status of mere 
projections that need to be overcome, Freud also knows that mythology is not just 
symptomatic of primitive psychic states that can be more rationally interpreted and 
explained; indeed, such a false sense of overcoming the past is the pre-condition of the 
uncanny and of the therapeutic method. For Freud, remaining open to primitive modes of 
                                                       
202 Derrida goes on, “(I have attempted elsewhere to show, and cannot go into it here, that each time the 
word unheimlich appears in Freud’s text—and not only in the essay of this title Das Unheimlich—one can 
localize an uncontrollable undecidability in the axiomatics, the epistemology, the logic, the order of the 
discourse and of the thetic or theoretic statements; and the same is true, in just as significant a way, of 
Heidegger.)” (p. 46). In light of this hint of Derrida’s, we notice that in Freud’s late work on religion—
Future of an Illusion—he does in fact return to the language of the uncanny yet again: “But if the elements 
have passions that rage as they do in our own souls, if death itself is not something spontaneous but the 
violent act of an evil Will, if everywhere in nature there are Beings around us of a kind that we know in our 
own society, then we can breathe freely, can feel at home in the uncanny and can deal by psychical means 
with our senseless anxiety” (SE Vol. XXI, pp. 16-17). 
203 Sigmund Freud, A Phylogenetic Fantasy. Trans. Axel Hoffer and Peter T. Hoffer (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1987). 
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engaging with reality, including pre-repressive, ego-building processes like projection, 
introjection and identification, is integral to therapeutic success and to understanding 
mythology.204 Freud comes close to Schelling here, suggesting that the truth we discover 
is neither an historical fact nor an insight into the psychology of an alien, primitive 
people; it is a truth that still and always belongs to us, and so we experience the uncanny.  
Schelling argues that traditional interpretations of mythology amount to various 
ways of masking the transformative reality of myth—protecting us from our essential and 
existential uncanniness. Mythology, Schelling maintains, enacts the historical 
development of meaning—and, in doing so, the birth of language and of peoples:  
In any case it is apparent that to the Old Testament way of thinking the 
emergence of peoples, the confusion of language and polytheism are 
related concepts and connected phenomena. If we look back from here to 
what was found earlier, then every people is first there as such after it has 
defined and decided itself in view of its mythology. Thus this mythology 
cannot emerge for it in the time of the already completed division and 
after it had already become a people; because, moreover, it could equally 
less emerge for the people as long as the latter was, in the whole of 
humanity, still at the point of being like an until then invisible part of it, 
mythology’s origin will occur precisely in the transition, because the 
people does not yet exist as a determinate one but precisely at this point is 
ready to extrude and isolate itself as such (Lecture 5, 79). 
  
Notice the connection Schelling makes between mythology and transition: the origin of 
mythology, its meaning and truth, is located in transition.  And what kind of location—
destabilizing, dynamic—would this be? We are faced with a mutual productivity where 
the longing for identity springs from and creates difference. The source of this cision, a 
spiritual crisis as Schelling calls it, can only be experienced as having been, as already 
past; consciousness is a demand for the very unity it destroys in coming to be. The 
                                                       
204 See: Laplanche and Pontalis The Language of Psychoanalysis for discussions of the development of the 
terms “introjection”, “projection”, and “identification” in psychoanalytic theory.  
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histories of the gods bear witness to the originary longing and unutterable self-division 
through which meaning becomes questionable—which is to say, becomes possible.  For 
Schelling, there is no sense in working out the distortions in mythology to uncover what 
really happened. Rather, we need to consider the way in which mythology plays out the 
developmental—the transitional—structure of reality itself.  
 
5.   Symptoms of Subjectivity 
 
The fact that Schelling’s interest in the uncanny comes in his late exploration of 
mythology gives credence to my claim that reality must encompass the unconscious and 
the archaic.205 Mythology, as Schelling explains, is not some primitive attempt to explain 
the world that modern science has made redundant; neither is it a veiled message or 
allegory that might be translated into laws or moral codes. The meaning of mythology is 
united with its being in a manner quite unlike the removed knowledge of conscious 
experience or scientific investigation. By grounding knowledge in the unconscious, truth 
in the mythological, Schelling disturbs the distinction between the objective and the 
subjective. Thus meaning is re-imagined in Schelling as process, as revelation: like the 
gods themselves, truth is timeless, but only if we reframe this timelessness, as Schelling 
does in his Weltalter, in terms of repression and historicity. In other words, truth is not 
essentially and eternally present, but instead tied to that vanishing limit between 
concealment and revelation that, equally, holds together the “darkening power” with the 
“clear blue” Homeric sky: the uncanny.  
                                                       
205 See Markus Gabriel’s essay “The Mythological Being of Reflection” in Mythology, Madness and 
Laughter for a sustained and fruitful discussion of the central role of mythology in Schelling and for a 
provocative distinction between constitutive and regulative mythology (p. 66). 
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Schelling writes, “As the common germ of both gods and men, absolute chaos is 
night, obscurity. The first forms and figures fantasy allows to be born from within it are 
also still formless. A world of misshapen and frightful forms must perish before the mild 
realm of the blessed and enduring gods can enter” (p. 37). Although these “frightful 
forms” may perish, the gods themselves bear the traces, we might even say the symptoms, 
of their bond with “absolute chaos”. Thus, in order to understand the reality Schelling 
ascribes to the gods (and the “common germ” that humans share with them) we have to 
approach the non-presence of the boundary—a concealment that is always also the 
possibility of revelation—as integral to the truth of mythology.  
Schelling argues that mythology tells us what it means in the only terms it can: as 
a history of the gods and thus of the development of consciousness. What comes out of 
Schelling’s account is a theory of meaning that both allows for and presses beyond 
conceptual thought. Language, in its mythological expression, is not primarily a medium 
for transmitting ideas: it is also and more importantly a reflection of a particular, and 
perhaps even foundational, sense of how psyche and world interact as reality. The 
practice of psychoanalysis, at least implicitly, depends upon a similarly developmental 
and reciprocal theory of world-creation and self-expression. Furthermore, it is a tenet of 
psychoanalysis that these various levels and forms of self-understanding are not simply 
cast out in favor of more rational structures; rather, the former maintain and even increase 
their effectiveness precisely insofar as they threaten and contradict the latter. Borrowing 
heavily from Hans Loewald’s work, Jonathan Lear explains in Love and Its Place in 
Nature that symptoms (and the unconscious fantasies and desires they express) are 
always pervaded by infantile theories of selfhood and primal forms of subjectivity: 
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The case of Anna O. shows us, right at the beginning of psychoanalysis, 
that in addition to infecting our memories and current experience, archaic 
mental life has a “theory” of the mind’s own workings. Anna O.’s 
“theory” of catharsis was not an explicitly conceptualized theory, thus the 
use of quotes. Her “theory” was expressed at the same archaic level of 
mental functioning as the rest of her fantasies: she experienced catharsis as 
corporealized discharge (p. 36). 
 
Lear continues, explaining how it is that the therapeutic model fits into this account: “A 
‘theory’ of the mental process is part of the person’s (perhaps unconscious) experience of 
that process. Thus the fantasied ‘theory’ becomes part and parcel of the mental process, 
and in altering the fantasy one alters the mental process itself” (p.37). Mythology is thus 
a theory of the mind, in Lear’s sense of the term, insofar as it is an expression of a form 
of psychic life bound up with the attempt to understand that life. Or, as Schelling would 
have it, mythological language is what it says—the symbolic (or symptomatic) is the 
union of being and meaning, the entanglement of our existence with the sense we make 
of it:  
Mythology as such and every poetic rendering of it in particular are to be 
comprehended neither schematically nor allegorically, but rather 
symbolically. This is the case because the requirement of absolute artistic 
representation is: representation with complete indifference such that the 
universal is completely the particular and the particular simultaneously the 
entire universal, and does not merely mean or signify it. The requirement 
is poetically resolved in mythology, since each figure in it is to be taken as 
that which it is, for precisely in this way is each also taken as that which it 
means or signifies. Meaning here is simultaneously being itself, passed 
over into the object itself and one with it. As soon as we allow these 
beings to mean or signify something, they themselves are no longer 
anything. Their reality is one with their ideality; that is, their idea, their 
concept is also destroyed to the extent that they are not conceived as 
actual. Their ultimate charm resides precisely in the fact that they, by 
simply being as they are without reference to anything else—absolute 
within themselves—simultaneously always allow the meaning itself to be 
dimly visible (Philosophy of Art, pp. 48-49). 
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The gods of mythology, on Schelling’s account, cannot be fully acknowledged through a 
language where concept and being, form and content, remain opposed; that is to say, we 
cannot understand mythology through the paradigm of any depth of meaning to be 
recovered. Already in this early text, Schelling suggests the existential line of thinking 
that will culminate in his positive philosophy and its interpretation of mythology: to 
philosophically engage with mythology, one must confront a destabilizing truth, a truth 
that encompasses modes of relating to ourselves and the world that can neither be fully 
integrated nor refused.  
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Conclusion: Magical Thinking 
 
 
As a result of these rites, the initiate himself becomes a link in that enchanted chain, he himself a 
Cabir, taken up into that indestructible nexus and, as an ancient inscription puts it, welcomed 
into the company of the higher gods. In this sense, we may call the Cabiri or their acolytes the 
inventers of those magical incantations that, as Socrates says, the child in us must always conjure 
up in order to be healed by them, annealed to the point where the child in us is liberated from the 
fear of death –Schelling, The Deities of Samothrace 
 
 
 
In approaching the relationship between the development of mythology and the 
development of consciousness in Schelling—or the convergent inheritance of an 
individual, a people and reality as such—it is useful to look at psychoanalysis as a 
therapeutic response to the same line of questioning: How does reality encompass the 
unconscious? It seems to me that the truth sought in Freudian psychoanalysis—a truth 
that can only be judged by its therapeutic effect—is indispensible in understanding 
Schelling’s philosophy of mythology: the reality of the unconscious, and the various and 
contradictory forms of subjectivity that constitute it, depends upon a transformative 
dimension of meaning. The histories of the gods, no less than the case histories of 
Freud’s analysands, open up disturbingly foreign (and thus potent) forms of subjectivity 
that remain at work in the mutual development of meaning and being. Myths are not just 
stories, they are profoundly and disturbingly our own—if we can let them mean what 
they say.  
I turn briefly to Freud’s Hungarian protégé, Sándor Ferenczi, as a concrete 
example of how psychoanalytic therapy depends upon language that remains open to and 
marked by these various modes of meaningful engagement. In First Contributions to 
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Psychoanalysis he suggests a series of developmental moments where the structures of 
the developing ego parallel the modes in which meaning can be created and appreciated. 
One such stage is “the period of magic thoughts and magic words”:  
Now conscious thought by means of speech signs is the highest 
accomplishment of the psychic apparatus, and alone makes adjustment to 
reality possible by retarding the reflex motor discharge and the release 
from unpleasantness. In spite of this the child knows how to preserve his 
feeling of omnipotence even in this stage of his development, for his 
wishes that can be set forth in thoughts are still so few and comparatively 
uncomplicated that the attentive entourage concerned with the child’s 
welfare easily manages to guess most of these thoughts. The mimic 
expressions that continually accompany thinking (peculiarly so with 
children) make this kind of thought-reading especially easy for the adults; 
and when the child actually formulates his wishes in words the entourage, 
ever ready to help, hastens to fulfill them as soon as possible. The child 
then thinks himself in possession of magic capacities, is thus in the period 
of magic thoughts and magic words…In superstition, magic, and in 
religious cults this belief in the irresistible power of certain prayer, 
cursing, or magic formulas, which one has only to think inwardly or only 
to speak aloud for them to work, plays an enormous part (p. 230). 
 
Ferenczi argues for a robust psychoanalytic reality by way of a productive, primal 
language; such a language reaches back to a nascent self-consciousness, suggesting that 
the individual emerges out of myriad efforts to make sense of and defend against the dual 
threats of engulfing union and castrating differentiation. Furthermore, I draw attention to 
this particular “magical” language insofar as it is essentially a form of playing with 
boundaries—the same kind of experience that recurs in the uncanny and the therapeutic 
(as well as in the aesthetic). For the child, we might say, such a phase is developmentally 
useful, if not necessary; and while behaving in such a manner might appear pathological 
in an adult, the process of renegotiating the limits of our agency and vulnerability in 
psychoanalytic therapy is in fact a re-appropriation of this creative, playful dimension of 
language.  
 230 
Schelling, in his philosophy of mythology, similarly returns language to its world-
creating capacities. That is, if we want to elucidate Schelling’s account of mythological 
meaning, we would do well to consider the concrete and mutual development of 
language, subject and world that psychoanalysis finds inextricably bound to fantasy and 
to the transitional more generally.  Though Schelling has been attacked as an obscurantist 
for suggesting that absolute truth defies conceptualization, I think this concern is 
misplaced; we need to ask, as psychoanalysis does, how it is that language does in fact 
give voice to repressed non-conceptual truths. We could say that language functions 
within psychoanalytic therapy in a manner much closer to the way it functions in 
mythology than in ordinary speech: speaking both reveals and conceals the historical and 
contradictory truths that constitute the subject. Language shows itself in its double 
aspect—as a tool for delimiting and defining our experience but also as a concrete 
manifestation of our sense of being a subject. In other words, the deceptive transparency 
of language echoes the more fundamentally deceptive transparency of self-consciousness. 
In ways intentional and not, the words we choose, like our actions and bearing in the 
world, encompass various modes of subjective experience. Free association is not the 
deterministic manner in which the unconscious speaks, but an activity that brings into 
relief these oscillations between various stages of self-understanding that constitute our 
subjectivity. Tempted by the solidity of words, and before that by the clear outlines of our 
bodies, we erroneously imagine that knowledge—and self-knowledge along with it—
must be unchanging, self-identical and rational.  
Schelling’s provocative claim that mythology means what it is, is importantly 
related to Freud’s discovery that hysterical symptoms are memories. For Schelling, we 
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saw that the symbol binds together being and meaning, cause and existence. Equally, 
Freud discovers that how symptoms mean is inextricably connected to what they mean. 
For instance, bodily manifestations are not only and not primarily a representation of 
intolerable conflicts (what they mean), but also a defensive regression to a different mode 
of subjectivity that understands itself as bodily (how they mean). As with Schelling’s 
theory of mythology, meaning is not concealed within the symptom. “Interpreting” a 
symptom, for Freud, is something other than “translating” it into a more refined, 
scientific language; meaning is created between life and language, between our being and 
the thought of our being.206 It is not merely the particular unconscious wish/es that are 
manifested in the symptom, but also the mode of self-consciousness, irreducible to 
conceptual terms, through which and by which the symptom appears. Similarly for 
Schelling, it is the self-consciousness of a people—their sense of reality—that is 
essentially preserved as mythology. To interpret a symptom—or a mythology—is to 
gather together our various modes of relating self and world in new, more fulfilling ways. 
Schelling’s lectures on mythology are a rethinking of history in terms of the pathological. 
Destabilizing the relationship between being and meaning, and in an effort to engage with 
the crisis mythology attests to, Schelling develops a therapeutic approach: mythology 
threatens us with the intimation of our shared, conflicted beginnings, but in doing so 
offers the possibility of renewed health and individuality. Mythology reveals itself as the 
symptom of a primordial anxiety, as a defense against and eruption of temporality and 
differentiation for an essentially traumatized subjectivity.  
                                                       
206 See Jonathan Lear, Love and Its Place in Nature: A Philosophical Interpretation of Freudian 
Psychoanalysis (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1990). 
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If we view Freud’s project as a philosophy of therapy, concerned with the way 
meaning affects our very being, then approaching Schelling’s reading of mythology as an 
interpretation of a symptom does not seem so far-fetched. As Freud writes, “linguistic 
usage, then, employs the word…symptom when a function has undergone some unusual 
change or when a new phenomenon has arisen out of it” (“Inhibitions, Symptoms and 
Anxiety”, p. 3/SE Vol. XX p. 87). Mythology would thus be a symptom insofar as 
consciousness itself develops a new form of expression and embodiment through it. 
Schelling, like Freud, defines a people and an individual in light of their pathology—and 
subjectivity becomes a negotiation between the threat of an immersive unity on the one 
hand, and of alienating separation on the other.  
I hope that by framing Freudian interpretation as a form of historicizing 
subjectivity, and in bringing this to bear on Schelling’s philosophy of mythology, we can 
begin to sketch out what a Schellingian therapy might look like. Schelling’s lectures on 
mythology ask to be read in this way, his proximity to Freud showing up even in his 
locating mythology—as Freud does with psychoanalysis—outside of the opposition 
between science and art. In Schelling’s lectures mythology is a defense and a therapeutic 
effort—a reaction to and repetition of the anxiety concomitant with creation and 
differentiation. This appeal to an originary anxiety might help provide ontological 
grounding for separation anxiety, on the societal and individual levels, that Freud 
assumes are repetitions of a purely physiological overstimulation. Instead, as mythology 
arises in Schelling from a primordial cision, from the unprethinkable transition into 
languages and peoples, so does the Freudian symptom conceal and express the trauma of 
individuation (echoes of which resonate in the anxieties of birth, castration, and death).  
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In order to flesh out the nature of this “ontological” anxiety, I cite Freud in 
“Inhibition, Symptom and Anxiety,” where he reverses a foundational psychoanalytic 
view of clinical anxiety:  
The anxiety belonging to the animal phobias was an untransformed fear of 
castration. It was therefore a realistic fear, a fear of a danger which was 
actually impending or was judged to be a real one. It was anxiety which 
produced repression and not, as I formerly believed, repression which 
produced anxiety…it is always the ego’s attitude of anxiety which is the 
primary thing and which sets repression going (SE Vol. XX, pp. 108-109). 
 
Notice the strange emphasis on the “realistic” nature of the danger of castration—a 
danger we might want to banish to the realm of “fantasy.” Anxiety, Freud now realizes, is 
powerful enough to produce repression—to authenticate and delimit reality, or rather, to 
alert us to its inherent instability. Such a constitutive instability is corroborated in the 
same work, as Freud articulates the trauma this anxiety signals as loss: 
The statement I have just made, to the effect that the ego has been 
prepared to expect castration by having undergone constantly repeated 
object-losses, places the question of anxiety in a new light. We have 
hitherto regarded it as an affective signal of danger; but now, since the 
danger is so often one of castration, it appears to us as a reaction to a loss, 
to a separation (“Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety”, SE Vol. XX, p. 
130, my italics). 
 
The danger Freud concerns himself with here is not merely the loss of a particular object 
or satisfaction, but the loss of the sense of reality through which object and satisfaction 
became meaningful.207 
With this deeper sense of separation in mind, and what this may suggest about the 
connection between trauma and subjectivity, we can better approach the symptom in its 
peculiar fixation on the past: the desire for a lost unity, which the symptom feigns to 
                                                       
207 See: “Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis,” SE Vol. XIX pp. 183-190. 
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recuperate, also signals an underlying terror of futurity and the overwhelming openness 
of historical processes.  The pathological repetition that symptom and mythology share 
serves to foreclose the danger of otherness, to conceal the abyssal freedom that 
constitutes an individual and a people as historical. And yet as efforts to bind this 
“separation anxiety” within the limits of symbol and narrative, the myth is always also a 
real trace of the trauma that makes the pre-historical, pre-egoic past interpretable again. 
Therapeutic engagement with symptoms, then, is effective only insofar as it returns us to 
the formlessness of anxiety that the symptom, in its contained particularity, would deny. 
Schelling insists that in reading mythology we are not recovering some concealed truth: 
the interpretation of mythology demands a re-appropriation—a reliving—of the trauma 
that continues to threaten our stability and to spur our development. If mythology is both 
the history and the enactment of an emerging consciousness, this is because 
consciousness itself is a symptom of irreducible, conflicting desires for union and 
separation, for projection and identification, revelation and concealment. In Schelling’s 
example of the successive polytheism of the Greeks—from Uranus through Kronos to 
Zeus—we find a literal expression of Freud’s psychic processes of development: the 
vomiting up of the son is the primordial projection or creation, the swallowing a bodily 
identification, and castration a physical separation. History—or the development of the 
individual through trauma and anxiety—is a working out of the boundaries between 
being and meaning, between the physical and the psychical. 
When history and consciousness are conceived of in this way, the pre-historical 
and the unconscious need to be understood as essentially without boundary; anxiety 
arises in the excess of an undifferentiated totality that is always also an unbearable need, 
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a self-seeking. This need, which Freud calls the wish, is the contradictory essence of the 
unconscious. The wish is directed at eliminating difference—the tension between desire 
and satisfaction—but the wish is itself the primal division. This central conflict that 
defines the unconscious, this struggle between non-differentation and separation that is 
already there in the wish, is transformed into the symptoms of an individual and the 
mythology of a people. Indeed, the very fact that there is mythology means that the 
unconscious continues to exist within higher levels of organization, that the pre-historical 
remains vital to the historical. For psychoanalysis, this means that the goal of therapy 
would be the “new development” of a function—of language and of consciousness—for 
acknowledging our most ancient and unrecognizable subjectivity. The temptation here is 
to imagine that there are unconscious “thoughts” that are identical to their potentially 
conscious counterparts, only temporarily or contingently inaccessible. But it is more 
fitting to say that symptoms—as symbols of conflict both within unconscious wishes and 
between varying levels of psychic organization—express a primal form of subjectivity. 
Psychoanalytic therapy is the process of individuation achieved through a return to more 
primitive forms of relating to ourselves and to reality. Psychoanalysis thus comes ever 
closer to the role Schelling gives philosophy in his lectures on mythology: the living 
force of the unconscious is essential to self- transformation or to becoming an authentic 
individual. And individuality is here understood as the health of the subject. It is a 
permeability and ambivalence rooted in our primal modes of responding to the world and 
making it our own.  
Schelling’s account of the meaning of mythology suggests a similar notion of 
healthy regression, of a method of self-narration and a notion of history that opens truth 
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into the archaic.208 Mythology is the truthful expression of a people, the intimate self-
reflection of the birth and development of consciousness from the unconscious. This is in 
fact quite close to Lear’s explanation of cathartic regression in psychoanalysis: the 
symptomatic return to infantile activities that initially constructed the boundaries between 
self and reality, processes like projection and identification, also embody a primitive 
theory of selfhood or subjectivity. Therapeutic interpretation is an attunement to the 
subjectivity these meaningful expressions belong to. Schelling’s interpretation of 
mythology is thus therapeutic because it brings us into contact with the beginnings of 
subjectivity and our most tenacious, founding fantasy: that the past remains fixed behind 
us, ensuring the self-certainty of presence and the continued familiarity of the future. But 
in reading mythology in this way, as a symptom that expresses conflicted desires, 
Schelling also exposes us to the disintegrative danger of interpretation—to a 
confrontation with the lack that existence disguises and the grounding anxiety that 
consciousness harbors within itself. 
Acting as signal and disguise, a memory that is also a forgetting, mythology 
shares the dual structure of the symptom—at once evidence of a deeper illness and the 
first painful step towards a cure.209 And it is because mythology is divided in this way 
that its interpretation must be more than an explanation of its emergence—its history 
                                                       
208 See Markus Gabriel’s essay “The Mythological Being of Reflection” in Mythology, Madness and 
Laughter for a sustained and fruitful discussion of the central role of mythology in Schelling and for a 
provocative distinction between constitutive and regulative mythology (p. 66). 
209 At the metaphysical level, mythologizing is thus a form of cure for certain Kantian limitations. Goudeli 
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unity of the history of becoming” (p. 124). 
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more than the inert result of what came before. Early on Freud recognizes that merely 
explaining the significance of a symptom to its sufferer does not succeed therapeutically; 
its meaning must be grasped by the analysand in a particular way—it must become his 
own.210 The insufficiency of merely “giving” the meaning of a symptom in therapeutic 
practice suggests two related ramifications that apply to Schelling’s reading of 
mythology: 1) a symptom is more than the effect of discrete events that lead to its 
formation and 2) in order for it to be therapeutic, an interpretation requires more than 
explanation. The symptom (and the interpretation of it) not only belong to a subjectivity 
which, by its very nature, is historical; it is also the case that the form the symptom takes 
is itself a mode—albeit a regressive one—of historicizing; it is an expression of a 
subjectivity that goes through the trauma of temporalization, a coagulation of primal 
anxiety that shapes the past and protects us from the alterity of the future. The symptom 
is duplicitous once more—simultaneously a narration of and defense against the past. 
Such strange expression betrays the anxiety at the heart of mythology—a history of 
emergence that also is the emergence of history.  
Insofar as mythology is a memory of temporalization itself, it cannot simply 
belong to the past. It is rather like the symptom, which only appears external to the 
subjectivity it disturbs. Indeed, it is the peculiarity of being experienced by the sufferer as 
an alien, meaningless affliction that marks the inhibition or perversion of a function as a 
symptom. In order to relieve the symptom, the sufferer must approach it as a mode of 
self-understanding. Thus psychoanalytic treatment, no less than Schelling’s interpretation 
of mythology, requires a certain vulnerability: a re-opening of the borders of subjectivity 
so that we might come to acknowledge the symptom as our own, as a meaningful 
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expression of the foreignness and familiarity of the past. Schelling maintains that truly 
engaging with mythology demands disintegration—a depth of questioning that extends to 
our most fundamental sense of the limits of self and world.  Such interpretive 
vulnerability does not necessarily signal the corrosion of illness or psychosis: to interpret 
mythology as a symptom is also to light up the world and our subjectivity in a particular 
way—to develop a sensitivity to and reverence for the uncanniness of existence. In this 
way, Schelling’s interpretation of mythology inaugurates a radical rethinking of what it 
means for something to be true. Mythology draws us into the reciprocity of subject and 
interpretation, returning us to the therapeutic unity between our being and the sense we 
make of it.  
 At this point, where existence and interpretation converge, I would like to make 
some concluding remarks concerning an essential Schellingian theme that might seem to 
have only a limited place in the scope of this dissertation: the imagination. The kind of 
truth that I have tried to suggest is bound up with psychoanalysis and with Schelling’s 
philosophy—and furthermore the possibility of becoming available to such a truth—has 
everything to do with a certain conception of creative imagination or fantasy, and 
particularly in regards to self-understanding. If I have tended to use these terms 
interchangeably, and focused more on fantasy, I would like to take the time now to 
defend that choice. The ambiguity that characterizes imagination in the Kantian tradition, 
between passivity (receptivity) and activity (productivity), is maintained in the Freudian 
use of fantasy; furthermore, both imagination (Einbildung) and fantasy (Phantasie) can 
suggest a paradoxically immaterial materiality. That is, the language denotes the brute 
physicality of a picture (Bild) or appearance (from the Greek phantasia), while at the 
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same time gesturing at the difference between what is emphatically real and what is 
merely imagined. That is, imagination is differentiated from sensation on account of the 
absence of an empirical object, but is itself an activity of bringing to presence. As John 
Sallis puts it so succinctly in The Gathering of Reason, 
Consequently, imagination as the power of intuiting an object without its 
presence, of intuiting an absent object, involves making present something 
which is and remains in another regard absent. Even at this elementary 
level imagination inaugurates a certain play of presence and absence, a 
gathering into presence. And because it makes something present, 
imagination cannot be merely passive (as sense is); it is an active stem 
within sensibility, within passivity in general. Inaugurating a play of 
presence and absence, imagination installs itself as a play of activity and 
passivity, as activity within passivity (p. 147). 
  
Sallis’s reading of the Kantian imagination is of course compatible with Heidegger’s 
remarks in his Kantbuch, where the latter emphasizes the creative power and ambivalent 
space of the imagination in terms of the formation of “the horizon of objectivity as such” 
(p. 138).212 It is worth noting, however, that Heidegger immediately goes on to point out 
that while the imagination can be productive in this sense, it is so only with respect to the 
production of a “possible object” and that the realization of such an object is “never 
accomplished by the imagination itself” (p.137). Given Sallis’s point about the play of 
the imagination between presence and absence, however, the very notion of production—
of relating possibility to its realization—must be revisited. Indeed, this is precisely the 
space in which Schelling developed his account of intellectual intuition: while 
imagination cannot by itself will a particular empirical object into existence, this does not 
exclude the possibility of a self-productive subject. If we take seriously the idea that there 
is no “objective” reality beneath our meaningful engagements with it, a claim I have 
                                                       
212 Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (Forgotten Books, 2012). 
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suggested that both Schelling and Freud put forth in their own manners, this productive 
imagination would have some far-reaching consequences.  
So while I would not want to collapse imagination into fantasy, my preference for 
the latter term in large part derives from its unique place in psychoanalysis. That is, I 
believe we are better able to grasp Schelling’s account of the productive imagination as a 
departure from the Kantian tradition—as an activity that weaves together the potencies of 
nature with the personalities of man and God—if we think of it in terms of the 
unconscious. In contemporary English usage, imagination tends to be tied up with 
conscious creativity while fantasy, in large part due to our Freudian inheritance, connotes 
the unconscious desires, complexes and forms of thinking and feeling that put pressure on 
familiar narrative arcs and traditional logical and temporal structures. Whereas the 
freedom of the Kantian imagination is generally reduced to a certain form of schematic 
“spontaneity” that is organized and subdued through the understanding, Schelling 
confronts us with the uncanny aspect of imagination—which I call fantasy—and its 
vulnerable, excessive freedom. 
So while much important work has been (and I’m sure will continue to be) done 
on the philosophy of imagination—including an interrogation of the ambivalence 
between the appearance and that which appears, unity and multiplicity, passivity and 
activity—my own contribution in this project has a slightly different, though hardly 
unrelated, emphasis.214 My interest in the convergence of Schelling’s metaphysics and 
Freudian psychoanalysis concerns the uncanny space of the boundary—and insofar as 
                                                       
214 To name just a few: John Sallis, The Gathering of Reason. (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 2005); Double Truth. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995); The Logic of 
Imagination: The Expanse of the Elemental. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012). Richard 
Kearney, The Wake of Imagination: Towards a Post-Modern Culture (New York: Routledge, 1998); 
Poetics of Imagining: Modern to Post-Modern (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998). 
 241 
this boundary, like the truth that it embodies, ought to remain non-objective, it would 
confuse the matter to introduce the problematic of the image as such and, furthermore, to 
assume the unified subject that the Kantian Einbildung can imply. In the German, 
Einbildung suggests a process of unification/formation that, I would say, threatens to 
conceal the equally powerful process of dislocation/dissolution that is as much at the 
heart of the ambivalent reality I have tried to develop here. Indeed, as Kyriaki Goudeli 
points out in Challenges to German Idealism, the Kantian imagination that Schelling 
takes up and rearticulates can be seen to run aground on precisely this point: 
Furthermore, the requirement of the static, formal identity of the self 
excludes the possibility of dreams, visions, or any states where the subject 
does not recognize in them its continuing and absolutely same ego—in 
fact, states which, as will be seen in the following chapters, may lead to 
even deeper levels of self-consciousness. Instead, according to Kant, these 
states do not count at all as synthesized representations but as mere 
ineffable glances, and ultimately as irrational ones; the formal unity of the 
self excludes the possibility of any sense of break, loss or change of its 
pure abiding identity (p. 31)  
 
The advantage in working with the concept of fantasy, then, comes in part from the 
broader psychoanalytic implementation of a subjectivity grounded in dislocation—in 
precisely those moments of break, loss and “ineffable glances” that Kant could not or 
would not contend with. Indeed, Freud’s wide-ranging applications of the term “fantasy” 
speak to its dual capacity to cover over and let be seen the disruptions that constitute and 
disturb identity—to speak and to withhold the truth and to reconfigure and bring to light 
the limits between self and world. The acknowledgment of unconscious fantasies, no less 
than the interpretation of dreams, is an act of creativity; the fantasies are not there fully 
formed, to be retrieved and put aside, but exist as a negotiation of the limit between what 
we have been and how we choose to be—or, as Kant might have put it, as a decision that 
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lies outside of time. Fantasy, as Freud reminds us, is the ineradicable root and motor of 
memory and perception. Fantasy is thus the act of self/world-constitution, at the most 
concrete level, while imagination was so for Kant only theoretically. 
With respect to this essentially liminal, uncanny character of fantasy, where 
spatio-temporal reality confronts its Other, Kristeva writes in Time and Sense:  
The fantasy makes the unconscious into a narrative. As a result, when the 
outside-time of the unconscious is named and recounted, it acquires a 
meaning, a goal, and a value. The fantasy, along with the dream narrative, 
becomes a narration torn between the atemporality of the unconscious and 
the forward-moving flight of the story. The fantasy is the novel that Freud 
asked his patients to bring him. As opposed to the neurotic, who is afraid 
and ashamed of his fantasies, and the pervert, who acts them out 
meticulously without being disturbed by what they mean, the analysand is 
invited to do with words what the pervert does with things (and with 
people who are reduced to mere things). He is invited to stage his 
unconscious…[t]he fantasy is at the boundary between the outside-time 
space of the unconscious (which threatens to consume it by depriving it of 
words in order to direct it toward drives and acts) and the haste of 
narration (which is the hero’s seduction of his victim and narrator’s 
seduction of his addressee) (The Portable Kristeva, p. 130). 
 
Kristeva locates fantasy as a temporalizing moment—as that which appears only in its 
resistance to the conceptual framing through which it is realized. Its therapeutic import 
derives as much from the empathetic collaboration between analyst and analysand—their 
mutual production—as it does from its value in developing a personal, interpretive rubric.  
My intention is thus not to disavow the role of the imagination, in either Schelling or 
Freud, but rather to insist on a reading that focuses more precisely on its therapeutic and 
even existential possibilities. The connection between freedom and fantasy that I have 
attempted to draw out of Freud in particular, our ability to acknowledge the fluidity of 
our past and to rearticulate our founding prophecies, depends upon a conception of a 
subject whose truth is not concealed in or deluded by fantasy, but rather enlivened and 
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continually renewed by it. For Schelling as well, the redemptive and tragic possibilities of 
personality are dependent upon our availability to a radically non-objective truth: to a 
hopeful, albeit insecure, self-knowledge. This strong sense of freedom—a belief in 
authentic self-creation—is in no way a naïve, Romantic artifact but remains essential to 
any genuinely philosophical account of the reality and experience of subjectivity.  
 Indeed, the emphasis on mythology and tragedy can be seen as not only naïve but, 
in fact, quite dangerous: looking to Nietzsche’s project in The Birth of Tragedy, which in 
many ways articulates the convergence of Schelling’s and Freud’s thought, and therein 
the convergence of the sublime and the uncanny, we remember the threatening aspect of 
inaugurating or recalling the mythology of a people.  I would suggest, however, that we 
would do well to remember Heidegger’s appropriation of Hölderlin’s line from Patmos 
here: “But where danger is/grows the saving power also”.216  That is, I believe that both 
Freud and Schelling rely on a cure that always also endangers us—that disintegration, 
evil and illness are necessary moments of freedom, goodness and health. Salvation, no 
less than damnation, is subject to finitude. As Nietzsche tells us so succinctly, the 
Dionysian is in no way fully separable from the Apollinian—our identity is inextricably 
linked to our utter diffusion, form and reason bound to chaos and desire.217  
 To return briefly to Freud, this precarious balance between reason and desire is 
perhaps best approached through his late, and relatively obscure paper “The Loss of 
                                                       
216 Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, p. 34. Trans. William Lovitt 
(New York: Harper Perennial, 1977). 
217 “Of this foundation of all existence—the Dionysian basic ground of the world—not one whit more may 
enter the consciousness of the human individual than can be overcome again by his Apollinian power of 
transfiguration. Thus these two art drives must unfold their powers in a strict proportion, according to the 
law of eternal justice. Where the Dionysian powers rise up as impetuously as we experience them now, 
Apollo, too, must already have descended among us, wrapped in a cloud; and the next generation will 
probably behold his most ample beautiful effects” (p. 144). Friedrich Nietzsche, Basic Writings of 
Nietzsche. Ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Modern Library, 2000). 
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Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis” (1924).218 Insofar as we have, along with Loewald, 
suggested that there is a certain neurotic restraint at work in Freud’s metapsychology, it is 
perhaps worthwhile to address the role of psychosis in expanding the psychoanalytic 
worldview. While I do not want to collapse the Apollinian into the neurotic, nor the 
Dionysian into the psychotic, it is still useful to understand the ways in which these are 
always and everywhere intertwined—the ways in which, that is, reality itself must be 
comprised of both psychotic and neurotic elements. Freud writes in this paper, “Both 
neurosis and psychosis are thus the expression of a rebellion on the part of the id against 
the external world, of its unwillingness—or, if one prefers, its incapacity—to adapt itself 
to the exigencies of reality, to Ananke [Necessity]” (p. 185). Notably, Freud’s language 
here becomes tragic, as he argues that the necessity characterizing reality is 
fundamentally at odds with the wild freedom of the id. The dichotomy between neurosis 
and psychosis that in a sense stabilizes his metapsychology is undone, as Freud 
recognizes that the irreducible alterity of the id cannot but expand and disturb the order of 
reality.  
What I would really like to point to, however, is not so much the contrast between 
“id” and “reality”, or “freedom” and “necessity”, that is expressed in neurotic and 
psychotic formations but rather what Freud understands by the “loss of reality”. My sense 
is that Schelling’s understanding of freedom, of the choice between good and evil, in 
large part rests on a similar conception of reality lost and gained. One way to view this 
loss is in terms of limits that define truth and fantasy, inner and outer, self and other; 
rather than any particular aspect of reality that might be distorted, denied and replaced, 
the loss of reality indicates an utter vulnerability and disintegration that indeed 
                                                       
218 Sigmund Freud, SE Vol. XIX, pp. 182-187. 
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characterizes the psychotic that suffers from it. While Freud struggles to maintain a 
reality that lies apart from the threat of its dissolution or transformation, Schelling allows 
us a way to shore up this reality precisely because of this threat. If we look back at 
Schelling’s account of evil and love in the Freiheitsschrift, we see that it is only in the 
pulsation of disintegration and creation, in the letting go of limits in order to realize them 
more fully, that love can manifest itself. In other words, it is only in loosening our grip on 
reality that we come closest to its truth. To cite Nietzsche again, the great thinker of 
psychotic reality, 
He beholds the transfigured world of the stage and nevertheless denies it. 
He sees the tragic hero before him in epic clearness and beauty, and 
nevertheless rejoices in his annihilation. He comprehends the action deep 
down, and yet likes to flee into the incomprehensible. He feels the actions 
of the hero to be justified, and is nevertheless still more elated when these 
actions annihilate their agent. He shudders at the sufferings which will 
befall the hero, and yet anticipates in them a higher, much more 
overpowering joy. He sees more extensively and profoundly than ever, 
and yet wishes he were blind (The Birth of Tragedy, p. 131).   
 
It is in holding together impinging presence with the equally powerful and disruptive 
withdrawal that we glimpse reality. This is the essence of tragic vision, Nietzsche tells us, 
that can take seriously the world of necessity and appearance while simultaneously 
embracing its impermanence:  
Those who have never had the experience of having to see at the same 
time that they also longed to transcend all seeing will scarcely be able to 
imagine how definitely and clearly these two processes coexist and are felt 
at the same time, as one contemplates the tragic myth (p. 140). 
 
One of my hopes for this project is that it might gesture at how the intimacy between 
freedom and evil in Schelling, and between therapy and trauma in Freud, remains 
relevant to current and impending crises in philosophy.  Particularly in light of the ways 
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in which science and philosophy appear at odds in the modern academy, and yet so 
clearly converge again in areas of research like neuroscience and phenomenology, 
questions of how the unconscious and our experience of self come together are more 
pertinent than ever. Part of what becomes apparent here is a much-needed reevaluation of 
the dichotomy between the subjective and the objective (which is so easily reified in the 
opposition between the “humanities” and the “sciences”). That is, as I have tried to 
suggest, Schelling and Freud teach us to expand our ideas of “objectivity” to include 
modes of experience that require a different form of knowledge—a knowledge more 
dependent on empathetic engagement, hope, despair and vulnerability; and on developing 
a certain sensitivity to the uncanny, the mythological, the psychotic and the sublime. If 
the trend has been for academics to focus on narrower and narrower issues within the 
history of philosophy, I will consider it no small contribution to return to the “big” 
questions and concerns that might yet reach beyond professional journals and university 
classrooms.  
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